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While much scholarly attention has been paid to deliberation as a set of procedures used to achieve
democratic goals of individual autonomy and mutually beneficial policy outcomes, few studies have
asked to what extent contemporary American society resembles a deliberative democracy. In order to
assess the prospects for deliberative democracy, everyday political conversation, its influences and its
consequences are examined. The dissertation establishes a “reasonable ideal” of deliberation by which a
democracy may be judged. The reasonable ideal has five elements: conversation, disagreement,
information, the common interest, and the accommodation of uncertainty. Results show that American
democracy is deliberative in some ways but not in others. Political conversation is disproportionately the
pastime of the elite, and discussion across lines of difference, an essential element of deliberation, is
extremely rare. Contrary to the assumptions of deliberative theory, conversation produces an increase in
the belief that citizens are motivated by self-interest. However, the discussions that occur do succeed in
producing learning and reducing uncertainty about political issues. While media use serves deliberative
ends by spurring some to discuss politics and providing information, it also increases the likelihood that
others will view political discussion as unpleasantly argumentative. News media thus encourage
deliberation for some and discourage it for others.
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ABSTRACT
DELIBERATION IN PRACTICE:
DELIBERATIVE THEORY, NEWS MEDIA, AND POLITICAL CONVERSATION
Paul Waldman
Kathleen Hall Jamieson

While much scholarly attention has been paid to deliberation as a set o f procedures used
to achieve democratic goals o f individual autonomy and mutually beneficial policy
outcomes, few studies have asked to what extent contemporary American society
resembles a deliberative democracy. In order to assess the prospects for deliberative
democracy, everyday political conversation, its influences and its consequences are
examined. The dissertation establishes a “reasonable ideal” o f deliberation by which a
democracy may be judged. The reasonable ideal has five elements: conversation,
disagreement, information, the common interest, and the accommodation o f uncertainty.
Results show that American democracy is deliberative in some ways but not in others.
Political conversation is disproportionately the pastime o f the elite, and discussion across
lines o f difference, an essential element o f deliberation, is extremely rare. Contrary to the
assumptions o f deliberative theory, conversation produces an increase in the belief that
citizens are motivated by self-interest. However, the discussions that occur do succeed in
producing learning and reducing uncertainty about political issues. While media use
serves deliberative ends by spurring some to discuss politics and providing information, it
also increases the likelihood that others will view political discussion as unpleasantly
argumentative. News media thus encourage deliberation for some and discourage it for
others.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

We shall never know and can never imagine to what degree newspapers have
transformed, both enriched and leveled, unified in space and diversified in time, the
conversations o f individuals, even those who do not read papers but who, talking to those
who do. are fo rced to fo llo w the groove o f their borrowed thoughts. One pen suffices to
set o ff a thousand tongues.
Gabriel Tarde, Opinion and Conversation (1898)

In most circles it is hard work to sustain conversation on a political theme; and once
initiated, it is quickly dismissed with a yawn. Let there be introduced the topic o f the
mechanism and accomplishment o f various makes o f motor cars or the respective merits
o f actresses, and the dialogue goes on at a lively pace.
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (1927)

Dewey's lament rings true today. While public and private spaces vibrate with
conversations about celebrities and sensational crime stories, political matters capture
universal attention only sporadically. Politics, it seems, is not something we discuss in
polite company. To the newspapers o f Tarde's nineteenth-century France we have added
television, radio, and the internet, but pens, along with transmitters and keyboards, appear
limited in their ability to set o ff tongues when it comes to politics.
Recent years have seen a proliferation o f scholarship on the idea o f public
deliberation. Political decision-making, it is argued, is best carried out through a
discursive process where participants explore issues, offer arguments, and advance
toward decisions together. In a deliberative system, politics occurs through talk. While
many discussions o f deliberation concentrate on small groups with decision-making
authority, the notion that deliberation could or should occur on a mass scale is often
implied and occasionally stated.

1
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The purpose o f this study is to offer a theoretical model o f citizen deliberation,
then assess the degree to which the everyday political conversation that takes place lives
up to that deliberative standard. It is easy to establish an impossible ideal, then dismiss
the American citizenry as woefully inadequate to the task. Political theory is rich with
unrealistic expectations; my intention is not to measure reality against perfection, but
instead to determine whether political conversation, in both its causes and effects, meets a
more practical set o f goals to which a contemporary democracy might aspire.
In order to do so, I will specify a "reasonable ideal" o f deliberation. Theorists
often describe an "ideal" as a device to establish the specific characteristics o f democratic
practice. Unfortunately, theory often gets bogged down in the particulars o f the ideal and
ignores the actual conditions that determine what is possible. In the end, reality falls
short o f the ideal. Consequently, I propose the reasonable ideal as a more practical
evaluative tool, one that asks whether deliberation is achievable within current
institutional structures, whether current practice advances (as opposed to realizes)
democratic goals, and whether deliberation is compatible with pre-existing capabilities
and dispositions. The issue is not whether our democracy can satisfy all the various
requirements o f true deliberation, because plainly, it cannot. Instead, the issue is to what
extent the political life o f the American citizenry can be considered deliberative at all.
In a large society, the functioning o f deliberation will be determined in significant
part by the discourse delivered to the citizenry through the news media. If media nurture
deliberation, it may flourish; if they act to discourage it, it will be absent. As Craig
Calhoun (1992) writes, “A public sphere adequate to a democratic polity depends upon
both quality o f discourse and quantity o f participation.” I will analyze the quality o f
2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mediated discourse in order to determine whether it offers citizens the kinds o f
information they need in order to deliberate. I will also examine the quantity o f
participation in the particular form o f political discussion, for without a citizenry actively
engaged in political conversation, democracy is hollow. The extent to which that
conversation lives up to a deliberative standard provides a good measure o f whether it is
"just talk." or rather functions as a crucial element o f democratic practice.
Throughout this dissertation I will use the terms “‘political conversation" and
"political discussion” interchangeably to refer to any and all occasions when two or more
people talk about political matters. While there may be a variety o f dynamics that occur
in conversation - for instance, political discussions between two people may differ in
systematic ways from discussions involving three or m ore - for the present study we will
consider all political conversations together.
I will argue that while there are ways in which everyday conversation resembles
deliberation, in other critical respects it does not. Furthermore, conversation may in some
cases not only fail to be deliberative but actually undermine deliberative goals. Likewise,
the news media, which have a central role in enabling deliberation to occur, can serve to
inhibit some citizens from engaging with one another in the search for solutions to
political problems.

What is deliberation?
Although this question has been answered in a num ber o f ways, common
elements emerge from the body o f literature on deliberation. To begin, let us define

3
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deliberation as reasoned discussion among equals about public issues with the goal o f
ascertaining the best course o f action to pursue in order to optimize the common good.
The idea o f reasoned discourse amounts to a first principle o f deliberation. As
Joshua Cohen (1989) put it, “Deliberation is reasoned in that the parties to it are required
to state their reasons for advancing proposals, supporting or criticizing them. They give
reasons with the expectation that those reasons (and not, for example, power) will settle
the fate o f the proposal." Each argument must be supported by some evidence or
justification. The presentation and critique o f these reasons will constitute the bulk o f the
discussion. The second principle is that all participants in the discussion will be equal.
No member, by virtue o f social position or any other criterion, will be afforded more
opportunity to speak than any other. Nor will any member be exempt from any o f the
other requirements. While there may be inequalities among people that have
consequences for the discussion (for instance, differences in knowledge or eloquence), all
will have identical privileges and responsibilities within the deliberation. Next, the
discussion will concern public issues, and the best course o f action to be pursued. Only
those issues in which the state, or citizens acting collectively, have some role will be at
issue. Furthermore, the discussion takes place with the understanding that some action
will be taken (or not taken). The ultimate purpose o f the discussion is to arrive at a
decision, whether that decision results in action by the participants themselves or their
representatives. As a consequence, a central feature o f deliberation will be attempts by
the participants to persuade one another (Bessette, 1994). Finally, the discussion
concerns the common good. The quality o f potential outcomes is judged not by their
effects on the individual participants, but on the larger collectivity.
4

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Why deliberate?
There are three general benefits o f public deliberation, none o f which is beyond
question, but each o f which offers a compelling argument in favor o f a deliberative
democracy. Although some authors (e.g. Christiano, 1997) have offered slightly different
justifications, there is a great deal o f overlap among deliberative theories. Citizen
deliberation, as opposed to the formal deliberative procedures operating within an
institution such as a legislature, presents a unique but related set o f problems. In the
abstract, however, the benefits o f deliberation are common to both, although their
prospects for realization differ.
The first benefit o f deliberation as a core element o f democratic practice is that it
incorporates fundamental democratic ideals, and thus makes good on the democratic
promise. Among these are citizen participation (if the people are to rule, then they must
be involved in the decision-making process in some way) and equality (just as each
citizen has an equal vote, each has an equal opportunity to participate in debate). The
degree to which citizen deliberation actually displays these ideals is perhaps the thorniest
question confronting the advocate o f deliberative democracy.
The second benefit is that the process o f civic deliberation transforms the
participants. In the simplest terms, the citizen should be 1) reasonably well-informed; 2)
able and willing to participate in the democratic discussion; and 3) motivated at least in
part by a desire to advance the common good. The process o f deliberation has the
potential to transform individuals into citizens on each count. First, all political
conversation, even that which is not strictly deliberative, has the potential to enhance
political knowledge as facts and arguments are shared. Second, like any participatory
5
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process, each positive episode o f participation enables and encourages the following one.
Third, participation in a discussion about the common good exposes one to facts and
arguments about the interests o f others and the larger polity to which one might not have
had access previously, and requires the person who would persuade to frame her
arguments in common terms and build from shared assumptions. Thus the citizen must
find public reasons for her private views. In the process, those views may change, or at
the very least expand to include the interests o f others. As a consequence, deliberation
not only produces (as opposed to merely articulating) the common will (Warren, 1992),
but cultivates within each citizen a will based on the common good.
Like other forms o f participation, deliberation builds political efficacy, “the belief
that one can be self-governing, and confidence in one’s ability to participate responsibly
and effectively” (Pateman, 1970). The process is, o f course, a reciprocal one; efficacy
encourages participation, which in turn strengthens efficacy (Almond & Verba, 1965).
Ultimately, deliberation enables one to achieve autonomy, the necessary characteristic of
the self-governing citizen. As Mark Warren (1992) describes it, “individuals are
autonomous if their preferences, goals, and life plans are not the result o f manipulation,
brainwashing, unthinking obedience, or reflexive acceptance o f ascribed roles but, rather,
a result o f their examining and evaluating wants, needs, desires, values, roles, and
commitments.” While we may leave to others the work o f gathering information and
arguments, we can develop autonomy only through our own participation (Barber, 1984).
Further, the advocate o f expansive democracy argues that autonomy is itself social; only
through the process o f deliberating with others can we identify the myriad ways in which
our well-being is entwined with that o f our fellow citizens.
6
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A final transformative justification for deliberation is that citizenship, i.e.
engagement with the other members o f the polity in determining and bringing about the
progress and improvement o f society, is not merely a way o f safeguarding our interests or
o f contributing to the betterment o f society, but an essential element o f the good life.
Politics, and one's engagement in it. is not only a means to an end but an end in itself.
According to Hannah Arendt (1959), we do not merely pursue our private goals in the
public realm, but take on an entirely different set o f goals. John Stuart Mill (1966) too
argued that citizenship forces one to consider the welfare o f others, whereby one learns
and grows. As Rousseau wrote in The Social Contract (1987), when a man becomes a
citizen. “His faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are broadened, his feelings
are ennobled, his entire soul is elevated.”
The final potential benefit o f deliberation is that it produces better results than
policy-making that occurs in its absence. The “quality” o f results is, o f course, difficult
to assess. Many theorists have argued that good results are simply those that arise from a
good process (e.g. Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1991). If the process incorporates
democratic principles, then the outcome is morally justifiable and legitimate in the sense
that the participants will abide by the results even if their favored proposal is not adopted.
No external means o f evaluating outcomes is necessary. Others argue that public debate
produces the best reasons for any action, improving the quality o f decision-making
(Bohman, 1996). Argumentation is not simply a means o f persuasion or justification for
positions, but the process through which truth is discovered and knowledge created
(Rowland, 1987).

7
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The requirements o f deliberation do not necessarily guarantee that citizens will
choose wisely, but they do insist that certain specific distortions and biases will be absent.
Arguments based on prejudice or the will o f the powerful, for instance, will be
insufficient to carry the day. Nonetheless, there is always the possibility that deliberators
will either not have adequate information to make the best decision, or that the
information they do have will be deceptive and thus lead to suboptimal outcomes. But
the question is less whether deliberation will necessarily produce the best answer to a
given question than whether in the long run deliberation will tend to produce more
outcomes that enhance the common good. While it may be impossible to answer this
question empirically, what works in favor o f deliberation is that the democratic goals one
wishes policy to enhance are themselves incorporated into the deliberative process.
Other processes - relying on the wisdom o f the philosopher king, for instance - certainly
may produce beneficial results, but the normal operating o f such a process does not
preclude anti-democratic outcomes.
This is not to say, o f course, that formally deliberative bodies do not often
produce outcomes inconsistent with democratic ideals. However, those outcomes are not
natural products o f the deliberative process, but are instead caused by distortions such as
deception or the individual exercise o f power. In fact, in American politics it is often the
case that the ability o f officials to ignore the common interest and act to advance narrow
interests varies inversely with the amount o f public discussion around a particular
decision (Schattschneider, 1960). For example, according to William Greider (1992)
polluting industries are able to receive far better treatment during the regulatory process,
which takes place largely outside public view, than in the legislative process. And we are
8
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all familiar with narrowly beneficial tax breaks secretly inserted into a large bill in the
eleventh hour. Quasi-corrupt influence-buying is thus more likely to occur when public
deliberation is absent.
Other theorists have added additional items to the list o f deliberation's benefits.
For example, Joshua Cohen (1989) cites consensus as the end o f the ideal deliberative
process. Similarly, Benjamin Barber (1984) contends that democratic talk has the ability
not simply to mediate conflict but to transform it into agreement. These perspectives
may be somewhat optimistic; when we extend deliberation to an entire society, true
consensus appears impossible, and may not be desirable. There are always dissenters to
any policy, whether among the public or in a legislature, and their presence gives some
assurance that any proposal will be critiqued and its weaknesses exposed.1 It is far more
important that all participants feel bound by the decision whether their side carries the
day or not (Bohman, 1996). While deliberation may encourage agreement, it by no
means guarantees it; ultimately, questions will need to be put to a vote (Knight &
Johnson, 1994).

Objections to deliberation
While the volume o f scholarly writing advocating some form o f deliberative
democracy is substantial and growing, there have been a number o f objections raised to
deliberation. Lynn Sanders (1997) contends that one o f the core premises o f deliberation,
that o f equality and its corollary o f equal respect, is extremely difficult to achieve.

1Congress does frequently pass measures without dissent, but these are usually on the order o f declarations
o f National Cottage Cheese Awareness Week.
9
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Citizens arrive at a discussion with unequal faculties, resources, and rhetorical skills;
debate is likely to favor those who can frame their arguments in accord with the
deliberative model. Thus, '“taking deliberation as a signal o f democratic practice
paradoxically works undemocratically, discrediting on seemingly democratic grounds the
views o f those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as
characteristically deliberative/" One imagines a debate between two people, both of
whom are actually seeking to advance their own interests, in which one cleverly cloaks
his argument in the language o f the common good, while the other is unable to do so and
thus loses out. Sanders concludes further that those who are already underrepresented women, racial minorities, and the poor - are most likely to be silenced by deliberative
requirements. Nonetheless, inequalities in rhetorical skill are far more easily overcome
than inequalities o f power; the latter is more likely to marginalize certain groups than the
former (Guttman & Thompson, 1996).
In practice, a prohibition on self-interested claims might lead to a norm in which
one would be allowed to offer evidence about a proposal’s effects on a small group, as
long as one were not a member o f that group. Apart from being somewhat ridiculous,
such a norm would result in a degradation o f the available body o f evidence in a debate.
Often, individuals are the only ones who can offer the most complete articulation o f their
interests. If they are forbidden to do so, their interests will not be known or taken into
account.
It is true that societal inequality may be manifest in deliberation, just as it is in
other political processes and institutions. In order to address that inequality, those who

10
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suffer from it must make special claims to the majority. If the deliberative process is
strict in its insistence that all arguments revolve around the common good, such claims
may be ruled out o f bounds, or at the very least require substantial logical and rhetorical
acrobatics in order to be presented “properly.” Thus, I argue that the appropriate place o f
the common good is as the guide and end o f deliberation, not as a requirement o f every
utterance within the process. An open deliberation allows an individual claim to be
presented, but treats it as a datum to be compared with others in determining the nature o f
the common good. Personal testimony (Sanders, 1997) would not only be permissible
but encouraged as necessary information deliberators need to arrive at a decision.
Participants may assume one o f a number o f roles when speaking: witness, expert,
advocate, etc. When one listens, however, one’s role shifts (Bickford, 1996b). It is in
this role that consideration o f the common good becomes central.
The second response to the inequality objection is that ongoing deliberation is
itself the cure for the ill o f communicative inequality. The more one participates in
debate, the greater one's ability to make persuasive arguments and win support for one’s
positions. While the advantaged may already be well-informed and possess autonomy
before debate begins, the deliberative process enhances these qualities among the
disadvantaged who engage in it.
Sanders also observes that often, there is no “common good” at issue. She offers
the claims o f Japanese-Americans for compensation for internment during World War II
as a case where “democratic assemblies should do nothing like pursue the common good
but instead should just listen and respond to particular complaints.” I agree, but argue
further that such cases are not merely occasional but in fact comprise a great portion,
11
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perhaps even the majority o f questions before the public. True, the allocations o f funds
in this case have a negligible effect on the federal budget or the economy, whereas, for
instance, increases in student loans extend a greater web o f economic effects. But in both
cases, the task o f the deliberator is to determine what is best for a finite number o f others.
It will be exceedingly difficult for her to locate any self-interest in the question at hand.
As a consequence, it will not be necessary to rely on her altruism, good will, or
commitment to the polity in order to spur her to consider the common good; she will have
little choice.
Some have raised the possibility that deliberation will, by bringing multiple
arguments and information to light, actually increase conflict. Deliberators could
discover that the grounds for disagreement are deeper than they had originally imagined.
"A participant may conclude that ‘if this is what is at stake, then I really disagree!'"
(Knight & Johnson, 1994). This scenario is only problematic, however, if we believe that
agreement itself is the end o f deliberation, regardless o f what that agreement produces or
on what it is based. An agreement brought about by incomplete knowledge or deception
is no more desirable than one resulting from coercion. The advantage o f deliberation is
not simply that it is more likely to result in agreement, but that that agreement will rest on
shared understandings and values.
Another objection to deliberation is that it imposes too many obligations on the
citizenry. People should be able to ignore politics if they so choose. The role o f citizen
is and should be able to be freely rejected. People have too many other concerns —their
jobs, their families, their hobbies - to take on politics as an ongoing task. In addition,
speaking publicly about politics is something many find downright unpleasant
12
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(Schudson, 1997). However, whether or not the individual chooses to act as a citizen,
political decisions will continue to be made. The fact that he ignores them does not mean
they will cease to affect him. One may choose to be a citizen or a subject; to abdicate the
choice is to choose the latter.
Some have also argued that the premise that deliberation leads to "better"
outcomes is questionable. Experiments have shown that on certain subjects. “gut”
reactions are more likely to result in accurate assessments than deliberate thinking
(Kuklinski et al, 1993). However, the nature o f laboratory or field experiments usually
means that in the created dilemma there will in fact be a “correct'’ answer. This is plainly
not the case when citizens make political judgments. Furthermore, political deliberations
are carried out over an extended period; the question is not whether one will make one’s
decision by thinking or feeling, but how thoughts and feelings will combine into
judgment.
A related issue is the role o f emotion in deliberation. Some have maintained that
"reasoned’' argument precludes emotional appeals or considerations. I argue that, to the
contrary, emotion is a necessary element o f political debate. First, politics concerns
crucial questions; we can not expect ourselves to always maintain a critical distance from
issues when we care deeply about the outcome. Emotion does not necessarily drive out
reason; in fact, it can often encourage us to serve the values on which we base our
politics, highlighting considerations of, for instance, justice or fairness. Emotional
appeals can encourage listeners to act in the interests o f others. A dynamic deliberation
would allow emotional appeals with the condition that they are then followed by
deliberative reflection. As Schudson (1997) put it, “Democracy may sometimes require
13
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that your interlocutor does not wait politely for you to finish but grabs you by the collar
and cries ‘Listen! Listen for God’s sake!’” If emotion heightens one’s willingness to
listen, it will enhance deliberation. There is evidence from both experimental and
survey-based research that heightened emotion leads individuals to attend more closely to
information (Neuman, Marcus, & MacKuen, 1996; Theiss-Morse, Marcus, & Sullivan,
1993). If this is true, emotion does not distort reason but instead enhances it. No less an
authority than Aristotle (1991) advised speakers to direct their listeners’ passions toward
wise decisions.
Finally, a debate without emotion is, quite simply, boring. One o f the key
challenges to advocates o f an engaged democracy is sustaining the interests o f the
citizenry. While to the high-minded theorist this may seem a trivial consideration, in
practice maintaining citizen interest in public affairs is critical to the health o f any
democracy. The challenge o f deliberation is to expand political discussion and debate
beyond the narrow group o f “political junkies” into the larger citizenry.

Deliberation in the real world
When we move from discussions o f ideal civic deliberation to an examination of
actual citizen deliberation, a critical question presents itself. How does citizen
deliberation stand in relation to the ideal? Are people discussing public affairs? When
such conversations occur, do they incorporate deliberative norms? As I noted earlier, one
is tempted by some deliberative theories to describe ideal political discourse, and then
cast all other political talk aside as irrelevant to the operation o f deliberation. However,
to do so is to ignore the bulk o f citizens’ political life. Political talk takes place in diverse
14
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settings where norms and patterns o f discourse vary. In order to build a theory o f
deliberation based on actual conversation, we must understand each o f these and its
relation to deliberative goals.
The lengthy discussions one finds in theoretical texts o f the proper procedures
necessary to institute deliberative democracy betray a Newtonian impulse. We may
decide exactly what we want our democracy to look like, then draft rules to ensure that it
operates according to plan. When things deviate from the plan, the rules will sanction the
transgressors and restore the democracy to proper operation. We will then be able, post
hoc, to determine which decisions were deliberative and which were not.
In real life, thing are much more untidy and uncertain. While procedures may be
necessary and proper in the context o f a small institution such as a legislature, there is
little purpose in discussing procedures that the public will be required to follow in its
political discussions. In ordinary conversation, rules will necessarily be informal and
sporadically enforced. Even if we were to imagine that the "ideal speech situation"
(Habermas, 1989) could be created, it would necessarily comprise only a part o f the
citizenry's political life. Imagine two co-workers eating their lunch together. One says,
"Did you see the State o f the Union speech last night?" and the other replies. "I would be
happy to discuss it, but we should wait until we go to the salon where the rules o f
deliberation may be enforced.” Democratic discussion takes place in many varied
settings where such rules have little applicability.
Furthermore, most theorizing is silent on the question o f how, specifically, public
deliberation is supposed to translate into policy. One possibility is that public
deliberation could be incorporated into local political institutions with decision-making
15
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power, as in the town meeting (Mansbridge, 1980). The knowledge and commitment
acquired by citizens might then translate into engagement on larger issues. Currently,
this form o f government exists only in a few places, and often falls short o f ideals o f
attendance and participation (Bryan, 1999). A second possibility, which also involves the
citizenry in direct policy-making, is occasional public decision-making in referenda, in
which deliberation ought to but not necessarily does precede the moment o f decision. A
third possibility would be the institutionalization o f something like Fishkin's (1991)
"deliberative poll," in which a representative group o f citizens engages in formal
deliberation, the results o f which become binding in some way on a government body, be
it local or national. A fourth would be a non-binding deliberative poll system, where the
results were held to be a true measure o f “public opinion," thus exposing legislatures to
public sanction if they were ignored. The final possibility is a maintenance o f current
institutional structures, but with improved public deliberation that makes public opinion
more considered and less capricious. The more stable and considered opinion is, the less
likely it will be ignored or contradicted by policy-makers.
Local politics is the logical starting point for deliberative democracy for a number
o f reasons. First, within a neighborhood or town individuals are more likely to have the
interpersonal ties that can enable conversation to begin and encourage participants to
adopt each other's perspectives. Second, pre-existing feelings o f community lay the
foundation for common-interest thinking. Issues can acquire a salience based on
proximity that operates apart from self-interest. For citizens to care about issues that
affect a larger community, they have to care about the community itself. Even if I have
no children o f my own, I m ay be more aroused by the fate o f the schools in my town than
16
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those in my state because the children o f my neighbors and acquaintances are involved. I
have no greater self-interest in the children who live on my street than those who live
fifty miles away, but their proximity and concreteness elicit a higher degree o f caring. In
addition, local issues tend to be less characterized by knowledge gaps between those o f
higher and lower socio-economic status (Gaziano, 1983).
Finally, the nature o f local issues is such that they tend not to break along the
strictly defined ideological lines that often hamper communication. Citizens who vote
for different parties in federal elections find themselves agreeing on whether the town
should buy a new snowplow. This is not to say, o f course, that local issues are not often
divisive and hard-fought. But except in those cases where one issue comes to so
dominate a locality’s politics that personal relationships become determined by
agreement or disagreement on that issue, overlapping alliances mean that each member of
the community may see potential agreement with every other member on at least some
issue.
Politics in small, homogeneous communities may in fact be less conflictual and
less often based on intergroup differences than that in larger cities. The larger and more
heterogeneous the community, the more likely that interest groups are organized and that
institutional structures are established to manage and coordinate conflict (Olien,
Donohue, & Tichenor, 1995). Conover, Leonard and Searing (1993) report that “The
citizens in our study seem most ‘liberal’ with regard to their citizenship in the nation.
When they focus on the local community context, by contrast, they begin to behave and
speak like ‘communitarians’ and articulate an expanded sense o f responsibility.”

17
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Generally, the smaller any group is, the more likely each member is to feel obligated to
the other members (Mansbridge, 1980).
Obviously, this presents a challenge to any theory o f citizen deliberation. Could
citizens think about national and local issues in the same way? To do so, the factors that
combine to produce concern for others in the local arena, such as affinity for community
members, understanding o f the consequences o f proposals, and interpersonal discussion,
would need to be duplicated. Although there would be some impediments, this is by no
means impossible. There is little doubt that in contemporary rhetoric, local community is
celebrated, despite the fact that relatively few Americans live in the small towns for
which we profess such admiration.2
The initiative process is offered by some as part o r all o f the solution to a
disconnected citizenry (Barber, 1984; Slaton, 1992). Used to the greatest degree in
California but present in a number o f states, initiatives can offer the best and worst o f rule
by the people (Broder, 2000). The relatively simple requirements for getting a question
on the ballot can empower citizens to set agendas for policy decisions, but allow narrow
well-funded interests to place undemocratic propositions there as well. Many recent
successful initiatives in California have been built not on creative proposals for change,
but on anger at state assistance directed toward minorities: Propositions 187, 209, and
226, which all passed, sought to eliminate affirmative action, forbid immigrants from
receiving government services, and ban bilingual education. In these cases, the

'A s Ronald Lee (1994) has observed, “ Ironically, at a time when urban living has made neighbors strangers
and mobility has extinguished the extended family, our politics celebrates the nurturing local community.
At an earlier time, when most people lived in small towns and large families, our politics celebrated grand
visions o f national community.”
18
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referendum process became a tool for the majority to restrict benefits available to a
minority. Unfortunately, there is simply no system that would preserve the ability o f
citizens to initiate policy and simultaneously prevent narrow interests from doing the
same. One could argue that the success o f these propositions and the failure o f more
complex proposals on topics such as health care and campaign finance reform indicate a
lack o f public deliberation. Decision-making structures in and o f themselves do not
guarantee that deliberation will take place.
One proposal that has received a great deal o f attention in recent years is James
Fishkin’s "deliberative poll.” In this exercise (detailed in Fishkin, 1991), which has been
carried out in England and the United States, a randomly selected group o f citizens is
brought together to deliberate on public issues. They hear and question experts, review
informative material, and have extensive discussions with one another. At the end o f a
few days, they are surveyed for their views on the issues raised. Fishkin sees deliberative
polling as a third way between direct democracy and representative democracy, one that
keeps representative forms in place while allowing access to what is essentially "better”
public opinion data. He takes pains to point out that the results o f the deliberative poll
should not be binding on legislatures, but instead should serve as a guide to the
(considered) will o f the people.
However, Fishkin is somewhat vague as to precisely how he envisions the results
o f deliberative polling being used. Would they simply be reported, in the hopes that the
more fundamental “truths” about public opinion revealed by the polls would point us in
the direction o f particular policies? If so, we may presume that the adherents o f
deliberative polls would argue that their implementation could result in better policy
19
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outcomes, as the picture painted by unconsidered opinions is replaced by a richer, more
stable one created by deliberative opinions. With the exception o f the few hundred
citizens who are chosen to serve in the deliberative poll, however, nothing has changed.
The citizenry itself is no more deliberative than it was before. The institutionalization o f
deliberative polling would actually only provide legislators with more information, which
they would be free to use or discard at their discretion. O f course, if the results of
deliberative polls were widely reported in the press, the public might use them as a
resource, or a proxy for decision-making. Some might also watch the deliberations on
television were they broadcast. On the whole, though, citizens would be no more
politically engaged or aware than they are at present.
Furthermore, deliberative polling results would be far easier for policy-makers to
dismiss than actual opinions. It is important to keep in mind that legislators are
responsive to what they perceive the opinions o f their constituents to be. When the
public is inattentive, ill informed, and in possession o f no stable opinions on policy
matters, legislators are free to ignore their constituents.
The first attempts at deliberative polling have produced mixed results, with some
(but not overwhelming) opinion change (Merkle, 1996); o f course, the degree o f change
tells little about whether opinions are o f higher quality (Price & Neijens, 1998). While
such polls are certainly an interesting idea, their high cost in time and expense makes it
unlikely that they will become a permanent component o f American political life. To
date in the United States, deliberative polls have not attracted a sufficiently large
television audience to posit a significant impact on opinion through this channel. The
question o f what the public would think under conditions o f perfect deliberation is less
20
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critical than whether the benefits o f those conditions could be approximated on a mass
scale. I argue that they can, if a limited set o f requirements for political discussion are
met.

A reasonable ideal o f deliberation
The reasonable ideal o f a deliberative democracy for which I argue has five
elements, each o f which will be the subject o f a subsequent chapter. While there are
undoubtedly other requirements readers might devise, I contend that these constitute the
core minimum required for deliberative democracy to operate.
1. Conversation. In order for a democracy to be considered deliberative, citizens
must engage one another in discussion about matters o f public concern. These
discussions, furthermore, must take place not only among the elite but among members
o f all social strata. While it is often objected that many people are simply not interested
in politics, or may rationally choose to leave political decision-making in the hands o f
others, the question is not simply what proportion o f the public regularly discusses
politics, but which o f its members do and which don’t.
2. Disagreement. Citizens in a deliberative democracy must be willing to engage
one another across lines o f disagreement. The individual benefits o f deliberation will not
be fully realized unless opinions and arguments are tested in debate, where assumptions
may be challenged, alternative facts and perspectives brought to bear, and attempts at
persuasion made.
3. Self-interest. One element shared by most theories o f deliberation is that
participants argue not on the basis o f their self-interest but on appeals to the common
21
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good. The requirement that arguments be framed in collective terms not only increases
the likelihood that the common interest will be served, but engenders a transformation
among the participants, increasing their own regard for others.
4. Information. Participants must bring information to deliberation in order to
construct relevant and persuasive arguments. Nonetheless, deliberation should not be
restricted to those with higher knowledge. Information gain will be an individual
outcome o f deliberation, as partners leam from one another.
5. Uncertainty. Because uncertainty is an inevitable feature o f politics, citizens
must be willing to accommodate it, participating in deliberation even when they are not
precisely sure where they stand on a given issue or what the consequences o f a policy
might be. The process o f deliberation should in turn increase certainty.
A properly operating deliberative system will thus be marked by the following
characteristics, which can be translated into a set o f hypotheses to be tested empirically:
1. Political conversation will be a common feature o f everyday life, not only fo r
members o f the elite but across all social strata.
2. Citizens will regularly engage in political discussion with those whose views
differ from their own.
3. Political conversation will enhance both the participants ’ own concern fo r the
common good, and concomitantly the perception that others are similarly
motivated.
4. While lack o f political knowledge should not hinder participation in political
conversation, conversation should subsequently increase knowledge.
5. While uncertainty should not hinder participation in political conversation,
conversation shoidd subsequently increase the certainty o f opinions.
By testing these hypotheses, we will be able to render a judgm ent as to how
closely contemporary American political life approximates the ideal o f a deliberative
democracy that I have outlined. The reasonable ideal o f deliberation does not require
“omnicompetent” citizens (Lippman, 1922), nor does it require that politics consume the
22
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attentions o f all o f society’s members at all times. It does, however, demand that the
collective conversation in which public opinion is continually made and remade be free
o f certain specific distortions in its membership, its content, and its results.

The role o f the press
In the political world there are three distinct but related arenas o f deliberation.
The first is the elite sphere, where power resides and decisions are made. Only part o f
the deliberation that takes place in this sphere is visible to public view. The second is the
citizen sphere, constituted in the conversations among individuals. The final arena is the
mediated sphere, which represents and influences the other two.
This representation shapes and is shaped by the contours o f deliberation in both
the elite and citizen arenas in a reciprocal process. Like other dramatic presentations,
news uses conflict to engage its audience. While this may be a constant o f politics, the
conflict structure is manifested in various ways that determine the character of news and
the discourse received by citizens. Specifically, political news casts political actors not
as individuals o f good will characterized by philosophical differences seeking alternative
means o f accomplishing shared goals, but as implacable enemies with mutually exclusive
goals for whom compromise and agreement are all but impossible.
Mediated discourse serves as a model for citizen discourse. In form, lines o f
argument and language, citizens use mediated discourse to inform their own decisions
and conduct in the public sphere. Unfortunately, many see participation in political
discussion as a risky endeavor and thus avoid it. Political talk is “unsafe” for citizens in
part because mediated political discourse shows us that it is. When political actors tell us
23
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that those who oppose them on issues that seemingly do not involve fundamental values
are enemies o f all that is right and good, we fear that our neighbors will reveal
themselves to be similar enemies to us. When political disagreements seem to be
resolved only through heated conflict, we hesitate to bring politics into our lives.
Although in fact political talk has the potential to bind us together with other citizens, we
avoid it because we fear it will do exactly the opposite.
The citizen's assessment o f the risks and rewards o f engaging in political
conversation are a function o f what she understands the nature o f "‘politics" to be.3 If she
sees politics as an arena o f vituperative conflict, her natural response may be withdrawal;
while she may continue to observe the political world through the media (even being
entertained by the conflict), she will not be a participant, particularly if participation
could provoke discord with those with whom she enjoys friendly o r intimate
relationships. Although there are some who thrive on rhetorical conflict, many more find
in it a reason to avoid discussion. Political conversation is the lifeblood o f any
democracy, particularly a deliberative democracy. Without conversation, there is no
public and thus no public opinion. As Gabriel Tarde (1969) wrote, without conversation,
the press “would exercise no profound influence on any minds. They would be like a
string vibrating without a sounding board/’

Data and theses
In addressing these questions, this study will present data from three sources.
Chapter 2 will discuss results from the Campaign Discourse Mapping Project, a content

3 Throughout this dissertation, I will refer often to a hypothetical citizen whose gender will vary at random.
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analysis o f presidential campaign discourse, including news, from 1952 to 1996.
Secondly, data from a series o f surveys conducted from 1996 through 2000 at the
Annenberg School for Communication o f the University o f Pennsylvania will be
analyzed in detail in Chapters 3 through 7. The primary focus will be on a national
survey o f registered voters around the 1996 presidential campaign and a survey o f
California voters prior to the 1998 gubernatorial election in that state. In addition, some
data from a rolling cross-sectional survey o f the American electorate in 2000 will be
used. The final source o f data is the National Election Studies, which have included
questions on political discussion in their surveys since 1984.
Admittedly, there is something awkward about advocating a discursive notion o f
the public, then measuring it via sample surveys. I agree with Dewey and Habermas that
the public is constituted in the interactions between people; answers given on a survey are
not public, but spoken anonymously to an individual whose role is not that o f fellow
citizen but o f (ostensibly) disinterested researcher. Truly public opinions, on the other
hand, are those which are offered publicly. Nonetheless, survey data can offer clues to
the individual faculties, resources, and beliefs that shape the content o f those interactions.
Like any research method, surveys have inherent limitations; there are also limitations o f
the specific data sets on which I base my conclusions. I will acknowledge and discuss
these whenever relevant.
My study will use these data to make two principle claims. The first is that
contemporary news media do as much to hamper deliberation as to enable it. The second
and more equivocal claim is that, partly as a consequence o f news but due to other factors
as well, political discussion in the United States largely fails to be deliberative. While
25
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there are some ways in which everyday conversation satisfies deliberative requirements,
the overall picture is one o f a public that falls far short o f the standards o f deliberative
democracy.
While this conclusion may not be particularly startling, it is one at which I arrived
somewhat reluctantly. Academic analyses o f public opinion often reach pessimistic
conclusions when comparing the theoretical democratic citizen to the actual one (e.g.
(Berelson et al, 1954; Campbell et al, 1960; Converse, 1964). The failure o f
contemporary citizens to display perfect knowledge, wisdom and judgm ent is alternately
described as tragic or inevitable. My particular version o f deliberative democracy
attempts to set a more attainable standard, but even here the American public seems to be
somewhat lacking. Nonetheless, the picture is far from unequivocal; despite its
weaknesses, everyday political discussion does provide benefits to those who engage in it
and to our democracy as a whole.
The development o f deliberative theory was in part a response to the elitist model
o f democracy espoused by Schumpeter (1950) and Downs’ (1957) economic model
(Bohman & Rehg, 1997). While the elitist model is concerned with system-level
outcomes and the economic model with maximization o f individual interest, both reject
substantial participation because it exceeds the citizen’s capacity in the former case and is
irrational in the latter. In this view, representative democracy operates well precisely
because it demands so little o f people. In a similar vein, Berelson et al (1954) held that
universal participation was undesirable; widespread indifference to politics allowed for a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

smoothly operating government.4
In contrast, contemporary deliberative theory shares with Rousseau and John
Stuart Mill the belief that the development o f individuals is not simply a mechanism to
ensure the proper functioning o f institutions but one o f the core purposes o f politics.5 As
Mill argued, political arrangements serve not only to conduct a nation's business but to
educate its citizenry, imbuing them with desirable traits o f character. It is in this
function, and not in efficiency or the protection o f interests, that the strongest argument in
favor o f democracy is to be found.
Because deliberation helps to create citizens, it may be considered an end in itself
apart from the policy decisions that emerge from it. While some hold that democratic
discussion is not about who we are but about what to do (Elster, 1997), one can conceive
o f even discussion that results in no decision as, if nothing else, an investment in
subsequent decisions. If the transformative effects o f deliberation occur, those who
benefit will be more likely to render wise judgments in the future. Deliberation may thus
be defended both as a decision-making procedure and as a form o f civic engagement
from which policies flow only indirectly.
Just as in Aristotle’s vision o f the polis “the central concern o f all citizens was to
talk with each other” (Arendt, 1959), in a large representative democracy, participation in
the production o f opinion through conversation is the primary task o f citizenship. A polis
in which discussion is less than deliberative is itself less than democratic.

' Nonetheless, Berelson et al argued that “I f there is one characteristic for a democratic system (besides the
ballot itself) that is theoretically required, it is the capacity for and the practice o f discussion."
It should be noted that Rousseau was not an advocate o f discussion. His “general will” was. as Habermas
(Habermas, 1989) observed, “more a consensus o f hearts than o f arguments."
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Chapter 2
Discourse in the M ediated Public Sphere

Theoretical work on public deliberation is notably silent on the content o f elite
discourse, as though the political world seen by citizens had no influence on their conduct
and conversations. But it is that world, delivered through the filter o f news, which in
large part sets the terms o f citizen deliberation. News helps set a conversational agenda
and provides us with the language and arguments we use to discuss political issues. It
shows us what typical political debate is, which forces are allied and opposed, and who
believes what and why. As such, news has the power to enable deliberation or to
discourage it.
The model o f deliberation I espouse has five elements: conversation,
disagreement, self-interest, information, and uncertainty. Before I turn to survey data to
explore the effects o f media exposure on each, I will first examine the content o f political
discourse in both its unmediated and mediated forms to ascertain whether the political
world visible to the citizenry is likely to enhance its willingness and ability to engage in
deliberation. Such an examination indicates not only that news filters distort political
discourse, but that the particular ways in which they do so form a picture o f political
debate which is inimical to deliberation.
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Unmediated discourse
After nearly every election season, a wave o f articles appears in the press
decrying the "negativity” o f modem campaigns. Candidates, it is said, spend their time
ducking important issues as they cynically manipulate voters through harsh attack ads
vilifying their opponents. Negative campaigns are one o f the prime suspects in low voter
turnout and widespread disaffection with politics (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995).
Despite the common perception that campaigns are increasingly "negative.” the
majority o f what candidates say to voters in speeches, debates, and even ads is actually
positive. Candidates spend most o f their time arguing for their own positions, not
criticizing their opponents. The Campaign Discourse M apping Project coded speeches,
ads, and debates from presidential candidates from 1952 through 1996 for the amount o f
advocacy (advancing one's own position), attack (criticizing one's opponent), and
contrast (advocating and criticizing on the same issue).6 As Figures 2-1 through 2-4
indicate, not only is attack a smaller proportion o f candidate discourse than advocacy and
in most cases contrast, but presidential campaigns have not been getting dramatically
“more negative,” as many have argued (Kaid & Johnston, 1991). While there is a slight
upward trend in the amount o f attack in advertisements since I960, 1996 showed a
decline, in large part because Bill Clinton’s ads used a great deal o f contrast, criticizing
his opponent while advocating his own position on the same issue (Jamieson, Waldman,

6 O f course, a coding scheme measuring advocacy, attack and contrast does not capture every element o f
the “negativity” o f a campaign. All attacks are not created equal; some are fair, reasonable, and relevant,
while others are not. Not every important evaluative standard is amenable to content analysis. It is
interesting to note, however, that the election most often singled out for its poor quality, that o f 1988,
generates the poorest scores on most o f the measures here, including those tracking the performance o f both
candidates and media outlets.
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& Sherr, 2000). In debates and speeches, furthermore, attack has not been on the rise.
The level o f attack has never risen above 22% in either speeches or debates.

Figure 2-1:
Discourse Breakdown: S p eech es

Figure 2-2:
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Figure 2-4: Attack in
Campaign Discourse

100%

50%

Ads
80%

40%

60%

30%

40%

20%

20%

10%

□ Advocacy
0%
1952

ej Attack

Debates

Speeches

■ Contrast
0%

1960

1968

1976

1984

1992

1952

1960

1968

1976

1984

1992

The CDMP data indicate that when candidates engage in the more traditional
forms o f discourse —speeches and debates - they attack less often and nearly always
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provide evidence for their claims. Whether they do so grudgingly is beside the point.
Despite the attention usually paid to the strategies candidates employ in their advertising,
voters and reporters expect and demand that candidates present themselves in these
traditional contexts. Although many candidates have made television advertising central
to their strategies, running a campaign solely through ads is considered by the press to be
out o f bounds.7 However cynically reporters interpret speeches and debates, they
nonetheless demand that candidates undertake them. Within these rituals lies the most
issue-oriented, information-rich content available during a campaign. When candidate
discourse passes through the news filter, however, it emerges in a very different form.

Frames and narratives in the news
The notion o f framing as a way o f organizing information was originally
developed by Erving Goffrnan (1974), then later applied to news narratives by Todd
Gitlin (1980), who defined news frames as “persistent patterns o f cognition,
interpretation, and presentation; o f selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbolhandlers routinely organize discourse, whether visual or verbal.” A number o f
researchers, most notably Kahneman and Tversky (1984), have shown that framing
functionally identical information in different ways can influence interpretation and
decision-making.

7 Consider the example o f Mel Levine. A longtime Congressman from California, Levine seemed like a
strong contender for an open Senate seat in 1992. When he acknowledged publicly that he would make no
campaign appearances and appear at no debates, choosing instead to campaign almost exclusively through
television ads, the California press responded by dubbing Levine a “stealth candidate” and giving him
scornful coverage (Stall, 1992).
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In campaign news, most stories employ a strategic frame, also known as "horse
race" coverage (Patterson, 1993; Robinson & Sheehan, 1983). The strategic frame
determines the focus o f stories, the selection o f quotes, and the interpretation o f actions.
In its persistence, this frame has the power to structure understanding not just o f a
particular campaign or legislative debate but o f politics itself. As described by Cappella
and Jamieson (1997), the strategic frame “is an organized set o f assumptions that
implies and often explicitly states that leaders are self-interested to the exclusion o f the
public good, that their votes can be swayed by monied or special interests that do not
serve their constituents’ ends, and that they are dishonest about what they are trying to
accomplish and driven privately by a desire to stay in power."
The reliance o f the press on strategic interpretations o f political arguments and
events has been well established (Patterson, 1993). The strategic frame is characterized
by features that include: winning and losing as the central concern; metaphors o f war and
sports; mention o f performers (politicians), critics (journalists) and audience (citizens);
emphasis on candidate style and perceptions; and a reliance on polls (Jamieson, 1992).
Various researchers have measured the extent o f strategy coverage in different ways; for
instance, Thomas Patterson (1993) coded the focus o f front-page stories, while Daniel
Hallin (1992) measured the seconds devoted to the horse-race in television news.
Depending on the content analytic measure and sample employed, estimates o f the
proportion o f election news utilizing the strategic frame run from 50% up to 80%
(Patterson, 1993). In recent years, the strategy frame has migrated from campaign news
to coverage o f policy debates as well (Cappella & Jamieson, 1996).
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Strategy framing serves a number o f purposes for journalists. First, it allows them
to engage in substantial interpretation, offering opinions beyond what would otherwise be
considered appropriate under the norm o f objectivity. Second, it enhances their
privileged position by focusing on "‘inside" information to which only they have access.
Third, it fulfills dramatic requirements by structuring stories as battles between
antagonists, eventually resulting in a "winner" and a "loser” (Jamieson, Waldman, &
Devitt, 1998).
To a certain extent, strategy coverage is simply one more example o f media
organizations catering to a widespread fascination with “behind-the-scenes" information.
Just as "Entertainment Tonight” takes viewers to the sets where movies and television
shows are filmed, the news brings viewers into the backstage world o f campaigns. Some
trace the rise o f the strategic frame to Theodore White’s seminal book. The Making o f the
President I960 (White, 1961), which told a gripping behind-the-scenes tale featuring
John Kennedy as its protagonist. Its lineage actually extends back even farther: the first
major U.S. election study found that what we would call strategy coverage comprised the
greatest portion o f news about the 1940 election. “The most talked-about subject matter
[in news] during the cam paign,” Lazarsfeld and his colleagues wrote, “was the campaign
itself. Over a third o f all discussion centered on the progress o f the campaign, on the
campaign methods o f the two parties, and particularly on speculations about the
candidate's chances." (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944)
The fact that the strategic frame is not merely one element o f campaign coverage
but its primary structuring narrative betrays a fundamentally cynical stance on the part o f
reporters: political truth, they argue, is to be found in machinations and hidden tactics.
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This bias is revealed not only in the words reporters speak but in other ways as well. For
example, television correspondents on the campaign trail often tape "stand-ups” using a
candidate giving a speech as a backdrop (Sam Donaldson o f ABC News is particularly
fond o f this tableau). As the reporter talks to the viewers from near the stage, one sees
the candidate speaking but cannot make out his words. The implication is that those
words are devoid o f meaning, or at the very least not important enough to merit attention.
The reporter shields viewers from the candidate’s efforts at manipulation by rendering
him mute.
Frames "lead a double life., .they are structures o f the mind that impose order and
meaning on the problems o f society and., .interpretive structures embedded in political
discourse” (Kinder & Herzog, 1993). Consequently, framing may be studied as a means
of "constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic o f the discourse
itself.” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). My purpose here is the latter - to describe features o f the
strategy frame in campaign news and their implications for citizen deliberation. In order
to investigate the operation o f strategic framing, the Campaign Discourse Mapping
Project content analyzed a sample o f presidential campaign coverage from the three
network news programs from 1980 to 1996. Among the measures employed was a
judgment o f each story’s primary structure, defined as the frame introduced in the lead
and continuing through the majority o f the story. Each story was coded as a “strategy”
story (one concentrating on tactics, poll results, etc.), an “issue” story (one concentrating
on a specific issue or issues), or as “other,” a miscellaneous category. As Figure 2-5
shows, the proportion o f strategy stories is near or above fifty percent in all years.
Nineteen eighty-four showed the greatest focus on strategy, while 1992 and 1996
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displayed a marked improvement in the proportion o f issue stories. CDMP coders also
identified a secondary structure if the frame shifted for a substantial portion o f the story;
data reported here concern only the primary structure. Adding stories that included
strategy as a secondary structure increases the totals by approximately ten percent in each
year. In addition, while the CDMP gave greater weight to the opening or lead o f the
story in determining a primary structure, television reporters commonly close stories even serious issue stories - with a final comment about strategy. Hallin (1992) found that
in 1988. 82% o f all campaign stories closed with a “wrap-up" concerning strategy. It
should thus be noted that these figures understate the total amount o f strategic
information in campaign news.

Figure 2-5: Primary Story Structure,
Campaign Stories on Network News
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Strategic coverage is motivated at least in part by a noble impulse to expose
attempts at manipulation. But does such exposure actually benefit citizens, or simply
make them, as Todd Gitlin (1991) put it, “cogniscenti o f their own bamboozlement"?
Without an accompanying analysis o f issues, strategic coverage leaves voters unable to
assess whether politicians' claims should be believed. If we learn that a candidate
appeared at a senior citizen center in order to make us believe that he cares about the
elderly, we have no evidence that he does or does not in fact care about the elderly. The
default conclusion must be that all claims are false. The news thus invites citizens to
become as cynical as reporters appear to be.
If they accept the invitation, citizens may conclude that in politics, motives are
always suspect. Political actors virtually never admit to the kind o f strategic motivations
for statements and positions reporters routinely ascribe to them when discussing strategy.
The strategic frame by its nature asserts first that real motives are hidden by stated
motives, and second that the substance o f a speech or a policy is less important for
citizens to know than the real (strategic) motive behind it.
One might ask why, if reporters feel that a particular campaign appearance is
mere image-making, they bother to cover it all. Most political reporters, particularly
those who cover campaigns, are greater experts in politics than they are in policy. Since
politics is what they know, politics is what they cover. Within that context, coverage
becomes cynical. “Just as TV decries photo-opportunity and sound-bite campaigning yet
builds the news around them, so it decries the culture o f the campaign consultant, with its
emphasis on technique over substance, yet adopts that culture as its own." (Hallin, 1992)
Again and again, reporters offer a brief quote from a candidate, then inform viewers that
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what they just heard was an em pty sound bite with little to offer. While on the surface
this may appear to punish the offending candidate, in practice it does nothing to
encourage the candidate to speak at greater length. If, on the other hand, the reporter
quoted the candidate at greater length - rewarding substance instead o f punishing
superficiality - higher quality discourse might become more likely. Candidates want to
be quoted making their case, and will adapt their discourse to the dispositions o f the
news.
The following example, taken from an ABC news report during the 1996 election,
shows the strategic frame in operation. The night before, the two candidates held a
televised debate that covered a wide range o f issue areas. The next day's coverage,
however, begins with anchor Peter Jennings relating the results o f an overnight poll in
which the network asked people which candidate they thought "won" the debate.8 It is
this poll, and not the substance o f the debate, which contextualizes the report that
follows:
PETER JENNINGS: W ell, if you look to the polls as a guide, the overnight polls tell us that very
few minds were changed last night. The ABC News polls show that viewers, by a margin o f 20
points, thought President Clinton did the better job. Remember, however. Mr. Clinton held a
sizable lead going in and so the assessment o f who won m ay reflect that margin o f who was
watching. Mr. Dole was in New Jersey today and A B C ’s John Cochran is with him.
JOHN COCHRAN: To hear Bob Dole tell it, his campaign is rolling along just fine as he borrows
a page from the Bill Clinton playbook with a bus blitz through New Jersey.

8 Press coverage o f televised debates is i f anything even more focused on strategy than ordinary campaign
coverage. The guiding question here is whether a debate will shift significant numbers o f votes, despite the
fact that debates almost never do. News organizations conduct immediate polls to find out which candidate
“won” in the minds o f voters, then structure their subsequent coverage around these polls. Certain decisive
moments - almost always an attack by one candidate against another or a gaffe - are replayed again and
again. In the case o f debates, this strategic framing is particularly troubling. Post-debate coverage directs
voters to recall certain elements o f a debate and understand it in particular ways (Lemert et al, 1991).
Because debates are the most information-rich events o f a presidential campaign, if voters only recall a
particular attack, or that one candidate “w on” while the other “ lost,” then a precious opportunity for voter
education has been squandered.
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DOLE: D on’t look up at the score board, the game is still on. W e’ve got 30 days. W e’re going to
win the election.
COCHRAN: Dole and his top aides are simply ignoring his dismal showing in the overnight
polls.
SCOTT REED (Dole campaign manager): The polls are meaningless right now. The enthusiasm
you’re seeing in New Jersey today is a direct reflection o f last night.
COCHRAN: Dole’s strategy now? Keep the message simple. Tell them Bill Clinton is an
untrustworthy liberal, and keep promising that 15 percent tax cut.
DOLE: If I didn’t give you my word, and I’ve always kept my word, which you can’t say for Bill
Clinton.
COCHRAN: And for his gender gap problem with women, a new ad with one o f his best
campaign assets, his wife.
ELIZABETH DOLE (from TV ad): My husband has come out strongly to protect the victims o f
domestic violence, and to make sure a man and a woman who work at the same job get the same
retirement benefits.
COCHRAN: But it's a hard road ahead. No one expects the vice presidential debate to have
much impact, and the final presidential debate is a citizen's forum, a setting the Dole camp did not
want because Bill Clinton did so well talking to real people in the ‘92 debates. That’s why last
night’s debate was so important for Bob Dole, and why the early reviews from voters are so
disappointing for him. John Cochran. ABC News, Red Bank, New Jersey.
-ABC World News Tonight, 10/7/96

Cochran uses a sports metaphor (‘The Bill Clinton playbook"), echoing Dole, who
uses one o f his own (“D on't look up at the scoreboard, the game is still on.”). The only
reference Cochran makes to any o f the substantive matters Dole discussed during the day
is meant as an explanation o f strategy: “Dole's strategy now? Keep the message
simple." The story closes with another reference to the poll, using a theatrical metaphor
(voters' reactions are “reviews”).
The dominance o f the strategic frame has a number o f implications for the
practice o f deliberation. First, because the strategic frame characterizes all political
actors as fundamentally self-interested, it constructs the political world in ways that may
be inimical to deliberation, a topic discussed at length in Chapter 5. Secondly, it portrays
candidates as more prone to attack one another than they actually are. By focusing on the
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conflictual aspects o f a campaign, the news encourages the perception that
representatives o f different political parties are fundamentally opposed on all issues,
making disagreement seem the norm. Finally, the strategic frame gives citizens poorer
information by truncating complex arguments, leaving them without the evidence and
rationales with which to evaluate competing claims.
The metaphor o f the frame is used by communication researchers because it
indicates a structuring boundary, placing some things inside and therefore visible, and
others outside and therefore invisible. Strategic framing excludes certain types o f
information in order to focus on tactics and strategy. It also filters the rather substantial
amount o f candidate discourse in specific ways.
Politics in all its forms is largely comprised o f communication. Politicians talk to
each other and to citizens, citizens talk back to politicians, lobbying and interest groups
talk to government and to the citizenry, etc. In order to report on political activity in the
limited amount o f time it has available, the press must whittle all this talk down to a few
statements meant to convey the essence o f the total communication taking place. The
filters employed by reporters produce communication which is decidedly different from
discourse in its raw form. As the CDMP content analysis reveals, the filtering o f
candidate discourse is guided by two unstated principles: the exclusion o f evidence,
reducing complex arguments to simple assertion; and the privileging o f arguments that
attack.
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Conceal the evidence
The essence o f an active, engaged deliberation is the assessment o f evidence for
claims. The offering o f evidence is itself the substance o f argumentation. Claims
themselves tend to be simple and straightforward; evidence is required in order to
establish their validity. Without evidence at their disposal, citizens can do little but trade
claims back and forth, a conversational form that resembles deliberation in no way. If
one participant claims that taxes should be raised and the other responds that taxes should
be lowered, without evidence to answer the questions o f “why " and “h o w /’ the
conversation grinds to a halt.
Once a conversational agenda has been set, the bulk o f evidence citizens can
utilize must come from news media. W hile in some cases personal experience can be a
source o f information and logic, the nature o f political issues is such that in a majority o f
cases, the issue at hand will be sufficiently remote that more generalized information will
be required. This information must at some point come from the mass media. The
critical question, then, is how well the news media provide the evidence and lines o f
argument to support claims being made in the political world. In order to answer this
question, we must first assess the degree to which political actors themselves offer
evidence for their claims. Unless they do, reporters will have little material to pass on to
viewers and readers.
Data from the CDMP indicate that presidential candidates almost always offer
evidence to support their claims. As Figure 2-6 shows, particularly in the context o f
speeches and debates, arguments are supported by evidence over ninety percent o f the
time; this figure surpasses ninety-five percent in most years. While the numbers for ads
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are usually lower, even here evidence was offered for over seventy percent o f arguments
in all years but one.

Figure 2*6
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When these arguments pass through the news filter, they get reduced in a specific
way. W hile a presidential campaign speech may contain numerous arguments (between
five and ten is typical), reporters tend not to simply choose a single argument and present
it in its entirety. Instead, they more often take a number o f claims made by the candidate
and present them, while omitting the evidence offered for those claims. Thus while it is
true that sound bites in network evening news have grown shorter in past years (Hallin,
1992), the filtering o f political discourse goes beyond the simple truncation o f political
actors' statements. What is removed in most cases is evidence for claims. The CDMP
coded not only the quotes in news but the source o f those quotes, i.e. candidate speeches,
debates, etc. We are thus able to directly compare a discourse genre in its raw form and
the representation o f that discourse in news. As Figure 2-7 shows, while nearly all
41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

arguments in speeches contain evidence, when speeches are quoted in news evidence is
usually absent. In 1988, less than 20% o f quotes from speeches contained evidence.

Figure 2-7: Proportion of Arguments
With Evidence, Speeches and Quotes From
Speeches in Network News
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When evidence is removed from an argument, the only remaining information is
that the candidate is for or against something. Why he holds this position, we do not
know. Consequently, the viewer is left unable to have a discussion about either the
candidate’s position on the issue, or the issue itself.
The tendency to remove evidence, furthermore, is more pronounced in strategy
stories than in issue stories, as shown in Figure 2-8. Hallin (1992) produced very similar
results measuring the length o f sound bites in issue and strategy stories from 1968 to
1988; sound bites were generally shorter in strategy stories, in some cases dramatically
so. While the number o f arguments presented with evidence varies from year to year as
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does the difference between issue stories and strategy stories, the critical point is that
strategy stories were always less likely to contain evidence. This difference is significant
at p<.05 in all five years examined.

Figure 2-8: Proportion of Arguments
Containing Evidence, Quotes in Network News
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Because the focus in strategic coverage is not the candidate's words but his
intentions, it is not surprising that quotes in these stories are shorter than those in issue
stories. In a strategy story, the question o f why a candidate takes a position is answered
not by the candidate him/herself, but by the journalist. For example, in an issue story
about economic proposals, a candidate might be quoted as saying that the minimum wage
should be increased (assertion) because it has not kept up with inflation and lowerincome workers have failed to share in recent prosperity (evidence). In a strategy story,
the candidate states his support for a minimum wage increase, but the reporter explains
that labor unions have contributed to his campaign. In both cases a rationale is supplied
for an assertion, but it is the reporter who supplies the (very different) rationale in the
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strategy story.
Such a story may enable viewers to have a certain kind o f discussion, but that
discussion would be limited in critical ways. While they could debate a candidate's
motives, on the basis o f the story they would not have the wherewithal to assess whether
his proposal to raise the minimum wage is reasonable and fair, or what he thinks its
economic consequences are likely to be. A judgm ent o f the candidate that connects his
campaign proposals to his future performance in office therefore becomes less likely.
Political actors often echo reporters by charging that the true motive behind a
proposal or a position is gaining advantage in the upcoming election. For example,
Senator Edward Kennedy charged that the Defense o f Marriage Act was “Cynically
calculated to try and inflame the public eight weeks before the November 5th election”
(CBS Evening News, 9/10/96). Just as common is the charge that the hidden motive is
not simply electoral advantage, but a more sinister intent for which the speaker would be
punished if he spoke publicly, as in this statement by Ann Lewis, then a spokesperson
for Planned Parenthood, during the debate over the nomination o f Henry Foster for
Surgeon General: “Let us be clear - there is an issue o f credibility here. It is the
credibility o f those politicians who don't want to admit what their real motives are.
They really don’t think that abortion or decisions about reproductive health care should
be made by women and their doctors. They will take any means to attack it. And so,
they’re now trying to go back and find any excuse to say you’re opposing Dr. Foster
except the real one. Any day now, I expect to hear that they don’t like the way he parts
his h a ir’ (CNN. 2/14/95).
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This is not to say that motive questioning is necessarily a dishonest rhetorical
technique, but rather that it crowds out information more useful to citizens in arriving at
judgments, particularly on policy issues. For example, members o f Congress engaged in
a debate about a proposal to use sampling in the 2000 census to address the problem of
uncounted citizens. Most stories about the issue featured charges by each side that the
other's position, though stated in terms o f fairness, accuracy, or constitutionality, was
actually determined by concerns about the effects o f sampling on redistricting.
Democrats were said to support sampling because it would count more poor and minority
citizens, who would be more likely to vote Democratic. Republicans were said to oppose
sampling for the same reason.
Without doubt, these charges contained a good deal o f truth. But if we assume
that citizens are or should be making up their minds based not on electoral calculation but
on the facts and principles involved, then the question o f actors' motives is problematic
simply because it takes up space both in news stories and in citizens’ minds. Each charge
of hidden motives replaces a statement or explication o f a "public” reason that could be
used to form a public judgment.

Eliminate the positive
It is no accident that news items are referred to as “stories.” Like all storytellers,
reporters attempt to construct narratives that engage their audience. A key element of
storytelling is the presence o f conflict. As Vincent Price (1989) observes, “So common is
conflict as a theme in the news, in fact, that introductory journalism texts generally
include it in their inventories o f basic news values.” In the context o f political news, it
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then becomes more likely that statements that attack - whether a candidate attacking an
opponent, a legislator attacking a member o f another party, or an interest group
representative attacking a piece o f legislation - will pass through the news filter.
As a result, the political world seen by citizens through the news media is much
more conflictual than that world actually is. As Figure 2-9 shows, news dramatically
overrepresents the amount o f attack in candidate discourse. While the proportion o f
attack in presidential campaign speeches averages 15% and never rises above 22% in the
years studied, the proportion o f attack in quotes in network news stories taken from
speeches averages 46%. In 1988, attack comprised only 12% o f speech arguments, but
55% o f speech quotes.

Figure 2*9: Proportion of Attack in Speeches
and Quotes from Speeches in Network News
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The preference for attack extends beyond the comments o f candidates. For
example, while none o f the three network evening newscasts bothered to air a story about
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the final 1996 presidential debate the following evening, two did find news value in a
woman who yelled at Clinton that he was a “draft-dodging yellow-bellied liar7' as the
President jogged along the beach. The more harsh and insulting a comment, whatever its
source, the more likely it is to end up as part o f a news story.
Despite the fact that conflict is an organizing theme o f most political reporting,
the tendency to overstate attack emerges even more strongly in strategy stories than in
issue stories. Even in an issue story focusing on conflict, candidates' positions must be
stated before they can be attacked by opponents. In a strategy story, positions need not
be explicated; the point o f the story is often the simple fact that the candidates are
attacking each other. Attacks are quoted not for their explicit content, but in order to
illustrate the idea that the campaign is “getting nasty.” Again and again, campaign stories
open with the words, “Candidate X went on the attack today...” As Figure 2-10 shows,
attack is more likely to emerge in strategy stories in four o f the five years studied. Once
again, the greatest difference is in 1988, where 59% o f the quotes in strategy stories were
attacks, compared to 26% o f the quotes in issue stories.
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Figure 2-10: Attack as a Proportion of Quotes
in Network News
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The following story from 1988 shows how the two principles o f concealing the
evidence and accentuating the negative shape the discourse received by citizens. In their
first presidential debate, Michael Dukakis and George Bush discussed a wide range of
issues in relative depth. The debate contained 58 arguments, o f which 13 (22%) were
attacks. Fifty-one o f the arguments, or 88%, contained evidence. The report by Lesley
Stahl, on the other hand, contains six arguments, five o f which are attacks. Only one
contains evidence, Bush’s assertion that Dukakis was “out o f the mainstream.” and only
one o f the many substantive issue positions taken by the candidates during the debate is
quoted (Dukakis' position on health insurance). For good measure, a pair o f attacks from
the campaign managers close the report.
DAN RATHER: As the presidential candidates growled at each other long distance today, their
handlers were fanning out on so-called spin patrol, trying to affect press and public perception o f
who won and who lost last night. CBS News National Affairs Correspondent Lesley Stahl looks
now at the style and substance o f last night's joint Bush-Dukakis appearance and what may
happen now.

48

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

LESLEY STAHL: The presidential debate last night signaled messages and scenes that’ll be
repeated in the weeks ahead —code words like “card-carrying member’’ and “guns for hostages” —
and there was anger — Bush and Dukakis engaged in surprisingly harsh, often personal,
exchanges.
GOVERNOR MICHAEL DUKAKIS: Well, when it comes to ridicule, George, you win a gold
medal. I think we can agree on that.
STAHL: Aides had told Dukakis. “Loosen up; avoid sounding arrogant: but be aggressive and
reach out to the middle class with specific proposals.”
GOVERNOR DUKAKIS: And I think it’s time that, when you got a job in this country, it came
with health insurance.
STAHL: Bush’s game plan — in the debate and on the campaign trail —to keep Dukakis cornered
on the left.
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH: He said, "I am a strong, liberal Democrat.” —August. ‘87:
then he said, "I am a card-carrying member o f the ACLU.” That was what he said. He is out there
on -- out o f the mainstream.
STAHL: At times, Bush slipped back into his rambling, disjointed style o f speaking. Once, when
he did, he handled it with wit.
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Christmas. Christmas. (Laughter) Wouldn’t it be nice to be perfect?
Wouldn’t it be nice to be the ice man. so you never make a mistake?
STAHL: Both used humor -- not often, but they each got off some good one-liners.
GOVERNOR DUKAKIS: He wants to give the wealthiest taxpayers in this country a five-year,
S40-billion tax break. If he keeps this up, he's gonna be the Joe Isuzu o f —o f American politics.
(Laughter)
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: That answer was about as clear as Boston Harbor. Now —(laughter)
STAHL: After the debate, just in case the points were missed, armies o f surrogates reinforced the
scenes that will dominate the rest o f the election.
LEE ATW ATER / BUSH CAMPAIGN MANAGER: And I think those people who want that
kind o f mid-sixties, Kennedy —Ted Kennedy-, George McGovern-type liberalism will be elated.
SUSAN ESTRICH / DUKAKIS CAMPAIGN MANAGER: H e’s just satisfied to let things stay as
they are and hope for the best. That isn’t Mike Dukakis’s idea o f leadership, and I think that came
through very clearly tonight.
STAHL: Did it come though? To some extent. In the CBS News poll, 45 percent o f those who
watched said they now have a more favorable opinion o f Dukakis; 35 percent think better o f Bush.
More voters now see Dukakis as understanding the problems a President has to deal with, but
voters still consider Bush more presidential. Lesley Stahl, CBS News, Washington.

- CBS Evening News, 9/26/88
The fact that the press overstates the quantity o f attack does not, o f course, mean
that attacks do not occur. Nor are they always respectful or issue-based. In a speech
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before a group o f lobbyists weeks before the 1994 election, soon-to-be House Speaker
Newt Gingrich argued that Democrats should be portrayed as “the enemy o f normal
Americans" (Devroy & Babcock, 1994). Not long before, a memo with a similar
message circulated among Republicans in Washington. Prepared by GOP AC, a political
action committee founded by Gingrich, the memo was entitled "Language: A Key
Mechanism o f Control." It gave readers two lists o f words. “Optimistic Positive
Governing W ords" to describe Republicans and “Contrasting Words" to describe
Democrats. In the latter list were such terms as decay, failure, corrupt, sick, incompetent,
pathetic, lie, disgrace, bizarre, steal, betray, and traitor.
A report by the Annenberg Public Policy Center found that in Congressional floor
statements, incivility has not increased in recent years (Jamieson & Falk, 1998). Namecalling, hyperbole, and accusations o f lying have varied only slightly from year to year.
One exception, however, stands out. The first session o f the 104th Congress, in 1995, was
dramatically less civil than any since 1945.9 This, o f course, was the first session after
the Republican takeover o f both houses in the 1994 election. While members o f the press
believed (accurately) that Capitol Hill had become less civil during the 104th Congress,
legislators themselves felt that the press was more focused on attack than ever. “I do not
remember a time when the press was as negative as it is," said Barney Frank (D-MA). “I
am now enjoying the best press o f my life. And it’s because I am attacking people and
being negative. I get much more attention for three wisecracks and a point o f order than I
get for a full compromise to a difficult legislative solution." (Newswire, 1996) Content
analyses have confirmed that coverage o f Congress has declined in quantity and become

9 There was one other spike in incivility, during the debate on President C linton's impeachment.
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more negative, superficial and focused on scandal in recent years (Hibbing & TheissMorse, 1998; Lichter & Amundson, 1994).
These examples illustrate the fact that, as in all facets o f the political world, the
amount and nature o f attack that citizens ultimately hear is the result o f a symbiotic
process between the press and political actors. The press highlights attack; politicians
realize that attacking is the best way to get quoted, so they include attack in their
speeches; the press reports the attacks. At the same time, candidates often display an
admirable amount o f respect toward one another. On the stump in 1996, Bob Dole often
described Bill Clinton as "'my opponent, not my enemy.” While this assertion was
occasionally mentioned in campaign stories, it was usually used as ironic counterpoint
when discussing attacks between the two candidates. Comity between members o f
opposing parties is often portrayed ironically; indeed, as James Ettema and Theodore
Glasser (1994) have observed, reporters have an affinity for irony. One finds
occasionally a story on the news about two Senators (for example, Joe Biden and Strom
Thurmond or Orrin Hatch and Ted Kennedy) who despite their differing ideology
maintain a friendship. This fact is portrayed as ironic and extraordinary. Agreement and
friendship between those o f differing ideology becomes the exception that proves the
rule.
Popular commentators have noted what appears to be a harsher tone in public
affairs programming in recent years (Tannen, 1998). While the data presented here
concern only network news shows, the contribution to the general tenor o f political
discourse made by public affairs shows should be noted as well. Featured on the
networks but particularly plentiful on cable news channels such as MSNBC and the Fox
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News Network, shows such as Crossfire, The Capitol Gang, and Hardball can be seen at
almost any time o f day. Both the roundtable discussion and interview formats display a
similar discursive world where two groups, "liberals” and "conservatives,” oppose each
other with impassioned argument, charges o f dishonesty, and precious little civility.
Participants who generate heat are preferred to those who would offer light. The world o f
politics appears to be inhabited by two armed camps, forever opposed.
In such a world, uncertainty is effectively absent. Those quoted in news are
chosen to represent opposing viewpoints; they advocate for firmly held positions. There
is no such thing as an undecided participant. Mediated debate thus presents a
problematic model for citizen deliberation. For the citizen, a period o f uncertainty is a
necessary and inevitable stage in opinion formation. While uncertainty should increase
the desire to engage in deliberation, news portrays political debate as the province o f the
certain.

Enemies, adversaries, and conversation
Conflicts between adversaries take place within a system where all parties agree
on the fundamental rules o f operation. When confronted by adversaries, we critique their
arguments, or even their tactics. When faced with enemies, we discuss their inherent
nature. "Enemies are characterized by an inherent trait or set o f traits that marks them as
evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat regardless o f
what course o f action they pursue.” (Edelman, 1988)
Politicians do at times describe each other as enemies. Witness the difference in
attack ads aired by Jimmy Carter in 1980 and George Bush in 1988. Carter used citizens
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on the street describing Reagan as “risky.” someone who might rashly start a nuclear war.
In Bush's ads, on the other hand, ominous descriptions o f Dukakis' record were closed
with the line. “Now he wants to do for America what he's done for Massachussets.
America can't take that risk.” What Dukakis evidently “wants to do,” the ad's visuals
suggest, is transform the nation into a polluted dump full o f marauding escaped convicts.
Thus Dukakis is guilty not merely o f imprudence but o f intent to harm. It is also
common to hear candidates in primary campaigns state that they "want to focus on the
real enemy" - the opposing party.
Nonetheless, the bulk o f political discourse consists not o f descriptions of
opponents but o f competing arguments. There are a number o f classes o f arguments one
may make about other people's arguments. One accepts that your argument is made in
good faith, but holds it to be incorrect, for any number o f reasons. Although we share a
common goal, you may have misunderstood the nature o f present conditions or the
ramifications o f your proposal. Another would be that we are seeking different goals;
although both goals are worthy, mine is more pressing. Arguments o f this kind, that
recognize the legitimacy o f others’ claims and reasons, can sustain deliberation. If we
acknowledge that others’ arguments are offered in good faith, even if we disagree
deliberation may continue. A final argument I can make against you is that I believe your
argument is made in bad faith. Your proclaimed goal is actually a canard meant to
conceal different, less publicly defensible goals.
In mediated discourse, including the words o f both political actors and journalists,
a common response to any argument is the latter. These meta-arguments are made
consistently: reporters explain the self-interested calculation behind politicians' appeals,
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while the politicians characterize their opponents* arguments as disingenuous. For
example, as the 1996 general election campaign got underway, CNN’s Bill Schneider
predicted that each candidate “will try to portray his opponent as a dangerous radical,
one extremely liberal, one extremely conservative, and both with a hidden agenda.
Well, it looks like w e’re in for another negative campaign” (Inside Politics, 6/17/96).
Moderating a discussion between two political consultants, Fox News Network talk
show host Catherine Crier admitted that “in politics, we always question motives. It's
the standard operating procedure" ( The Crier Report, 4/29/98).
As with attack generally, while political actors may only sporadically describe
other actors as enemies, when they do those arguments are likely to find their way into
news. War metaphors are also common, particularly during campaigns. When A1 Gore
traveled to Texas to criticize George W. Bush’s record in July 2000, ABC News
described it as a mission "deep in enemy territory” ( World News Tonight, 7/20/00). The
Christian Science M onitor said. “It’s a classic ploy in war and politics: Go to your
enem y's home base, discover a weak point, and exploit it” (Baldauf, 2000), while the
Dallas Morning News portrayed Gore’s trip as “parachuting behind enemy lines”
(Minutaglio, 2000) and the Washington Post described Texas as “enemy territory”
(Edsall, 2000).
Politics is thus characterized by news as persistent conflict between antagonists
who never agree, because their values are fundamentally at odds. The legislative
process is not one o f debate, thoughtful consideration, and judgm ent; instead it is a pro
forma squabble before a preordained vote occurs and one side wins. What is the citizen
then to conclude about the prospects for deliberation? While the citizen viewing
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political discourse through the lens o f news may not believe that one side or the other is
actually evil, she may conclude that the participants believe their opponents to be so, or
that they are simply role-playing and are thus not to be taken seriously. If she searches
the mediated public sphere for a model o f deliberation, she will find none.
O f course, it is not plainly evident that citizens simply adopt the stance o f the news
media toward politics. As Thomas Patterson (1993) has argued. “The quest for victory
and power is connected to issues o f leadership and policy in the minds o f both journalists
and voters. It is not that journalists lack a governing schema or that voters do not have a
game schema. But the game schema dominates the journalist’s response to new
information far more than the voter’s response.” In interviews, Neuman, Just and Crigler
(1992) found that a conflict frame structured only six percent o f the comments subjects
made about news stories. Citizens are able to reinterpret and reframe the information
they receive. But as the data presented here indicate, the information presented in
political news may not equip them well for the process o f deliberation. By focusing on
harsh attacks and framing all political debate as conflict, news may make deliberation
appear dangerous. While many citizens may not be influenced by such coverage, there is
evidence that conflict in news affects attitudes toward policy debates and political actors.
In one study, respondents who perceived a media focus on conflict displayed more
cynicism about health care reform (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Those who rely on
television and radio for news do not have more negative cognitive evaluations o f
Congress, but do have more negative emotional reactions (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
1998). The decision to engage in political discussion may involve both cognitive and
emotional considerations. Will the discussion be informative and interesting, or will it be
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argumentative and unpleasant? Many individuals' answers to those questions will be
affected by their perceptions o f the character o f political argumentation.

Conclusion
The data presented here have implications for each o f the elements in our model
o f deliberation. By eliminating evidence from claims, news offers citizens incomplete
information, depriving them o f one o f the principle tools with which they might
deliberate. By focusing on attack, news makes political discussion appear inevitably
conflictual. By making conflict appear intractable, news makes political disagreement
appear harsh and unpleasant. By focusing on strategic interpretations, news defines selfinterest as the primary motivation o f political actions and words. Finally, by privileging
certainty, news discourages those with less than firm opinions from engaging in political
discussion.
While each o f these characterizations may accurately reflect news content, the
extent to which they actually have the hypothesized effects on those who read and watch
the news is an open question, one which the chapters that follow will attempt to address.
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Chapter 3
Conversation and Deliberation

It is hard to explain the place fille d by political concerns in the life o f an American. To
take a hand in the government o f society and to talk about it is his most important
business and. so to say. the only pleasure he knows. That is obvious even in the most
trivial habits o f his life: even the women often go to public meetings and forget household
cares while they listen to political speeches. For them clubs to some extent take the place
o f theaters. An American does not know how to converse, but he argues; he does not
talk, but expiates.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835)

Political discussion is often ignored as a form o f participation because is it not
seen to have systematic effects on electoral or policy outcomes (Huckfeldt, 1999). But
for most people, discussion is the primary arena in which they engage the political world.
Voting occurs only sporadically, and other forms o f participation, such as political protest
or writing letters to representatives, are undertaken by relatively few people. In order to
understand the political world in which citizens reside, we must address the most
common form o f political activity, simple conversation.
Theories o f deliberative democracy are “not simply about ensuring a public
culture o f reasoned discussion on public affairs," (Cohen, 1998) but are concerned more
broadly with issues o f state legitimacy and the exercise o f governmental authority. For
the present discussion, however, we will leave those issues aside and focus on the
presence or absence o f a public culture o f reasoned discussion. In order to assess
deliberation in practice we must abandon, at least temporarily, the conception of
deliberation as a set o f absolute procedures such that when one is violated, we declare
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that deliberation has not occurred. It is more useful to conceive o f a continuum o f
conversation running from the least to the most deliberative. Where the citizens o f a
polity are arrayed on that continuum provides one measure o f the health o f democracy.

Are people talking?
If we are to assess the operation o f deliberation in practice, the first question to
ask is this: are people talking about politics? In 1996, a multi-wave cross-sectional
survey o f the American electorate was conducted at the Annenberg School for
Communication o f the University o f Pennsylvania. Respondents were asked how often
they talked about politics. As Figure 3-1 shows, about half o f the electorate are
infrequent talkers - either never talking about politics or talking less often than once a
week. Another quarter talk once or twice a week, and the remaining quarter are frequent
talkers, discussing politics at least three times a week. There is reason to believe that
these numbers are overstated, perhaps considerably, first because this survey interviewed
only those who claimed to be registered voters, and second because just as many people
claim in surveys to have voted when in fact they have not (Presser & Traugott, 1992), in
the context o f a survey about political affairs it seems probable that some will exaggerate
the frequency with which they talk about politics.
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Figure 3-1
How often do you talk about politics?
(1996 Annenberg survey)
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

5%
0%

Never

Less often

Once or twice Three or four
a week
times a week

Everyday

What can we conclude about political conversation from this distribution? There
is no precise normative standard by which to measure whether a particular individual has
engaged in "enough’’ talk to be considered an active participant in the conversation of
democracy. We can say that as a part o f daily life, political conversation is the exception
rather than the norm for the majority o f Americans. Political discussion, furthermore, is
less common than more passive forms o f political engagement, i.e. media use. Figure 32, taken from the National Election Studies, shows that people watch the news on
television and read the newspaper far more often than they talk about politics.'

1 While the NES survey items for newspaper reading and political discussion have remained the same over
this period, the television news item has changed twice. In 1984 respondents were asked how often they
watched “national network news” ; from 1986 to 1994 they were asked about “the news on TV” ; and since
1996 they have been asked separate questions on local news and national network news. The data points in
the graph for 1996 and 1998 represent each respondent's higher score on those two items.
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By contrast, in 1944 Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1944) wrote that “On any
average day, at least 10% more people participated in discussions about the election either actively or passively - than listened to a major speech or read about campaign
items in a newspaper...One can avoid newspaper stories and radio speeches simply by
making a slight effort, but as the campaign mounts and discussion intensifies, it is hard to
avoid some talk of politics.'’ The informational environment in the 1940’s was very
different than it is today; it seems that unlike their predecessors, contemporary voters
have little trouble avoiding political talk.

Figure 3-2: Media Use and Political Discussion
(NES)
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5

4

Newspaper

2

Discussion
1

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

There is some variation from election year to election year in reported rates of
political conversation. While one might expect that people would discuss politics more
in advance o f presidential elections than before off-year congressional elections, this does
not appear to be the case. Conversation is responsive to campaigns; as the election draws
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near, people do increase the frequency o f their political discussions. Previous surveys,
however, have not captured these changes particularly well, probably because they began
interviewing voters when the intense general election had already begun. While people
give roughly the same answers over the course o f a campaign when they are asked how
often they talk about politics in general, answers to the question "How many days in the
last week did you talk about politics?” show some variation. Specifically, there appears
to be a great deal o f conversation that occurs just after election day. After a few days, the
level o f conversation recedes to its former frequency, around two days per week, as can
be seen in Figure 3-3. Although 1992 was in many ways the more interesting campaign,
with Ross Perot's viable candidacy and a relatively uncertain outcome compared to 1996
when Bill Clinton held a comfortable lead throughout the campaign, leading up to
election day voters in both years reported similar levels o f political discussion.
Discussion spiked immediately following election day, but we see that in 1996 it dropped
o ff precipitously soon after, dropping below a mean o f one day per week. In 1992,
discussion levels stayed somewhat high in the weeks following the election, indicating
that citizens discussed the transition to a new administration.
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Figure 3-3: Political Discussion in General Election
Campaigns (7-day moving average, NES)
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The Annenberg 2000 Survey, a rolling cross-section beginning before the 2000
primaries, shows that discussion can vary substantially depending on the presence or
absence o f a contested primary in a given state. Voters in New Hampshire, who are
subject to the most intensive "retail campaigning" o f the primary season (in addition to
plenty o f advertising) discussed politics much more than voters in other states as their
primary approached. Their frequency o f conversation began to increase approximately
one month before the primary, then jumped substantially in the final ten days. Although
lowans discussed politics less frequently than their counterparts in New Hampshire, a
similar increase in the final ten days before their caucuses occurred among Iowa voters.
Voters in Super Tuesday states (which included California, New York, and many others)
- where the candidates spent substantial time and money only in the last three weeks -
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actually discussed politics more than Iowa voters. Their frequency o f discussion
increased slowly over the two weeks leading up to Super Tuesday.

F ig u re 3-4: Political D isc u ss io n in P rim aries
(2000 Survey, 7-day moving average)
4

3

New Hampshi re
Super Tuesday states

2

1

0
29

27

25

23

21

19

17

15

13

11

9

7

5

3

1

Days to prim ary/caucus

The 2000 primary data contrast sharply with the general election data from the
NES. While in the general election political discussion among voters seems to decline
slightly as election day approaches and then spike immediately after the election, in
primaries voters appear to discuss politics with greater frequency in advance o f the
election. This result could be explained by the fact that most people discuss politics with
like-minded partners. Members o f the same party may have more to talk about in
advance o f a primary, when there is a choice to be made that usually involves far more
subtle distinctions between candidates than are present in a general election.
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Who’s talking?
One o f the justifications commonly offered for a deliberative conception o f
democracy is that it is democratic. While other forms o f decision-making may operate
equally well regardless o f any individual’s participation or non-participation, deliberative
democracy demands that all citizens participate; indeed, the transformative effect o f
deliberation on individuals is one o f its foundations. Thus, for deliberation to be fully
realized, discussion must be nearly universal.
In the real world, we would o f course not expect that every single citizen in a
large society would spend a substantial amount o f his or her time discussing politics.
There will always be some for whom the political world holds little interest. However, if
those who don’t participate are drawn disproportionately from certain groups and not
others, then a distortion o f democracy exists. In fact, this is precisely the case. Political
conversation is part o f a nexus o f activities - including voting, contributing money to
political causes, and use o f public affairs programming in media - which are highly
correlated with those variables we associate with membership in the socio-economic
elite. Foremost among these are income and education level.
Figure 3-5 shows that distortions are present in political conversation just as they
are in other forms o f participation. In order to set aside the anomalous rates o f
conversation respondents report immediately following election day and focus on
habitual conversation, the subsequent tables combine the three pre-election waves o f the
1996 Annenberg national survey (n=2623). First, we see that men talk about politics
more than women, a gap quite a bit smaller in the U.S. than in most European countries
(Inglehart, 1990). Other researchers (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995) have found that both
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men and women talk mostly to those o f the same gender. In addition, men have been
found to express more willingness to speak in public settings when in the minority
(McLeod et al., 1999; Noelle-Neumann, 1993), and speak substantially more often than
women in town meetings (Bryan, 1999).
Whites talk more than blacks and hispanics, the more educated talk more than the
less educated, and the wealthy talk more than the poor.2 The figure also shows the
percentage of respondents who gave answers at the ends o f the conversational spectrum.
We see for instance that nearly half o f those with less than a high school education never
talk about politics, as compared to only 10% o f those with a post-graduate degree. O ver
a third o f those earning less than 520,000 a year never talk about politics, while less than
12% o f those in the highest income category give the same response. In sum, the picture
is one in which political conversation is disproportionately a pastime o f the elite.

2 Ingelhart (1990) found that despite a generally strong relationship between per capita GNP and rates o f
political discussion, the U.S. lags behind most European countries in overall frequency o f discussion.
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Figure 3-5: Frequency of Conversation by Demographics
(Annenberg Survey, 1996)
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When we move to unpack these relationships and predict political discussion, we
see that the ability o f demographic variables to explain variance in discussion levels
drops sharply once controls are introduced. Table 3-1 shows a hierarchical regression
analysis entering demographics, followed by media use, followed by party and
ideological identification, political interest, and political knowledge.
While it is true that men talk more than women, gender fails to predict
conversation once media use is accounted for. Differences between whites and members
o f other racial groups are eliminated in the final stage o f the regression, while education
remains as a predictor, albeit a significantly less powerful one. Although the bivariate
relationship o f age and conversation is a curvilinear one rising up to around age fifty and
then falling, as has been found elsewhere (Straits, 1991), a polynomial term for age
proved insignificant even in the first stage o f the regression. O f the demographic
variables, only income remained a strong predictor in the full model.
The fact that television news watching predicts conversation more strongly than
newspaper reading is a somewhat surprising finding, given that newspapers contain more
information and might thus be expected to produce more conversation; newspaper
reading narrowly failed to be significant, with a p-value o f .053. Apparently, watching
network news is more closely associated with discussion. It should be noted that
newspaper reading is more closely correlated with political knowledge than news
watching, which could partially account for the insignificant result for newspapers in the
full model given the powerful effect o f knowledge. Listening to talk radio was a strong
predictor o f conversation; although almost three-quarters o f respondents reported no talk
radio use, those who do listen are heavy participants in political discussion.
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It should come as no surprise that the strongest predictors o f political discussion
are interest in politics and political knowledge. While the more interested will obviously
be more likely to begin political conversations, the strength o f knowledge as a predictor
suggests that confidence may be a key factor in people's willingness to discuss politics.

T able 3-1: P re d ictin g Political D isc u ssio n
(1996 Annenberg Survey)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

G en der (female)

-.18*
(.08)

-.04

-.09
(.09)

-.02

.01
(-09)

.00

Race (white)

.31**
(.11)

.05

.25*
(.12)

.04

.16
(.12)

.03

E ducation

.26***
(.04)

.14

.23***
(04)

.12

.09*
(0 4 )

.05

Incom e in th o u san d s

.01***
(.002)

.09

.01***
(.002)

.08

.01**
(.002)

.07

N ew spaper

.03
(.02)

.04

.00
(-02)

.00

Network new s

.14***
(-02)

.16

.08***
(.02)

.09

Talk radio

.28***
(.02)

.23

.15***
(.02)

.12

P arty ID (Republican)

.23*
(0 9 )

.05

Ideological strength

.31***
(-06)

.10

Political interest

.68***
(.06)

23

Political know ledge

.08***
(.01)

18

C o n stan t

.61***
(.16)

-.04
(.17)

-2.29***
(2 2 )

R2

.045

.131

.236

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses, standardized coefficients in italic.
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One could argue that the often-observed correlation between education, income
and political sophistication on the one hand and participation on the other is actually
functional for democracy. Since those who participate are those who know more, their
voices are properly being heard more. This is essentially the argument made by Mill in
Representative Democracy when he argued for weighting the votes o f better educated
citizens more heavily. Besides being antidemocratic in essence, this argument assumes
that sophistication is distributed among the population in something approximating a just
way. If those who participate were merely a representative sample o f the larger populace,
then the outcomes they produced would be the same as if all were participating. In
actuality, o f course, they are not representative: they are more wealthy, more white, and
more male (Verba et al, 1993). Political discussion is weighted toward the elite ju st as
other forms o f participation are.

Media and conversation
Beginning with Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet’s seminal study The People's
Choice (1944), interpersonal processes have been seen as a modifier and extender o f
media influence. In their oft-quoted formulation, the authors suggested that “ideas often
flow from radio and print to the opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections
o f the population." Due in part to their higher media use, opinion leaders were better
informed than those with whom they discussed politics (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). The
“two-step flow'’ posited uni-directional communication. Later research indicated that
while some people have more expansive networks than others and are likely to wield
greater influence, and people use political expertise as a criterion in choosing discussion
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partners (Huckfeldt, 1999), status as an "influential" seems unrelated to media use
(Weimann, 1991).
As data from the 1996 Annenberg study show, political conversation and use o f
news media are closely related (Table 3-2). Once again, we see that the respective
relationships o f newspaper reading and viewing o f network news to political discussion
are not as one might have predicted. While newspaper reading and political discussion
are both elite activities to a greater extent than network news watching in terms o f their
relationship to education and income, national news watching is actually more closely
correlated with political discussion than newspaper reading. The difference is relatively
small, but nonetheless in the opposite direction than expected. A substantial number o f
respondents said they read the newspaper nearly every day but never talk about politics,
while far fewer frequent news watchers never discussed politics.

T ab le 3-2
Z ero -O rd e r C o rre la tio n s: C o n v e rsa tio n a n d M edia U se
(1996 Annenberg Survey)
Conversation

Local news

Newspaper

Network
news

Local news

.073**

Newspaper

.154”

.147”

Network
news

.188”

.468”

.232”

Talk radio

.245”

.021

.119”

.054*

Political
interest

.371”

.179”

.172”

.277”

Talk radio

.257”

* p < .05
** p < .01

When addressing media-interpersonal interactions, most current research retains
the focus o f the two-step flow: some variable (e.g. information or influence) comes from
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media, and is then accepted, rejected, adapted, reinterpreted or ignored by individuals
depending on various factors within their individual and interpersonal context. The
interpersonal context, then, serves to mediate the influence o f the media, either by
moderating it or enhancing it. Much o f the research in this area treats personal and mass
media channels as antagonists (Chaffee, 1986). For example, Matthew Mendelsohn
(1996) argues that while press coverage o f campaigns focuses largely on individuals and
personalities, discussion tends to prime issues in voters' minds. Thus, interpersonal and
mass mediated channels pull voters in different directions. An alternative model is a
complementary one, positing that the two in combination produce effects which neither
could alone, as when discussion reinforces and strengthens evaluations o f candidates
(Lenart, 1994). However, the influence o f media on the interpersonal context in the
political realm has, with a few notable exceptions, been overlooked.
There is some evidence that media influence not only the topics and frequency o f
discussion, but the content as well. Using focus groups, William Gamson (1992) found
that in discussions, citizens often used the language, lines o f argument, and interpretive
frames they obtained from the news. However, the nature o f the relationship varied from
issue to issue in complicated ways. Similarly, Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1993) argues
that the media perform an “articulation function”: they “provide people with the words
and phrases they can use to defend a point o f view.” Michael Delli Carpini and Bruce
Williams (1994) also report that the political conversations o f focus-group subjects were
peppered with media references. When offering evidence from their own lives, they
often contextualized personal experience by citing information received from the media.
Like Vincent Price (1992), Delli Carpini and Williams describe public opinion as a
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‘"conversation,” arguing that “although individuals may not regularly talk with each other
about political issues, television is engaged in an ongoing political conversation; when
we turn the set on, we dip into this conversation.” Nonetheless, watching a conversation
take place is fundamentally different than participating in one.
Because o f their informational and agenda-setting value, the news media are
critical to the conduct o f conversation. Michael Schudson (1997) points out that “Much
thinking about the mass media today assumes that face-to-face conversation is a superior
form o f human interaction for which mass communication is a forever flawed substitute."
But the question is less which form o f communication is superior than whether
democratic goals can be achieved without both. As John Dewey (1927) argued, “The
Great Community, in the sense o f free and full intercommunication, is conceivable. But
it can never possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final
work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience o f local associations.”
Using the experience o f recent developments in Israel as a case study, Elihu Katz
has suggested that political conversation may be dependent in part on the perception that
potential conversation partners have been exposed to the same news as one’s self (Katz,
1996). With an ever-increasing number o f sources o f political information, the
possibility that people will become fragmented in their knowledge o f and exposure to
political events presents itself. The stratified character o f political discussion could thus
be exacerbated. Even so, it is possible that the perception o f a shared news source
creating the context for discussion could account for the strong relationship o f network
news watching and conversation.
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From conversation to deliberation
Everyday conversation is unlike formal deliberation in a number o f ways.
Perhaps most importantly, deliberation is undertaken with explicit goals in mind. The
individual participant's goal is to persuade others to her position, while the goal o f the
enterprise as a whole is decision-making. Conversation, on the other hand, is in large
part talk for the sake o f talking. While citizens talking about politics may arrive at
opinions and make decisions (e.g. for whom to vote), these decisions will be individual in
nature, whereas true deliberators make a collective decision (even if some dissent).
Persuasion is a goal that some citizens will choose to pursue in their discussions, while
others will not. Since no immediate outcome hinges on bringing one's partner to one's
view, vigorous and persuasive argumentation is optional.3 Questions may be left
unresolved or uncertainty unaddressed.
Citizens in conversation may often not conceive o f their discussions as "political."
Obviously, the same topic can vary in the political content with which different
conversations infuse it. Wyatt, Katz and Kim (2000) found, for instance, that discussion
o f education and crime at home is more closely related to "personal talk," i.e. family
matters, religion, etc., while at work the same topics are more closely related to "political
talk," i.e. national and state government or foreign affairs. It is possible that a discussion
about crime at work might center on crime trends or municipal policies, while talk about
crime at home could concern personal experiences and fears. It seems likely that both

3 It is worth noting that debate in Congress, though restricted by a variety o f formal rules and informal
norms intended to foster fair and effective deliberation, fails to be deliberative in one critical sense: in most
cases, the participants have made up their minds prior to engaging in debate (Granstaff, 1999). Arguments
are generally intended to persuade not fellow decision-makers but the public at large.
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discussions will contain some combination o f ‘'political” and “personal” content, even if
the partners in one case are those with whom we usually discuss public matters, and in
the other case those with whom we discuss private matters.
In all cases, however, the discussion o f politics takes place among people who
have pre-existing relationships that are not based on political discussion itself. The
occasions o f everyday political conversation are “not perceived as political; therefore, the
scripts that apply to them are embedded not in politics but in the routines o f friendship,
recreation, and parenting.” (Merelman, 1998) As a consequence, norms o f friendly
engagement - which differ from norms o f deliberation - must necessarily be in force. For
many, one important norm will be an avoidance o f argument, without which deliberation
may be impossible.
One o f the defining features o f everyday conversation is that it takes place
primarily among people who share the same opinions. One survey found that 65% o f
respondents indicated that they held precisely the same political orientation as their
intimate circle, and a further 24% indicated a difference o f only one point on a five-point
liberal-conservative scale (Wyatt et al., 2000). O f course, it is not only in political
orientation that social networks tend to be homogeneous; people associate with those who
are similar to them in income, education and race as well (Marsden, 1987).
On the other hand, Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton and Levine (1995) report that when
asked with whom they talked about politics apart from their spouses, 39% o f respondents
named a discussion partner who held different vote preferences. However, this
discordance was masked by a large degree o f misperception o f preferences, meaning that
many discussions between partners o f opposing beliefs were probably sufficiently
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homogeneous in form to conceal any disagreement. There is a difference between the
willingness to discuss a political issue and the willingness to make one’s opinions known
(Scheufele, 1999); discussion in which some participants manage to hide their true
opinions cannot be characterized by mutual vigorous advocacy. In any case, it appears
that people have some opportunity to engage in heterogeneous conversation, but most o f
the time they decline to do so.
If persuasion is an essential element o f deliberation (Bessette, 1994), it would
appear that most citizens do not deliberate. Many if not most conversations consist of
something that would be better termed affirmation. Although it may perform some o f the
same functions as deliberation, such as the sharing o f information and the reduction o f
uncertainty, affirmation is not deliberative. Although partners may certainly address
others' arguments if they have been exposed to them elsewhere (i.e. in news media),
without someone to argue in opposition, they will not be forced to formulate their own
arguments in persuasive terms.
While the workplace is the arena in which people are most likely to encounter
those with opposing views, it is also the place in which people are most hesitant to
discuss political matters (Wyatt et al, 1996), both because o f the possibility o f argument
and the perception that political disagreements could have negative professional
consequences (Jensen, 1990). In the Annenberg 2000 survey, respondents reported
discussing politics with friends and family an average o f almost twice a week during the
presidential primary period, but less than once a week with co-workers. Seventy-one
percent reported no discussion at all with co-workers, compared to forty-three percent
who reported no discussion with friends and family.
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For many, political conversation is thus an activity that is both public and private.
It is public in the sense that the topics o f conversation are those o f the larger political
world, but it remains private in that the discussion is not open to all, but rather is
restricted to partners who share friendship or family ties and, more often than not, the
same material interests as well. The nature o f those individual relationships will shape
the contours o f discussion, whether political or otherwise.
This raises the question o f whether citizens in conversation may truly be
considered a "public.” What distinguishes a public from a mass is the fact that members
o f a public engage one another in debate and discussion. A mass, on the other hand, is
merely a collection o f individuals who share some object o f attention, but are
disconnected from one another. Consequently, a mass is incapable o f any collective will
formation. A number o f opinion researchers have concluded that only a small portion o f
the American electorate could be considered a public, while the great bulk constitute a
mass that is unable or unwilling to engage the political world (Converse, 1964; Lippman,
1927; Neuman, 1986). As I noted earlier, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954)
argued that this situation was functional for democracy as it maintained stability by
limiting stresses on the system, thus making virtue out o f an apparent failure o f
democracy (Peters, 1989).
This position is antidemocratic if the citizens who qualify as members o f the
public are not representative o f the population as a whole; the data plainly indicate that
they are not. Michael Schudson (1998) suggests that “monitorial citizens,” who generally
pay only slight attention to public affairs but stand ready to devote their energy to
deliberation when cued by the news media to do so, might be sufficient to sustain
76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

democracy. While this notion has practical appeal, one wonders whether the threshold o f
coverage necessary to focus the citizenry on a particular matter might be so high that
many important debates pass by with little popular engagement.
In addition, the fact that most people don’t discuss politics with those o f differing
views means that a single overarching “public” may not exist at all even among those
who are talking. Instead, most citizens - even those who are politically sophisticated and
involved - are members o f smaller, more ideologically constricted publics. Although
they may acknowledge each other’s arguments, these individual publics rarely engage
one another directly.
Only on rare occasions do all members o f the public collectively turn their
attention toward a single issue and confront one another across lines o f disagreement.
Two recent cases provide clues to the conditions that foster such deliberation. It may be
that conversation is generated in the greatest quantity when two characteristics o f the
issue are present: first, that individuals can use their personal experience and the
experiences o f others as evidence for positions; and second, that expert opinion is of
relatively little value in arriving at conclusions. This was the case with the issue that
generated perhaps more discussion than any other in memory, that o f the Clarence
Thomas-Anita Hill hearings, and was also the case with the issue o f President Clinton's
alleged affair with Monica Lewinsky. In both cases, objective evidence was minimal,
and citizens found themselves no less equipped than journalists or pundits to speculate
about the truth o f the matter. In addition, in both cases questions o f fact became less
important than the conclusion to be drawn if the allegations were true. What were Hill’s
motives for coming forward? Did Thomas’ alleged behavior constitute harassment, and
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if so did that render him unqualified to serve on the Supreme Court? Would having an
affair with an intern warrant the President’s removal? Should such private matters be of
public concern? These were questions citizens found themselves quite willing and able
to discuss and argue over.
Unfortunately, such occasions are exceedingly rare. Policy questions are usually
complex, and although common sense and a few critical pieces o f information are often
all one needs to arrive at a reasonable judgment, people may not consider themselves
qualified to do so. If the “public" exists “only in so far as there are active exchanges of
views and information among citizens” (Dahlgren, 1995), then most o f the time the
public is dormant.

Conclusion
Why isn’t political discussion a more common feature o f everyday life? Roderick
Hart (1999) suggests that “For many citizens, watching governance has become
equivalent to engaging governance.’’ Robert Putnam’s (1995) analysis might suggest that
low levels o f political talk are only one aspect o f a larger decline in social capital. Others
have countered that the apparent decline in social capital is more accurately described as
a transformation in civic life away from certain types o f activity - within highly
organized groups - and toward more individualized volunteer activities. Thus, it is
argued, true social capital has not declined, but merely changed form (Bennett, 1998b). It
has also been shown that some forms o f television viewing, specifically use o f news and
public affairs programming, is related to public participation in multiple ways, often
positively (Norris, 1996). The data I have presented here support that contention.
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Nonetheless, the fact remains that most people interact with the political world primarily
as spectators.
The relationship between media use and political conversation is a complex and
often contradictory one. Although the picture o f the political world painted by the news
media is one o f confrontation and dispute, many citizens are encouraged by media use to
discuss politics with family, friends, and co-workers despite the potential for argument.
For others, media use discourages political talk, hampering their ability and willingness
to engage in meaningful deliberation. Thus, the fear o f argument, combined with a
perception o f inadequate expertise, serves to restrict public deliberation largely to
members o f the elite. A truly deliberative democracy would include in the dialogue of
democracy, if not all its members, at the very least a representative group. Ours does not
appear to do so.
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Chapter 4
Disagreement and D eliberation

Conflict on substantive issues - the clash o f politics - has a precarious
relationship to deliberation. On one hand, conflict is essential to both generating interest
in public affairs and to any meaningful public deliberation. On the other hand, when it
passes a certain point conflict can become poisonous for deliberation, encouraging
cynicism and withdrawal. When conflict appears fundamental and intractable, it
threatens to make deliberation impossible.
Although some theories o f deliberation emphasize its potential to transform
disagreement by leading discussion to what is held in common, disagreement is an
inevitable part o f political discourse, even under deliberative conditions. As Joshua
Cohen (1997) observes. 'T h e good-faith exercise o f practical reason, by people who are
reasonable in being concerned to live with others, on terms that those others can accept,
does not lead to convergence on one particular philosophy o f life.” The existence o f a set
o f com m on core values does not necessarily ensure that disagreement will always be
resolved once they are invoked and understood. Not all issues are reducible to a single
value, and even when they are, disagreement m ay persist. It is this disagreement that
generates the competing arguments that form the content o f deliberative discussion.
But disagreement can become dysfunctional for democracy if we assume that it is
a sign o f mutually exclusive goals, intractable conflict, and fundamental antagonism. O f
course, disagreement is often unpleasant. But we view different kinds o f disagreement
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differently; how we view political disagreement will in large part determine our
willingness to engage in political discussion.
Alfie Kohn (1992) argues that “What makes disagreement destructive is not the
fact o f conflict itself but the addition o f competition." Embedded within our conception
o f political conversation is the notion that a discussion in which the participants disagree
will have a winner and a loser. In actuality, o f course, deliberation is not zero-sum. For
citizens in particular, the purpose o f deliberation is not decision-making but opinion
formation. Even in the electoral context, the victorious candidate's supporters do not
"w in." The community as a whole chooses a leader; s/he will be the president or senator
or mayor for all in that community, regardless o f whom each citizen voted for. Some
individuals and groups may stand to benefit more than others, but whether an individual
receives those benefits is not contingent on the opinion he holds.
As such, citizens in conversation constitute what Nancy Fraser (1992) calls a
"weak public." Unlike strong publics, weak publics form for the purpose o f opinion
formation but not decision-making. Even in cases o f elections and referenda where
decisions are eventually rendered, the decision is individual and secret, and therefore
aggregate but not collective. Votes are also separated from citizen deliberation by space
and time, further disconnecting the discussion from the decision.
The context in which conflict occurs shapes the effects it has on the participants
and their relationship to each other. In zero-sum contexts, a participant sees others'
losses as her gains, and vice-versa. Actions within the process must serve the goal; if the
goal is victory, those actions will be oriented not toward arriving at the most favorable
solution to the problem which the debate is m eant to address, but toward defeat o f the
81

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

opposition. When legislators deliberate, they often do so under competitive conditions.
The side that sees its proposal instituted will be able to claim credit, which increases the
chances o f electoral success; thus there are finite rewards to be had. For citizens, on the
other hand, the distance between discussion and political outcomes should obviate
competitive considerations. Although the conflicting goals o f individuals may certainly
carry over into the political realm, the nature o f political issues is such that in most cases,
the outcome will be remote enough that self-interest need not be a consideration.
Consequently, political disagreement should be less antagonistic than other kinds
o f disagreement for a number o f reasons. First, the outcome o f the question at hand will
usually not result in differential benefits for the participants, at least not directly. Second,
just as one's vote has only a small effect on the outcome o f an election, a single
conversation has a small effect on public opinion and the ultimate outcome o f collective
deliberation. Finally, the process o f conversation will elucidate the experience,
perspective, and reasoning o f one's partner in ways that, while not necessarily resulting
in agreement, will at least allow discussants to "agree to disagree” amicably. Further
conversation on other topics where common ground may be found thus will remain a
possibility (Ackerman, 1989). It has been observed that the exercise o f reason is no more
likely to produce agreement than other forms o f decision-making; it can, in fact, produce
more disagreement as deliberators are exposed to arguments they had not previously
considered (Cohen, 1989; Knight & Johnson, 1994). The kind o f disagreement that is
produced, however, should leave open the possibility o f future agreement. Nonetheless,
political conversation seems to many to be an arena o f competition.
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A number o f researchers have identified people’s reluctance to engage in political
discussion. Robert Lane (1962) found that "more than a third o f the men say there isn’t
much point to having political discussion with one’s friends.” Doris Graber (1984)
reported that "both men and women tended to limit discussions to consensual remarks
and to avoid political discussions that were likely to be controversial. In fact, several
panelists expressed strong reluctance to discuss politics at all. Some said that politics and
religion were topics that they avoided because they considered them potentially divisive.”
Similarly. Nina Eliasoph (1998) was told by one o f her subjects, "You don’t talk about
politics with your friends. Not if you want to keep them.” Political disagreement is thus
considered so powerful that it can destroy friendships.
The desire to avoid political disagreement is, o f course, related to a more general
impulse to avoid disagreement in conversation altogether. While deliberation demands
that differences o f opinion be explored and elaborated, the norms o f friendly conversation
often demand that they be muted or avoided. According to Charles Willard (1989), in
everyday conversation ‘‘an antipathy for disagreement is the most uniform and universal
finding in the interviews: arguments should be avoided whenever possible;
disagreements are impediments to getting things done; they become unpleasant; only
quarrelsome people really like them; disagreement is inevitable, but best kept
submerged.” On some topics, this impulse may simply move conversation to areas o f
agreement, as W illiam Gamson (1992) found his subjects’ discussions did when
disagreement appeared. This move can have the functional effect o f moving discussion
forward by confirming shared values, or the dysfunctional effect o f changing the subject
without exploring a critical question.
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Michael Schudson (1997) draws a distinction between homogeneous and
heterogeneous political conversation, 'i n homogeneous conversation, people talk
primarily with others who share their values and they expect that conversation will
reinforce them in the views they already share...In [heterogeneous] conversations,
friendly testing is all but impossible; in these settings, there are penalties for expressing
uncertainty and doubt, rewards for speaking with conviction and certainty." The
operative assumption is that a heterogeneous conversation is a competitive one.
Unsurprisingly, m any o f the terms we use to describe argumentation involve metaphors
o f war and violence (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Uncertainty and doubt give one's partner
an advantage; penalties and rewards lead toward defeat or victory.
If we don’t talk politics with those with whom we disagree (or hide our true
feelings when we do), we know our opponents only as abstractions, making it easier to
discount them and their interests. Even if, for instance, I know that my neighbor favors
the Blue Party while I favor the Yellow Party, and even if we have pleasant non-political
conversations, unless I talk with her about politics I need not seriously consider Blue
Party arguments. In political discussion where we make our true feelings known, it
becomes impossible to disconnect her political views from her personality. My general
empathy for her necessarily becomes part o f my political evaluation, as I am forced
through the process o f discussion to respond to her arguments.
Nina Eliasoph (1997) asserts that there exists a “culture o f political avoidance”
that operates apart from any generalized fear o f disagreement. I modify this position
somewhat by arguing that fear o f political disagreement is in fact at the heart o f political
avoidance. People view political disagreement as particularly dangerous, not simply
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because political discussion may involve fundamental values, but because the political
realm is seen as an arena where enemies engage each other with poison-tipped verbal
arrows.
Avoidance o f political disagreement is not simply part o f human nature; rather, it
is a component o f American political culture. In some other countries, people feel as
comfortable arguing about politics as Americans do arguing about sports. Israelis, for
instance, consider politics a subject that creates shared ground among non-intimates
(Wyatt, Katz, & Liebes, 1995). In the United States, we are more apt to believe that
politics is best discussed only in “safe” situations, those in which all participants have the
same views.

What's wrong with conflict?
As I discussed in Chapter 2, conflict is a primary organizing frame around which
political news narratives are built. Is there necessarily anything wrong with this
construction in the abstract? After all, all drama is based on conflict; without it, news
might not be able to generate any interest in political matters. One group o f researchers
has shown that in certain cases the perception o f conflict is actually associated with
greater knowledge about an issue (Olien, Donohue, & Tichenor, 1995; Tichenor,
Donohue, & Olien, 1999). They argue that conflict can lead to a renewed emphasis on
traditional norms, the emergence o f new norms, and heightened group identification and
cohesion. But as they observe in their study o f local issues, politics in small,
homogeneous communities tends to be less conflictual and based less on intergroup
differences than politics in larger communities. In addition, local issues are less likely to
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divide along traditional liberal/conservative lines. Thus the idea that those who disagree
about a given topic o f local concern could never agree about anything has less purchase
than it does in the context o f national politics.
Defining conflict in terms o f mutually exclusive groups has benefits and pitfalls.
Richard Merelman (1991) argues that group conflict promotes all the key elements o f
democracy, including popular participation, majority rule, and the protection o f the rights
o f minorities. Even if this picture is an accurate one, there is a danger that consistent
definition o f politics in group terms will enhance the perception o f politics as zero-sum
competition, where benefits received by one group are necessarily taken from other
groups. Heightening the salience o f group membership can clarify issues, but it can also
encourage stereotypical thinking and polarized opinion formation (Price, 1989). One
content analysis has identified a trend toward increasing identification o f individuals
quoted in news by their group identity (Mutz, 1998). If political news is organized
around group conflict, one key question is whether citizens adopt that paradigm as their
own. Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) report that while conflict was among the most
common frames in news, it made up only 6% o f the frames used by citizens to discuss
political issues in depth interviews. On the other hand, Gamson (1992) argues that
drawing distinctions between “us” and “them” is an important part o f social conversation
about politics. Many people define their political views in large part by what they
oppose, rather than what they favor (Walsh, 1999).
In order for conflict to emerge in conversation, one must know someone with
opposing views. Jan Leighley (1990) found that the presence o f conflict in one's social
network (measured by whether a discussion partner had tried to convince the respondent
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to change his/her vote) heightened participatory activity, including voting, contacting
government officials, and volunteering for a campaign. This finding is in some ways an
extension o f Mark G ranovetters (1973) work on "the strength o f weak ties." Granovetter
showed that since the family and friends with whom we are closest usually share our
perspectives, experiences, and knowledge, it is our acquaintances who are more critical in
bringing new information to our attention. In homogeneous networks, inaccurate
information is more likely to go uncorrected (Chaffee, 1986). Those with whom we
disagree politically are more likely to bring to our attention uncomfortable facts and
novel arguments. In addition, by requiring us to construct arguments to defend our
positions, they force clear and logical articulation o f our beliefs. Leighley’s findings
accord with one o f the principal theoretical justifications for deliberation, that engaging
with others in debate not only builds knowledge and political judgm ent, but enhances
feelings o f citizenship. The benefits o f heterogeneous conversation can only be realized,
however, if people are willing to engage in political conversation those with whom they
disagree.

Disagreement in conversation
In order to engage in heterogeneous conversation, citizens must encounter those
with whom they disagree politically. The primary arena o f political conversation is the
home simply because we see our families every day. In addition, the vast majority of
spouses share the same political beliefs (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). Outside the home,
a number o f variables will help determine the amount o f political disagreement to which
an individual is exposed: the range o f opinions in her social and work contacts, the range
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o f opinions in her community, her choice o f conversation partners, and the extent to
which she and those partners avoid disagreement when discussing politics (Huckfeldt et
al, 1998). Any one o f these factors can work to suppress political conversation.
Nonetheless, since people may have numerous discussion partners in varying contexts,
even if most discussion is among the like-minded, most people will encounter
disagreement somewhere (Huckfeldt et al., 1995). It appears, however, that the amount
they encounter is rather small.
Data from recent Annenberg studies produce similar results. The 1998 California
study asked respondents, “When you discuss politics with your family or friends, how
often is there some difference o f opinion? Would you say there is some difference of
opinion often, sometimes, rarely or never?” As Figure 4-1 shows, most respondents
claim a difference o f opinion at least “sometimes.” In the California sample. 18.6% of
respondents were frequent talkers (at least three times per week) and said that their
political conversations “often” contained differences o f opinion. Those who said they
never talked about politics are not shown in this figure.
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Figure 4-1: How often is there a difference
of opinion? (1998 California study)
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There is also a positive relationship between conversation and disagreement:
people who talk about politics more frequently are more likely to cite disagreement. For
those who talk less frequently, when discussion occurs it is almost always consensual.
Data from the Annenberg 2000 survey, which also asked about political discussion at
work, show that despite low overall levels o f conversation at work, people who encounter
at least some disagreement at work discuss politics just as often there as they do with
family and friends.
There is reason to believe that disagreement would be inversely related to
partisanship; that is, those who strongly identify with a party would be less likely to
encounter disagreement. While strong partisans may be more willing to speak up and
thus initiate disagreements, they may also be more likely to selectively perceive
agreement with their strongly held views. In addition, their friends and co-workers,
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knowing how opinionated they are, may be more likely to avoid engaging partisans in
discussion. Furthermore, because o f their staunchly held beliefs, strong partisans may
consider agreement to be a more important criterion in choosing discussion partners than
weak partisans do. On the other hand, strong partisans might seek out disagreement in
order to advocate for their party. As it happens, the differences between strong and weak
identifiers are sm all.1 Strong party identifiers are slightly more likely than weak
identifiers and independents to cite disagreement. However, when the frequency o f
overall political conversation is controlled, this difference largely disappears.
Incorporating respondents' overall level o f political conversation allows us to
examine the absolute frequency o f disagreement. In order to do so, a variable combining
the two measures was created.2 The distribution o f this variable is striking in how
infrequent disagreement appears to be. A quarter o f the sample encountered no political
disagreement whatsoever. Only twelve percent o f the sample encountered disagreement
more than once a week.

1 It should be noted that the California sample, while reasonably representative on standard demographic
items, is quite unrepresentative in the area o f party identification. The sample contains twice as many
Democrats as Republicans, whereas in national random samples identification with the two parties is
usually roughly even.
2 This variable was generated by assigning percentages to each response to the question, “How often is
there some difference o f opinion?” then multiplying those percentages by the respondent’s frequency o f
general political conversation. The percentages were as follows: never=0, rarely=.l, sometimes=.25,
often=.5.
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Figure 4-2: Exposure to Disagreement
(1998 California study)
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When we attempt to predict frequency o f disagreement, we see that respondents
with higher incomes, the more knowledgeable, and those who are highly interested in the
governor's campaign score higher. Since this variable is a function o f respondents'
overall level o f conversation, it is unsurprising that exposure to national news and talk
radio are significant predictors, as they are o f conversation. When the level o f general
political conversation is controlled, newspaper reading and use o f local and national news
are unrelated to frequency o f disagreement; only talk radio remains significantly
correlated. One figure from this regression stands out in contrast to the results o f
predictions o f conversation: local news watching is actually associated with a decrease in
the degree to which a respondent participates in heterogeneous conversation. Although
the coefficient does not reach statistical significance (p=.14), it does suggest that local
news m ay be suppressing heterogeneous conversation. When other factors are
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controlled, local news is unrelated to both political knowledge and general political
conversation.

T ab le 4-1: P re d ic to rs o f F re q u e n c y o f D isa g re e m e n t
(1998 California study)
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Although most people do have occasion to encounter disagreement somewhere,
the fact remains that for most people most o f the time, political conversation happens
without disagreement. One could argue that despite the multiple benefits heterogeneous
conversation offers, citizens seem to do well enough without it. While psychological
experiments have shown that agreement can push attitudes in extreme directions (Baron,
1996), in recent years Am ericans’ political opinions have actually moved in the direction
o f consensus on many issues (DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996). One exception is
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abortion, an issue on which people have in large part “agreed to disagree." What this
means, o f course, is that we have agreed not to discuss the issue, at least with those
whose opinions differ from our own.
Many homogeneous conversations may indirectly engage opposing opinions, if
only through reference to arguments obtained through the news media. I would argue
that such engagement, while valuable, cannot substitute for interactive discussion with
someone who holds those views. Engaging in a heterogeneous discussion requires one to
both listen to opposing arguments and to construct arguments that have the potential to
persuade others; in this process the benefits o f deliberation are to be found. In short,
homogeneous conversation, while not without substantial value, does not qualify as
deliberation.

Discourse and disagreement
One o f the themes running through this study is that our understanding o f what
“politics" is - what occurs in the political world, how we should think, speak and act
when we engage ourselves politically - is shaped by the presentation we see in news
media. As I argued previously, news emphasizes conflict, assuming that all actions are
undertaken to achieve victory, and that outcomes have winners and losers.3 This

3 Even esteemed researchers are not immune from the impulse to cast politics in competitive terms, even
when elections are not at issue. At one point in The Spiral o f Silence, Noelle-Neumann describes the
results o f one set o f survey data on the phenomenon as one where “those confident o f victory speak up,
while losers tend toward silence." The topics in question were support for a treaty between East Germany
and West Germany and opinions o f Chancellor Willy Brandt. Note that in neither o f these two topics is
there truly a “winner” or “loser,” and more to the point, even if there were the views o f individual citizens
would not determine whether they won or lost If the treaty is adopted, its advocate and critic will be
affected equally. If Brandt wins his next election (although the question being asked was not about voting),
his supporter and opponent will both live under his policies. One should hesitate before referring to
citizens expressing opinions as “winners” and '‘losers.”
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tendency is manifest in the framing o f events and in the choices made by reporters when
quotes are selected for publication.
As we saw in Chapter 2, news overrepresents conflict in the discourse o f
candidates. In speeches, debates, and advertising, candidates' attacks on their opponents
are more likely to find their way into news than are explanations o f their own positions.
The result is a picture o f campaigns that is substantially more negative than is actually the
case. As a general principle, the harsher the attack, the more likely it is to be reported.
This is particularly true o f arguments that attack the character o f opponents as opposed to
their positions.
In the context o f citizen deliberation, vilifying one's fellow participants is a sure
way to break off discussion. Since conversation between citizens is voluntary, primarily
expressive (as opposed to goal-oriented), and undertaken by those with personal
relationships existing outside o f the political world, norms o f friendly engagement
necessarily must be in force. In elite discourse - whether it takes place in legislative
bodies or in media forums - participants are not necessarily friendly; therefore a different
set o f conversational norms obtains. Debate in legislatures and through the media fails to
be deliberative in one significant way: the participants have generally decided their
positions before they engage in speech. They spend a great deal o f time speaking, but are
not required to listen (Barber, 1984); witness the fact that members o f Congress routinely
give speeches to an empty chamber. Listening requires an openness to change and an
empathy for the speaker largely missing from the mediated public sphere. This is one
significant respect in which mediated discourse is a problematic model for citizen
deliberation.
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In addition, mediated discourse is marked by frequent motive questioning, as
speakers charge that those who disagree with them are hiding their true intentions behind
a cloak o f common interest argumentation. Imputations o f bad motives and bad character
have long been decried as political fallacies undermining the pursuit o f solutions to
political problems. The assertion that one’s opponent’s intents are unworthy “is an all
purpose argument which can be used to discredit any position, whatever its moral
merits." (Guttman & Thompson, 1996). Importantly, the charge asks listeners to ignore
the content o f arguments. It is also unanswerable; I have no way o f proving to you what
is in my heart. As we will see in Chapter 5, most people do in fact believe that in
political questions others are motivated primarily by self-interest. Given that so few
arguments in the public forum are explicitly self-interested, the vision o f the public
sphere is thus one in which most o f those engaging in public debate are attempting to
deceive their listeners. One o f the potential advantages o f friendly deliberation - that
arguments are less easily discounted when offered by those for whom the listener has
preexisting good will —is turned on its head when motive questioning becomes a standard
element o f political argumentation. If those with whom we disagree by definition have
bad motives, we need never attempt to adopt their perspectives and enlarge our own
thinking about the issue at hand.
One further element o f news reporting —the standard o f objectivity —enhances the
impression o f political disagreement as fundamental value conflict. “Objective”
reporting is usually operationalized as an imperative to present “both sides” o f an issue.
News presentations thus tend to present issues as two-sided conflicts, even in cases where
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areas o f agreement are more substantial than areas o f disagreement, or when there are
more than two sides.
In the picture painted by the news, politics is thus characterized by persistent
conflict between antagonists who never agree, because their values are fundamentally at
odds. When they engage each other in discussion, they do so on terms that are less than
honest. Political disagreement is presented as more fundamental, less likely to be
resolved amicably, and more unpleasant than other kinds o f disagreement. The key
question is whether this presentation affects the beliefs and behavior o f those exposed to
it.

Fear o f argument
Do people fear political disagreement? Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (1993) argues
that what people fear is actually social isolation. Those who believe they are in the
minority don’t engage others in conversation for fear that they will be set apart from the
group. As a result, majority opinion appears increasingly universal, to the point where
minorities are effectively silenced. Although testing by other scholars o f the “spiral of
silence" has produced mixed results (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997), even if it
accurately describes patterns o f discussion Noelle-Neumann’s theory is not incompatible
with an explanation based on an avoidance o f disagreement. Most o f Noelle-Neumann’s
tests, furthermore, rely on hypothetical situations concerning interaction with strangers:
whether one would talk to someone on a train, wear a campaign button, etc.
I argue that while the fear o f social isolation may be real, another distinct force
also inhibits political conversation. In order to illustrate how a fear o f political
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disagreement can operate independently o f a fear o f social isolation, I offer a reanalysis
o f data presented by Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague (1987). The authors
interviewed subjects, then interviewed the people whom the subjects identified as their
discussion partners. They show that respondents are much more likely to misperceive
their discussants’ vote choice when it differs from their own. and offer two possible
explanations for this result. The first is that a kind o f selective perception may be
operating, in that the respondents ignore evidence o f disagreement, then project their own
beliefs on to their discussants. A second explanation is that the misperception is a result
o f the discussant intentionally concealing his/her own preferences in the knowledge that
revealing them might initiate disagreement.
Results from the South Bend studies support the second explanation. The
likelihood o f respondents misperceiving their discussants' vote choice is further
influenced by the level o f support for the candidates (in this case Reagan and Mondale) in
the respondents' neighborhood. I reproduce this table because my interpretation o f the
data is somewhat more detailed than that o f the authors, for whom these findings were
one small part o f a larger project. I have also drawn lines that do not appear in the
original, in order to illustrate the points made about the different situations described.
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Table 4-2
Probability That Main Respondent Correctly Perceives Whether The Discussant Is a Reagan Voter by
Main Respondent’s Vote, the Discussant’s Vote, and the Proportional Reagan Vote in the Main
Respondent’s Neighborhood
Vote o f the Main
Respondent and Discussant

Reagan-Reagan
Reagan-Mondale
Mondale-Reagan
Mondale-Mondale

Neighborhood Reagan_Support________
Low (.31)
High (.78)

.68 C .
.88 B —— - .54 D
.93 A

^^__A
D
B
C

.95
.47
.84
.76

Source: Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987)

The differences between pairs o f situations show support for both the spiral o f
silence and my hypothesis o f disagreement avoidance. The highest level o f accurate
perception appears when both members o f the dyad agree, and they agree with the
prevailing climate o f opinion (line A). In this case, the discussant risks neither
disagreement nor social isolation in revealing his preferences. Note that the issue here is
the opinion and behavior o f the discussant, since he is the one whose opinion will be
perceived accurately or inaccurately.
The next highest level o f accuracy comes in the case o f line B. In this situation,
the respondent is at odds with the prevailing environment o f opinion, while the discussant
is not. The spiral o f silence would explain this finding with the fact that discussant, who
is in the majority, does not fear social isolation and thus freely states his views.
Consequently, the respondent becomes aware of the discussant’s opinion, and reports it
accurately. However, the respondent is slightly less accurate in this case than in the first
situation.
In the case o f line C, the respondents agree, but both are at variance with the
prevailing climate o f opinion, and there occurs a higher level o f misperception. Finally,
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in line D, the respondent agrees with the prevailing climate, but the discussant does not.
This situation shows the highest level o f misperception.
Let us begin with the assumption that if a discussant strongly expresses his
beliefs, the respondent will be unable to misperceive them. The respondent can "fill in"
the discussant's beliefs up to a point, but if the discussant is clear and unambiguous about
her preferences, this will become impossible. Some threshold o f intentional ambiguity
will have to be passed before the respondent can project his own beliefs on to the
discussant. I propose further that there are two potential sources o f this ambiguity. The
first is offered by the spiral o f silence; that is, being in the minority within the
environment. The discussant would fear social isolation if his preferences were known,
and thus keeps them hidden. The second source o f ambiguity is the knowledge or
suspicion that one’s discussion partner holds conflicting views. In some cases, these two
will work in concert, and we are unable to distinguish between the two; even if we
assume that the discussants are aware o f the distribution o f opinion within the
environment, we know nothing about their awareness o f the respondents’ opinions, which
would determine the potential for conflict between the two. In other cases, one incentive
will be present while the other will not. Selective perception and projection, on the other
hand, should operate the same whether one is in majority or minority. The impulse on
the part o f the respondent to reduce dissonance in the relationship is the same.
The data seem to contradict the selective perception/projection hypothesis. In the
case o f situation C (both members o f the dyad agree but are in the minority), if the
discussant is vague about his opinions, the hypothesis predicts that the respondent would
simply assume agreement, and thus there should thus be accurate perception even if the
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discussant is vague. However, in this case the level o f misperception is high. This means
that in dyads where the discussant is vague, the respondent assumes incorrectly that the
discussant agrees with the prevailing climate, and thus disagrees with the respondent.
We see a complementary result in situation B, where the two incentives for the discussant
to be vague are at odds (discussant and respondent disagree, but discussant is in
majority). In this case, if the respondent were to assume in the presence o f vagueness
that the discussant agreed with him, the result would be misperception. If, on the other
hand, the respondent assumed that the discussant agreed with the majority, he would be
correct, and misperception would be rare. In fact, this is what occurs; the probability o f
accurate perception here is nearly as high as in situation A, where there are no incentives
for vagueness, and selectivity in the direction o f dyadic agreement and environmental
agreement lead to the same accurate conclusion. In the final situation (D), all incentives
point toward ambiguity (fear o f social isolation and o f disagreement) and toward
inaccuracy (assumptions o f agreement and o f majority concurrence).
In sum, Huckfeldt and Sprague’s data do not seem to support the hypothesis of
selective perception and projection. Instead, it appears that when one discussion partner,
motivated by disagreement avoidance or fear o f social isolation, conceals her views, the
other partner is more likely to assume her to agree with the majority. Perhaps more
importantly, these data indicate that in a substantial number o f cases, people who discuss
politics are vague enough about their opinions that their regular partners are able to
misperceive even such fundamental opinions as presidential vote preference. A later
study (Huckfeldt et al., 1998) showed that a full 43.9% o f respondents in all discussion
dyads not including spouses (including both those with whom the respondent discussed
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"important matters” and politics) and 40.5% in political discussion dyads misperceived
their discussant's presidential preference. If these data are representative, in two o f every
five cases one individual in a discussion dyad is vague enough for his partner to
misperceive his opinions, a rather striking figure. It should also be noted that any case in
which an individual keeps silent because she is in the minority could be explained equally
reasonably by avoidance o f disagreement as by fear o f isolation. If she voices her
opinion, she will be contradicted, and the result may be an argument. In such cases it
may be not the fact o f isolation but the experience o f argument that people find
unpleasant. These studies illustrate the distinction between the willingness to discuss
politics and the willingness to make one’s opinions known (Scheufele, 1999). It appears
that significant numbers o f people are able to have political conversations while keeping
their own beliefs hidden.
Why should people find political argument threatening? A study by Robert Wyatt
et al (1995) provides insight into the reasons people choose not to engage in political
discussion. Their American subjects cited the workplace as the environment in which
they would be least likely to state their political views. On a list o f thirty-three possible
reasons for keeping quiet, the highest scores were given to “Saying what’s on your mind
may harm or damage other people,” “Speaking your mind may hurt the feelings o f those
you care for,” “You want to be polite,” and “You like for everything to go smoothly.”
All o f these justifications are geared toward maintaining the friendly nature o f
relationships that in many cases are built on fragile foundations. Since people seldom
choose their co-workers, the possibility o f significantly differing political views is a real
one. The more explicitly stated “You like to avoid arguments” ranked eighth on the list,
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ahead o f a variety o f items tapping feelings o f insecurity, inefficacy, and fear o f official
reprisal. Interestingly, items tapping the fear o f hurting others ranked higher than items
measuring fear o f being hurt oneself.
In order to examine the operation o f the fear o f political argument, we inserted the
following item in the survey o f California voters: “Sometimes people decide not to join
in a discussion about politics because they think that if they do, they will end up in an
argument. Would you say this describes you often, sometimes, rarely or never?’’ This
wording was chosen to isolate the idea o f argument as an interaction in which people
express opposed opinions, irrespective o f whether the respondent finds him/herself in the
majority or minority. As I will use the term throughout this section, “argument” refers to
something two or more people have, as opposed to something one person makes (Jacobs,
1987).4 The responses to the survey question were distributed fairly evenly (Figure 4-3).

Figure 4-3: Avoid political talk to avoid
argument? (1998 California study)
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4 While it is possible that some respondents heard the question to refer to the latter and not the former, the
fact that the question used the wording “end up in an argument” makes this unlikely.
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There are a number o f factors apart from media use that could affect this variable,
which I will call fear o f argument. Some are personality factors for which we have no
measure; some people are simply quarrelsome and therefore do not fear argument.3
Others may not be argumentative generally, but may enjoy political argument in
particular (Infante & Rancer, 1993). Critically, in order to avoid political discussion an
individual must be presented with the opportunity to engage in it in the first place.
Because o f the others with whom they interact in their social and work environments,
many people encounter few political discussions. Therefore they would score low on this
measure, but not because they are bravely forging ahead with political conversation
despite the potential for conflict. Their potential discussion partners’ own feelings about
political argument could play a role as well (Levine & Boster, 1996). Unfortunately, we
have no measure o f the opportunity our survey respondents have to discuss politics.
Another variable influencing fear o f argument would be political interest. Highly
interested citizens might be unable to tear themselves away from a political discussion,
even if it threatened to become hostile. Those with little interest in politics, on the other
hand, would avoid political discussion because it bored them, not because they feared
argument. One would thus predict a curvilinear relationship between interest and fear o f
argument, low at the ends and high in the middle. It is those with some interest who
would show the highest levels o f fear o f argument.
A final mitigating factor could be political knowledge. Some individuals’ fear o f
argument could be a function o f the confidence they have in their knowledge o f the

5 Although gender stereotypes might predict that men would be less likely to fear argument, there was no
difference between men and women on this variable.
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subject matter, and the consequent likelihood that they would be able to hold their own in
an argument. If that were the case, the more knowledgeable would be less likely to fear
argument. Unlike interest, the relationship with knowledge should, all other things being
equal, be a linear one. However, because interest, knowledge, and media use are
ordinarily all correlated, bivariate analysis o f all three could show a curvilinear
relationship, with fear o f argument peaking in the middle range.
It should be noted that in this sample, watching o f both local news and national
news is uncorrelated with knowledge o f the gubernatorial candidates. While the network
news shows certainly did not cover the California governor’s race with any regularity,
one might have expected that voters would have learned about the candidates from their
local news programs. A content analysis conducted by the Annenberg School revealed,
however, that television coverage o f the gubernatorial campaign was overwhelmingly
focused on strategy and tactics, while issues were given relatively little attention.
As John Zaller (1992) notes, in many cases those in the middle ranges o f political
awareness are the most susceptible to persuasion; the least aware do not receive any
persuasive messages, while the most aware not only receive adequate competing
messages but are also able to rebuff attempts at persuasion. While his argument concerns
the dynamics o f persuasion in communication environments with competing messages,
the curvilinear relationships he locates are similar to the one we expect with regard to
fear o f argument.
The expectations about the relationship o f knowledge and interest to fear o f
argument are not borne out by the data, however. While those at high levels o f interest
admit a slightly lower fear o f argument, there was no difference between those at low and
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moderate levels o f interest. All levels o f political knowledge showed roughly the same
degree o f fear o f argument. It is only on levels o f media use that we see a substantial
relationship with fear o f argument. Different media, furthermore, show different
patterns. Specifically, newspaper reading and talk radio use appear unrelated to fear o f
argument, while watching o f both local and national news show confirmation o f the
curvilinear hypothesis.
As Figure 4-4 shows, it is neither the heavy news watchers nor the light news
watchers who are more likely to admit to avoiding political discussion in order to avoid
argument. Instead, it is those in the middle - people who say they watch the news three
times a week - who are most likely to say they avoid political discussion because o f the
possibility o f argument.

Figure 4-4
Fear of Argument by News Watching
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This result has important implications for the operation o f deliberation in people's
everyday lives. One o f the key challenges for democracy is the engagement o f the m ass
of citizens in the middle ranges o f awareness and attention (Neuman, 1986). W hile w e
would expect that there will always be a small number o f highly engaged citizens and a
small number o f utterly disengaged citizens, the degree to which a system lives up to the
ideals o f democracy is determined in large part by the character o f the bulk o f the
electorate who resides in the middle. Plainly, if those who pay some (but a not a great
deal of) attention to public affairs find themselves reluctant to engage in political
conversation for fear o f argument, deliberation will take place only among the highly
engaged elite.
Unsurprisingly, those who admit to avoiding political conversation because o f a
fear o f argument talk less in total than those who do not express such a fear (Figure 4-5).
This relationship is significant not only at the bivariate level but in regression analysis
controlling for all other relevant predictors o f conversation as well.

Figure 4-5: Frequency of Conversation by
Fear Of Argument (1998 California study)
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Conclusion
By itself, the perception that political discussion involves unpleasant contention
can suppress conversation only if one knows that potential participants do not share one's
views, or if one suspects they might not. If fear o f argument is a significant factor in
deciding whether to have political discussions, uncertainty as to the beliefs o f one’s co
workers or social contacts will lead many people to avoid political discussions. A key
factor in creating this uncertainty is the relative lack o f class-based politics in America.
While there are certain demographic groups that vote overwhelmingly for one party (e.g.
Jews and African-Americans), by and large class is not a useful means to predict the
views o f one’s companions. A factory worker in most western European countries can be
fairly sure that his co-workers support the labor-oriented or social democratic party; a
factory worker in the United States will be less sure. While class-based voting has
become less prevalent in recent years in many European countries, it has always been far
less a factor in the U.S. (Inglehart, 1990), and what link exists between class and voting
patterns has been eroding over time (Kinder, 1983). Both major parties represent a
sometimes uneasy amalgam o f economic and social policy positions. As a result, people
are largely unable to make accurate predictions o f others’ political beliefs.
The less firmly grounded a relationship is, the more threatening disagreement can
become. Most people argue most regularly (and vociferously) with their families;
familial relationships can sustain an extraordinary amount o f conflict. Other less
important relationships, such as those among co-workers, may not be able to survive even
occasional disagreement if the participants feel that it is fundamental in some way. If two
friends disagree about the merits o f a particular quarterback, each assumes that the other
107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

is offering arguments in good faith, that there are no hidden agendas, and that the very
fact o f disagreement does not indicate a fundamental value difference that goes beyond
the subject at hand. All too often, the opposite assumptions are made when politics is the
issue being discussed. People seem to lack - or believe they lack - a language o f
political argumentation that can sustain deliberation. They doubt their ability to make an
argument without having an argument.
If the sketch I have drawn o f political discourse is an accurate one, it should not
be necessary for an individual to be exposed to a great deal o f that discourse in order to
arrive at the conclusion that politics is an unfriendly realm where opponents quickly
become antagonists. While those with a great deal o f interest in political affairs will
continue to engage their fellow citizens regardless, those with some degree o f exposure
will be less willing to deliberate in any meaningful way. In a perfectly operating
deliberative democracy, there would be a positive linear relationship between media
exposure and conversation. Those with moderate interest and exposure would participate
in a moderate quantity o f deliberation. News media should provide them with the facts
and arguments they need to deliberate meaningfully (Noelle-Neumann, 1993), more so if
they are exposed more and less so if they are exposed less. The distortion in patterns o f
conversation is that those who are exposed to moderate amounts o f television news
resemble those at the low end o f the scale more than they resemble those at the top end o f
the scale. They discuss politics infrequently, and when they do, their conversations are
unlikely to involve much disagreement.
Without the give-and-take involved in hearing discordant views and attempting to
convince others that one’s own view is the correct one, true deliberation cannot take
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place. The process o f building arguments aimed at persuading skeptical others is a
primary source o f deliberation’s benefits. Such arguments must be logically consistent,
incorporate relevant information, and be articulated in terms acceptable to those with
divergent interests. In contrast, arguments made to listeners who already agree with a
speaker may be far weaker. While homogeneous discussions can in principle be
deliberative, the fact that they need not be makes the likelihood that many are not a
strong one.
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Chapter 5
Self-Interest, Conversation, and Deliberation

The extent to which citizens should concern themselves with the good o f others in
the political realm is an essential question for theories o f public opinion and deliberation.
For most theorists, the goal o f deliberation in the public sphere is to arrive at the common
good through a discursive participatory process. In Jurgen Habermas' (1989) account,
individual and group interests are set aside before deliberation begins. The ability to
ignore self-interest is thus a pre-condition o f participation in deliberation. Although
others have critiqued and modified this notion as a normative requirement o f public
speech, discourse in the public sphere is generally thought to be o f the greatest value
when it addresses the common good. Arguments must be supported by reasons which are
"public” in the sense that they appeal to a common or shared interest (Rawls, 1971). At
the same time, a separate research tradition has emphasized the rationality o f individuals
pursuing their own interests in the political world.
This chapter will address a number o f questions raised by the issue o f individual
and common interests in an attempt to connect deliberative theory to the real-world
conditions o f public opinion and citizen deliberation. First, to what extent do citizens
consider the common good when formulating opinions? Second, how do they conceive
o f their fellow citizens and the role self-interest plays in public opinion? Third, what
might the influence o f elite mediated discourse be on the role o f self-interest in citizen
deliberation? Finally, could we revise our conception o f interests to allow for
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deliberation which is compatible with citizens’ predispositions and resources, stands
some chance o f being realized, and yet remains oriented toward the common good?
The reasonable ideal o f deliberation demands not that self-interest be banished,
but that it be reconciled with the common good. Citizens will consider their own
interests when deliberating, but they will also be required to address the interests o f their
discussion partners and the community as a whole. For political discussion to be
deliberative, participants must also grant the good faith o f their discussion partners.
Building on the previous chapter, I will argue that the tone and arguments present in news
coverage and public affairs programming encourage imputations o f bad faith, threatening
deliberation. While citizens’ predispositions and the nature o f political issues should in
principle combine to counter these messages, in practice the assumption o f selfish
motives is not only widespread but actually exacerbated by political discussion.

Self-interest and public opinion
A large body o f scholarship has argued within the framework o f rational choice
theory for the primacy o f self-interest in public opinion. Derived from neoclassical
economics, rational choice views the interest o f the individual as the proper guide to
political decisions. It assumes that people make rational decisions based on the
information available to them, that they are motivated to seek pleasure and avoid pain,
and most importantly, that they hold their own welfare to be o f greater value than that o f
others.1 Political decisions follow inevitably from these assumptions about human

1 Many economic analyses operationalize individual interest in purely financial terms. Robert Lane (1991),
observing that above the poverty level income and subjective well-being have virtually no relation to one
another, terms this the “economistic fallacy.”
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psychology. In the formulation o f Anthony Downs (1957), the progenitor o f rational
choice theory, "Each citizen votes for the party he believes will provide him with more
benefits than any other.” This logic is extended from voting decisions to policy choices:
one's opinion is based on the alternative which promises to provide one with the greater
benefit.
As Gordon Tullock (1975) put it. “Voters and customers are essentially the same
people. Mr. Smith buys and votes; he is the same man in the supermarket and in the
voting booth." It seems odd, though, to assume that because a set of motives and
behaviors is evident in one arena, it necessarily prevails in all arenas. It would make no
less sense to aver that since some people seek mates who remind them o f one o f their
parents, therefore they also vote for candidates who remind them o f their parents, and no
further explanation o f their vote choice is necessary. In actuality, each o f us inhabits
many worlds, o f which the economic is only one. My task here is not to argue the details
o f the voluminous body o f research in rational choice; instead, I will address its
fundamental premise - that people hold their own welfare to be o f greater value than that
o f others, and act accordingly - in forming an account o f public opinion and citizen
deliberation.
Does this premise hold in the world o f politics? The simple answer is that people
hold opinions and take actions that are self-interested some o f the time, while at other
times they do not. What is problematic about rational choice theory is that it proclaims
that people are always self-interested; the theory is thus gripped by a totalistic impulse,
the insistence that economic principles hold sway in all cases, all the time. Disproving
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this proposition becomes relatively simple; one need only show examples o f altruistic
beliefs and behaviors.
The reply o f the rational choice fundamentalist is that self-interest m ay be defined
as anything we value; therefore if we act to advance the interest o f others, it is because
we value their welfare; therefore we are acting to maximize what we value, and therefore
we are acting in our self-interest. Emotional or spiritual satisfaction, which may be
derived from seeing others benefit, is simply another o f our interests. But the fact that
there exists a relationship between personal satisfaction and altruistic action does not
mean that one kind o f behavior is “really” the other (Kelman, 1988; Sen, 1977). As Jane
Mansbridge (1993) points out, it is a fallacy to assume that “if we can detect any selfinterested reason to act in a particular way, this reason provides the only explanation we
need." In addition, the construction of altruism as merely another type of self-interest
makes rational choice theory unfalsifiable. If any action may be defined as selfinterested, then no hypothetical action would provide evidence against the theory. Let us
then set aside this notion and define self-interest more reasonably and simply as one's
own perceived well-being. If we are to assess the prospects for deliberative democracy,
we must ask if and when citizens are willing to consider the interests o f others when
arriving at political choices.
Empirical research has established quite clearly that when evaluating the world o f
politics, citizens look beyond their own interests. For example, Donald Kinder and
Roderick Kiewiet (1981) showed that sociotropic considerations - those concerning the
economic fortunes o f the country as a whole - play a large part in voting decisions. Their
analyses o f presidential and congressional elections produced scant evidence for the
113
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"pocketbook” hypothesis. Overall, the authors concluded that “Political preferences thus
seem to be shaped by citizens' conceptions o f national economic conditions, not by the
economic circumstances o f their personal lives. Politics is carried on sociotropically. not
at the level o f the pocketbook.’"
They also show that the relationship between one’s own circumstance and one's
perception o f the larger economy is extremely tenuous (with correlations on the order o f
.03), indicating that people do not simply extrapolate from their own situations to make
assessments o f the country’s well-being. This result (which was replicated in a number
o f election years) shows that voters find means outside their own experience by which
they may obtain information on the fate o f the larger collectivity. Since people have a
natural desire for autonomy and direct sources o f information with which to make
conclusions about their own lives, they are less likely to blame their own success or
failure on government (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Lane, 1962); I got that raise because I
deserved it, not because the economy for which the President is responsible is doing well.
When they are called to make judgments about how others are faring, they get
much o f their information from the news media. Mark Hetherington (1996) shows that
perceptions o f the state o f the economy derived from attention to news influenced vote
choices in 1992 to a greater extent than actual individual economic fortunes. A selfinterested voter would have been concerned not with the state o f the economy but with
his own economic gain. The information provided by the media tinned out to be
somewhat misleading (an economic recovery had begun by m id-1992 but went largely
unreported); a relationship between news exposure and economic judgm ents showed that
voters were relying on mediated information to make vote choices. Voters are further
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influenced by their perceptions o f how different groups are faring, according to principles
o f distributive fairness (Mutz & Mondak, 1997). Surveys have also shown that
evaluations o f the distributive and procedural fairness o f government programs influence
opinions about the president, while self-interest with regard to the same programs (e.g.
Social Security) does not (Tyler, 1990).
The failure to locate the influence o f self-interest is not restricted to the effects o f
the economy on vote choices. In a summary o f years o f research, David Sears and
Carolyn Funk (1991) show that in surveys addressing twenty-five separate issue areas
including 147 independent and 168 dependent variables, the average correlation between
self-interest and opinion was only .07. In regression analyses, only twenty-three percent
o f self-interest variables produced significant effects on opinion. The authors conclude
that “personal self-interest generally has not been o f major importance in explaining the
general public's social and political attitudes.’’
Sears and Funk offer the following explanations for the consistently slight
influence o f self-interest: the stakes o f an issue are usually not large, clear, or certain;
people have a bias toward internal attributions for their own fate; politics is presented in
symbolic, abstract terms to which people respond by relying on their symbolic
predispositions; and finally, socialization encourages people to respond to politics in a
public-regarding way. Jack Citrin and Donald Green (1990) offer a similar list o f
requirements an issue would need to stir self-interest: the consequences would need to be
visible, tangible, large, and certain. This is not to say, however, that if people simply had
more information and understood the implications o f a given policy that their opinions
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would necessarily be guided by self-interest. In many cases, better information would
show individuals that a policy does not affect them.
Sears and Funk identify five cases in which self-interest was significant: taxes,
voting in the 1984 presidential election, the reaction o f public employees to tax revolts,
one busing proposal in Los Angeles (in contrast to other busing cases where self-interest
was not predictive), and smoking restrictions. O f these, tax policy is the only national
issue that arises repeatedly. The authors argue that when self-interest influences opinion,
it does so only in the narrowest way. With the exception o f the 1984 presidential
election, only specific proposals that affected the individual in concrete, identifiable ways
produced an effect, while broader applications and effects on similar groups did not. Nor
did self-interest itself determine the symbolic predispositions held by subjects. Although
self-interest has been found in some cases to heighten attitude-behavior consistency
(Crano, 1997), this effect seems to emerge only on issues where, once again, the effects
o f policies are clear and substantial (Sears, 1997). While early voting researchers held
that public opinion “is best understood if we discard our notions o f ideology and think
rather in terms o f primitive self-interest,” (Campbell et al., 1960) in subsequent years a
different picture has emerged. Although there are some noteworthy exceptions, the
weight o f empirical research “appear[s] devastating for the claim that self interest.. .is the
central motive underlying American public opinion.” (Citrin and Green, 1990).

Self-interest and conversation
According to deliberative theory, participation in discussions about public affairs
will expand individuals’ circle o f concern to encompass their fellow citizens. This is a
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difficult proposition to test empirically, particularly if one works only with election
surveys. There are multiple ways in which such larger concern might manifest itself,
some observable and some not. Even if such effects were occurring, the scant
relationship o f self-interest to opinion with which one begins makes identification o f any
further dampening o f self-interest impossible to locate. There is one instance in which
self-interest has been found to influence vote choice, that o f the 1984 presidential election
(Sears & Funk, 1991). Since the National Election Studies did ask respondents about
their political conversations in the 1984 survey, we m ay examine whether discussion had
any effect on the degree to which self-interest influenced respondents in their vote
choices.
Like many theoretically posited relationships, the association between discussion
and self-interest is implicitly assumed to be linear: the more one talks, the more one is
motivated by the common good. In practice, we might actually expect a threshold effect,
where a relationship between self-interest and vote choice disappears beyond a certain
level o f conversation. In the case o f the 1984 election, we see neither a linear
relationship nor a threshold effect. In this case it appears that personal evaluations
mattered for the groups both high and low in conversation, but not for those individuals
who talked about politics occasionally.
Table 5-1 shows a logistic regression analysis using vote for Reagan as the
dependent variable. The independent variables are the respondent’s assessment of how
much better or worse s/he has fared financially in the past year, how much better or
worse s/he believes the country has fared economically (both measured on a five-point
scale), and his/her party identification (a seven-point scale). We see first that, unlike
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other election years, personal financial situation does have a significant effect on vote
choice overall, even when perceptions o f national conditions are controlled: those who
have done better are more likely to vote for Reagan. When the sample is divided by
levels o f conversation, we see that this effect disappears for those who talk occasionally
(once or twice a week or less often).

T able 5-1: E c o n o m ic P e rc e p tio n s a n d V ote fo r R e ag a n
(1984 NES)
Full Sample
8
(s.e.)

Talk = never

Odds
ratio

B
(s.e.)

Odds
ratio

Talk = once/twice
a week or less
8
Odds

Talk = 3 times a
week or more
8
Odds

(s.e.)

ratio

(s.e.)

ratio

Party ID

.90***
(05)

2.47

.82***
(10)

2.27

.88***
(07)

2.41

1.05***
(-11)

2.86

National
conditions

.66***
(.10)

1.94

.64**
(.18)

1.89

.68***
(.14)

1.97

.80***
(-20)

2.23

Respondent’s
situation

.23**
(08)

1.26

.32*
(.16)

1.37

.12
(11)

1.12

.45*
(.18)

1.56

Constant

-2.07***
(.14)

-1.74***
(.28)

-1.87***
(19)

-2.88***
(34)

% correctly
classified

85.45

83.22

82.55

89.80

N

1313

298

659

353

*p < .05
** p < .01
” * p < .001

Why might this be? It is possible that occasional talkers, having started from a
position o f self-interest, may learn that their own financial situation is not representative.
But frequent talkers would be even more likely to learn information that challenges their
assumptions, particularly since frequency o f conversation is correlated with frequency o f
disagreement. O f course, the 1984 election is a single case that may or may not shed
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light on the operation o f discussion on self-interest more generally. At the very least, it
suggests that deliberative theory may be correct in positing the ability o f conversation to
affect self-interest; but this effect may only emerge for some people some o f the time.
The 1984 election notwithstanding, in most cases self-interest exerts little
influence on opinion. It could, however, be a prime motivator o f political action.
Individuals may be generous in their opinions and even in their votes, but only take
action when their own fortunes are at stake. While there is surely some truth to this
argument, it is also the case that the political world is replete with examples of
individuals acting without regard to self-interest. People turn out to vote with the
knowledge that a single ballot cannot result in policies benefiting them,2 write their
Representatives to simply express opinions rather than influence legislation (Thelen,
1996), and contribute to advocacy groups, assuming individual costs for mutual benefits.
Nevertheless, there is a widely held perception that others are in fact motivated by selfinterest.

The myth o f self-interest
A stronger influence o f self-interest on behavior than on opinion has intuitive

2 Rational choice predicts that no one will turn out to vote, since the remote possibility that one’s vote
would determine an election’s outcome is far outweighed by the cost o f getting to the polls. The “paradox
o f voting” - the fact that large numbers o f citizens do in fact vote - has long bedeviled rational choice
advocates. Some have grudgingly acknowledged that perhaps all citizens do not actually construct decision
tables and carefully compute the expected utility o f voting in deciding whether to make their way to the
polls on election day (Aldrich, 1993). In fact, one could argue that in the time it would take the average
person to make such a calculation, he could have gone to the polls and returned home. This would make
rational decision-making itself irrational. Interestingly, one survey found that economists, who presumably
understand the cost/benefit ratio o f voting better than anyone, were only slightly less likely than other
academics to vote (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). Although the authors do not report absolute voting
rates, given the correlation between education and turnout it is reasonable to assume that even the
economists in their sample voted at a substantially higher rate than the population at large.
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appeal. While merely expressing an opinion has no concrete costs, the prospect o f taking
action leads individuals to assess costs in terms o f money, time, and effort (Green &
Cowden, 1992). Previous surveys may thus have underestimated the effect o f selfinterest on politics by focusing more on opinion than on behavior. Dale Miller and
Rebecca Ratner (1996) contend, however, that “those without vested interest are inhibited
from acting not only because they lack an incentive, but because they lack a
justification." Knowing that only those with vested interests are expected to join an
organization or participate in a protest, they often shy away despite their beliefs precisely
for fear that their motivations will be questioned. An experiment varying the cues given
to subjects about the need to justify their involvement with a hypothetical political group
seemed to support this hypothesis.
While an experiment on a single issue m ay not be conclusive, it does indicate that
the perceived need for justifying action m ay be an additional variable affecting political
participation. Participation involves not simply a decision to attempt to influence the
political process, but also a decision to enter into a particular social interaction where
opinions are necessarily on display. It is therefore not surprising that some would be
inhibited from political action when they feel it is “not their place” to act. O ne’s place,
furthermore, seems to be defined not by conviction or simple citizenship, but by the
presence or absence o f a material interest in the outcome o f a debate. One focus group
study found that citizens often questioned the motives o f community activists, believing
that there must be self-interested motives for involvement (Conover, Crew, & Searing,
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1991). If such interests are perceived to be the only justifiable motivation for action, then
participation is substantially constrained.3
This process is abetted by the perception that political opinions among the general
population are primarily motivated by self-interest. A later study by Miller and Ratner
(1998) gives persuasive evidence that this perception is in fact prevalent. The authors
found in five separate experiments that while their own opinions were largely unaffected
by self-interest (with the exception o f smokers' and non-smokers’ reactions to anti
smoking regulation), subjects consistently overestimated the effect that self-interest
would have on others’ opinions. "Participants’ actions and attitudes may not have
revealed them to be ardent self-interested agents, but their predictions revealed them to be
ardent self-interest theorists."
In short, "self-interest has become an influential myth, a social construction o f
man that influences self-presentation, attributions, expectations, and actions.” (Montada,
1996) The idea o f self-interest influences not only our own decisions and understanding
o f our roles in the political process, but our perceptions o f others as well, making it a key
element in the cycle o f opinion and action. The political world comes to be seen as that
in which people pursue narrow ends, where participation becomes morally questionable
once it becomes "political.” Recall that when we accuse someone o f "playing politics.” it
is because they have used a public process for their particular ends (Bellah et al, 1985).

3 Some evidence in the other direction conies from Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995), who conducted a
comprehensive survey o f political activists and found altruistic motivations cited more often than material
or social gratifications. However, the authors’ survey items allowed respondents to agree with multiple
m otivations for their participation, enabling them to define them selves as both self-interested and otherregarding. Verba et al’s findings do not necessarily refute M iller and Ratner’s; the myth o f self-interest
may be a more important variable in deterring specific acts o f participation among the less active than in
structuring the self-conceptions o f those who do in fact participate.
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Data from the 1998 Annenberg pilot study lend further support to the presence o f
the m yth o f self-interest. Survey respondents were asked, "W hen it comes to political
issues, would you say most people form their opinions by thinking about what is best for
themselves or by thinking about what is best for the country as a whole?” A follow-up
question asked how strongly they felt.

F ig u re 5-1: Are O th e rs S e lf-In te reste d ?
(1998 California study)
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

strongly

Yes strongly

The first noticeable feature o f these data is that whether or not self-interest is a
myth, the perception o f its prevalence is certainly widespread. Fully 76 percent o f survey
respondents agreed with the statement that most people are self-interested in their
political opinions, with over half o f the respondents agreeing strongly. Furthermore, this
sentiment is not simply a function o f ideology. While one might expect that more
conservative respondents would be more likely to agree that others are self-interested,
this tum s out to be only partly true. Although the great majority o f those describing
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themselves as “very conservative” did agree with the statement, liberals actually scored
higher than conservatives and moderates (Figure 5-2).

F ig u re 5-2: P e rc e n t V iew ing O th e rs a s SelfIn tere sted by Ideo lo g y (1998 California study)
100% -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

V ery
C onservative
co n servative

M oderate

Liberal

V ery liberal

One variable that had a strong effect on the perception o f self-interest was age.
The notion that young people today are cynical and disconnected from politics is widely
circulated in popular commentary, and research seems to support this view (Bennett,
1998a). Robert Putnam (1995) has argued that “social capital” has undergone a steady
decline, measured by, among other things, disagreement with the statement that “most
people can be trusted.” Analyzing NES data from 1972 to 1994, Putnam shows that
while the young tend to score lower on social trust, there is little difference between all
age groups over 40. In the 1996 study, however, the young remain low in social trust, but
a negative relationship with age emerges for those over 35. At the same time, the 1998
Annenberg pilot study shows a different relationship between age and the perception o f
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self-interest. To a significant degree (r = -. 11), higher age is associated with a decreased
perception that other citizens are motivated by their own interests in forming their
political opinions. Unlike that between age and trust, this relationship is linear. The
contrast between these two sets o f data indicates that perceptions o f self-interest in
politics are distinct from related factors that would fall under the headings o f social
capital or cynicism.

F ig u re 5-3: in te rp e rs o n a l T ru s t a n d
P e rc e p tio n o f S elf-Interest, B y A ge
■ Rsople can't be trusted (96 NES)
□ Others are self-interested (98 APS)

18-34

35-49

50-64

O ver 65

A ge

Self-interest in discourse
Since the late nineteenth century and the work o f Gabriel Tarde, the fostering o f
political conversation has been understood as one o f the press' key functions (Katz,
1992). By supplying citizens with news o f the day’s events, the press provides topics o f
discussion, setting a conversational agenda. This effect has been largely taken for
granted rather than investigated empirically. Although a substantial body o f research has
explored the ability o f the press to influence perceptions o f the country’s “most important
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problem" (Rogers, Dealing, & Bregman, 1993), whether the agenda-setting effect o f the
press operates on conversational agendas in the same fashion is a question that has been
essentially overlooked by agenda-setting research. For the moment, I am less concerned
with the press' success in placing particular items on the conversational agenda than with
its role in maintaining an active conversational sphere regardless o f topic and its
influence on the form political conversations take.
In order to fully understand this role, we must look beyond the topics being
reported and examine news frames, narrative structures, and the content o f political
discourse. The picture that emerges is a complex and often contradictory one. On one
hand, political actors consistently use the language o f common interests to build
arguments for and against policy proposals. On the other, journalists frame politics and
political discourse as a zero-sum competition among self-interested participants.
Mediated political discourse does in large part adhere to the deliberative standard
o f "public" speech. When political actors, particularly office-holders, speak, they offer
reasons for arguments based on an idea o f a common good. Specific policies are
generalized to larger principles and effects. The most naked assertions o f self-interest
must be made out o f public view. Officials feel compelled to describe private needs in
public terms in order to gain support. When talking to his constituents, the Congressman
who acts to preserve a weapons system manufactured in his district speaks o f ‘‘jobs." In
this context, the jobs constitute a common good, providing direct or indirect benefits to
the community and all its members. When interviewed on the national news, however,
he is more likely to speak o f “national security," a common good applicable to the nation.
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This does not hold true in all cases, o f course. Just as empirical research has
located tax policy as an area where citizens' opinions are substantially motivated by selfinterest, candidates have used appeals to economic self-interest to mold persuasive
arguments. In 1980, Ronald Reagan asked voters, “Are you better off now than you were
four years ago?", transforming a poll question into a persuasive appeal,4 and establishing
a criterion o f judgm ent that has been raised by one presidential candidate or another in
every election since.3 The purpose o f the question is to frame the election in terms o f the
individual's economic fortunes; it is notably different from “Is the country better off
now?" Data from the NES indicate that while Reagan's appeal was not successful in
motivating self-interested voting in 1980, by 1984 self-interest influenced at least some
votes (Sears and Funk, 1990).
In a related vein, Bob Dole justified his 1996 plan to cut taxes by fifteen percent
with the argument that “It's your money." At the same time, however, Dole argued that
the Clinton administration was not serving common needs at all. In his nomination
speech, he criticized the Clinton administration by saying, “It is demeaning to the nation
that within the Clinton administration, a core o f the elite who never grew up, never did
anything real, never sacrificed, never suffered and never learned, should have the power
to fund with your earnings their dubious and self-serving schem es...Are they taking care
o f you, or are they taking care o f themselves?” Dole's rhetoric thus combined an appeal
to self-interest with the accusation o f self-interest.

4 The Roper organization began asking people whether they were “better o ff now than you were a year ago”
in the 1970’s.
5 In a debate four years later, Reagan's opponent, Walter Mondale, said, “I would rather lose a campaign
about decency than win a campaign about self-interest. I don’t think this nation is composed o f people who
care only for themselves.”
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These examples raise the question o f whether appeals to self-interest are simply a
part o f conservative ideology, and thus will be found whenever Republicans speak. In
fact, while these exceptions to the principle o f common-interest argumentation are
important, they are by no means the norm. Republicans and Democrats both seek support
by appealing to notions o f the common good, particularly outside the realm o f tax policy.
Such arguments, however, are likely to be interpreted and reframed by journalists through
the prism o f self-interest.
As I discussed in Chapter 2, the bulk o f political news is delivered through a
strategic frame in which all actors are self-interested. When the question asked o f any
statement or action is what the actor’s hidden purpose might be, the answer is always the
same: gaining political advantage. Two kinds o f self-interest emerge here: the interests
o f those affected by policy, and the interests o f politicians in gaining and holding power.
All parties are viewed through the same lens. At least one set o f experiments (Cappella
& Jamieson, 1997) has shown that exposure to strategic news leads people to understand
policy debates in terms o f the interests o f the actors involved.
Framing all questions in terms o f self-interest or narrow interests leaves the
question o f common interests unaddressed. Let us elaborate on the example used earlier.
A Congressman gives a speech arguing that increased production o f a particular
helicopter is essential to our national security, and without it our ability to defend our
nation from attack would be seriously compromised. The clever reporter finds that,
unsurprisingly, the factory that manufactures the helicopter is located in the
Congressman’s district; therefore the Congressman has personal political reasons for
supporting further expenditures on the helicopter. In addition, the company that produces
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the helicopter has made hefty donations to each member o f the Armed Services
Committee, and is counting on new helicopter orders to boost its earnings. Although few
would assert that the reporter should omit these pieces o f information from her story, the
discovery o f the particular interests involved does not settle the question o f the common
interest, it merely sets it aside. There is still an important question to be answered, which
is whether more helicopters are in fact vital to national security. In m any cases, however,
this question will not be addressed, because evidence may be more difficult to gather and
the reporter will be unable to offer a conclusion without the appearance o f editorializing,
where she may do so freely on the ‘‘political'’ questions o f the hidden motivations o f the
actors and the legislative prospects o f the proposal.
The news receiver is then left with the impression that the substance o f the
argument made by the Congressman has no value. Part o f the journalist’s role is to take
the unmanageable bulk o f political discourse and deliver to the citizen the most important
parts; this selection signals that the motivation o f those making arguments is where
attention should be focused. In this way, strategic framing undercuts the “public” nature
o f arguments, in the sense that they are concerned with the common interest. It
effectively strips the common good o f any substantive meaning by recasting it as merely
a rhetorical tool used disingenuously to achieve private ends.
One could protest (and many reporters no doubt would) that journalists are merely
exposing the truth; what some see as cynicism is in fact realism. Politicians are
concerned with maintaining their positions. If journalists don’t explain how, the public
will never know. One will never hear the Congressman proclaim, “Mr. Speaker, I
support this bill because doing so will generate more contributions from the defense
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industry to my next campaign,” though that may indeed be the case. There is,
furthermore, the possibility that "The Senator weaving a mantle o f public talk around a
purely private interest still does a small service to the very idea o f the public, though he
may be putting it to a scoundrel's use.” (Barber, 1984) Strategic framing, however,
assumes that every use is that o f a scoundrel. Stories which do not actively assess
competing claims but merely offer each, then comment on actors' hidden intents,
encourage the conclusion that no one is concerned about the common good.
The news m edia's emphasis on self-interest may have consequences for public
opinion. There is evidence from experiments (Young et al, 1991) and surveys (Sears &
Lau, 1983) that individuals can be primed to consider self-interest more heavily in
forming opinions and in explaining their vote choices. Again, there are two levels o f
self-interest at issue. With regard to the individual’s self-interest, the question is whether
appeals such as Reagan's result in self-interested thinking. The second question is
whether a focus on the self-interested motivations o f political actors affects the citizen's
presumptions about the general political world and the specific individuals - family,
friends, neighbors, and co-workers —with whom he might deliberate.
The consequences for democratic deliberation could be substantial. In an
ethnographic study focusing on political conversation, Nina Eliasoph (1997) reported that
"citizens sounded more public-minded in casual or intimate contexts than in public
contexts: the wider the audience, the narrower were the ideas citizens could express.”
The fact that her subjects tended to revert to self-interested justifications when speaking
publicly indicates that at least some citizens believe self-interest to be the coin o f the
political realm. W hat produces this ironic inversion o f the public speaking norm
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described in democratic theory, where citizens are expected to give public reasons for
their opinions when discussing political matters in a public context? Note also that it is
survey research (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Mutz & Mondak, 1997; Sears & Funk, 1991;
Sears et al, 1980), an arena o f ‘'private” opinion, that consistently produces data
indicating a lack o f self-interest.
I contend that we derive our understanding o f how we should and should not
behave in political conversation at least in part from the political world shown to us by
the news media. The effect o f news media framing o f politics as a competition o f
interests may not produce self-interested thinking and opinions on the part o f news
receivers, but it may influence their assessment o f what other people think, an effect
described by Diana Mutz (1998) as “impersonal influence.” Whatever their own
opinions, individuals may come to believe that everyone else is self-interested. When
they speak in public, they may simply offer an account o f their own interest in the
question at hand, just as everyone else does. Since those who speak o f the common
interest in elite discourse are almost inevitably charged with disingenuousness by their
opponents, the press, or both, citizens in public contexts may choose to simply lay their
interests on the table. While in 1927 John Dewey (1927) could optimistically advocate
“the perfecting o f the means and ways o f communication o f meanings so that genuinely
shared interest in the consequences o f interdependent activities may inform desire and
effort and thereby direct action,” much o f today's news focuses instead on interests which
are not shared, but which motivate action directed toward individual gain in a seemingly
zero-sum enterprise.
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Eliasoph (1998) also reports that the citizen activists she studied had learned from
experience that the only way to get quoted in the local press was to hide their activist
affiliations, eschew policy analysis, and present themselves as concerned citizens acting
out o f self-interest. Her review o f local press coverage bore out this observation: citizens
were only quoted when they were speaking for themselves, explaining their opinions or
political participation in terms o f their own interests (or those o f their children). This
raises a vital question about the role o f news in the maintenance o f citizenship: how are
citizens presented overall in media reports? Are Eliasoph's findings true o f the larger
media environment? The news presents models o f involvement and identity. It instructs
citizens as to which roles are appropriate and what norms of discourse apply to their
participation in the public sphere. If it is true that citizens are shown as defined only by
their interests, then individuals’ perceptions o f each other and o f their own behavior
could be influenced in troubling ways.

Perceptions o f selfinterest
What then is the relationship between exposure to news media and the perception
o f self-interest? Although the preceding argument might lead one to predict a linear
association, this proves not to be the case. Analysis o f this variable is hampered by the
small variance; since the vast majority o f respondents agreed that others are motivated by
self-interest in their political opinions, there is little differentiation among groups. As
Figure 5-4 shows, there is almost no difference across levels o f media exposure; scores
run between 3 and 3.3, where a score o f 3 corresponds to a response indicating agreement
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with the statement that others are motivated by self-interest, and a score o f 4 corresponds
to a response indicating strong agreement with the statement.6

Figure 5-4
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How do we explain the scant relationship between m edia exposure and the
perception o f self-interest? The first explanation is, once again, that since so many
respondents agreed with the statement that in political issues most people form their
opinions by thinking about what is best for themselves, there sim ply was not enough
variance to allow for media effects. It may be that the underlying construct o f
perceptions o f self-interest is more complex than agreement or disagreement with this
statement is able to capture. Perhaps if respondents were given a seven-point differential
scale on which to place themselves instead o f an agree-disagree item, more

6 Exposure levels are as follows. Newspapers: zero or one day per week=low; two to six days per
week=medium; every day=high. Local and national news: zero or one day per week=low; two to four
days per week=medium; five to seven days per week=high. Radio: zero days per week=low; one or two
days per week=medium; three to seven days per week=high. These divisions are based on the variables’
distributions.
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variance would have emerged. A second explanation, o f course, is that the hypothesis is
simply incorrect. The fact that accusations o f self-interest play a key role in political
rhetoric does not necessarily mean that there will be a linear relationship between
exposure to that rhetoric and the perception o f self-interest. People could be arriving at
this opinion independent o f the discourse they encounter, perhaps basing it on their
interpersonal contacts.
A final explanation would be that accusations o f self-interest are so ubiquitous in
political discourse that the vast majority o f people, no matter what their level o f media
exposure, are influenced by them to the degree that they pass the threshold represented by
the survey question. This particular type o f motive questioning may simply be a part o f
American political culture, one maintained and renewed by the discourse present in news.

Conversation and perceptions o f self-interest
When we turn to conversation, we encounter another result that at first appears
difficult to explain. In theory, conversation should be negatively related to the perception
o f self-interest. Those who believe that people are motivated by self-interest would see
little purpose in engaging in political discussion, much less discussion that could be
called deliberative. Since people are out for themselves, there is little use trying to
convince them to change their opinions or support a given candidate. At the same time,
those who do talk about politics, and as a result experience the benefits o f conversation in
the acquisition o f knowledge and the building o f connections between the individual and
community, should be less likely to believe that others are self-interested. Once we talk
with each other, we may come to realize that self-interest is in fact largely a myth.
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But the data show the opposite to be true. In fact, there is a positive relationship
between conversation and the perception o f self-interest, as Figure 5-5 shows. Those
who talk more about politics are more likely to believe others are motivated by their own
interests. While the association is not overwhelming, it is statistically significant. The
correlation between frequency o f conversation and strongly agreeing that others are selfinterested was .09 (p<.01). But the figure shows not simply a positive correlation, but the
presence o f two distinct groups. Among those who rarely or never talk about politics,
between 45% and 50% strongly agree that others are self-interested. Among the
remainder o f respondents - essentially all those who discuss politics with any regularity 60% strongly agree.

Figure 5-5: Strongly Agreeing O thers Are SelfInterested By Frequency of C onversation
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How can we account for this result? An explanation may lie in the fact that elite
discourse provides citizens with both the content and form o f argumentation they use
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when discussing politics. In conversation, people repeat the arguments they hear in news,
which include accusations o f self-interest. When we converse, we not only hear these
arguments again, we make them ourselves, leading us to adopt them with more
conviction. Therefore, in an environment in which accusations o f self-interest are a
common mode o f counterargumentation, the more we talk, the more practiced we become
at identifying hidden self-interest, and the more clearly we come to believe that others are
in fact self-interested.
This is, o f course, a speculative claim. These data do not inform us about the
content o f citizens’ conversation. If it is correct, however, it would mean that
conversations between citizens fail to be deliberative in an important sense. Deliberative
conversation should reduce the extent to which people believe others are self-interested,
or at the very least not affect it in either direction. There is certainly the possibility that
despite increased deliberation, many would continue to believe that most people are selfinterested, even if those in their own circle o f friends and acquaintances are not. Many
people may believe this true to be true o f the larger population but not o f their own social
circle, people whom they know and like. Nonetheless, if that were the case there would
be no relationship between the two variables. The amount one talked with friends and
co-workers would not affect the perception o f self-interest, since people would be not be
making a judgment based on their interpersonal contacts.
Deliberative theory asserts that the form and content o f the arguments participants
make can have subsequent effects on their own opinions. If they are required to argue in
terms acceptable to others and in favor o f some conception o f the collective interest, their
opinions will grow more expansive. If this is true in regard to the arguments they make
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in favor o f their own position, it should also be true o f the arguments they make to refute
opponents. Persistent motive questioning would therefore provide a reasonable
explanation for the correlation between conversation and attributions o f self-interest.
While theorists regard argumentative norms as positive influences on opinion, it is
equally likely that a norm such as motive questioning could negatively affect opinion as
well.
On the other hand, it might be that talking about politics exposes one to the
opinions o f self-interested people. Despite the repeated findings indicating the weakness
o f self-interest as a predictor o f opinion, many public-spirited individuals will make selfinterested arguments in conversation, as Eliasoph (1998) argues: "In the contemporary
American public sphere, paradoxically, what marks a context as clearly 'public' is often
precisely the fact that the talk there is so narrow, not at all public-minded.,, It also seems
plausible that when people talk about politics, they engage in the kind o f motivequestioning so evident in elite discourse. They need not be charging each other with
disingenuousness; two altruists who agree can discuss the ulterior motives o f third parties
involved in a larger debate. The fact that most political conversation occurs between
people who agree means that when the motives o f political actors or other citizens are
questioned, no one is present to defend them, and therefore the unanswered accusation is
more likely to be accepted.
We might then expect that those who encounter more disagreement in their
conversations would be less likely, at a given level o f conversation, to believe that others
are self-interested than those who do not encounter disagreement. Participants in
heterogeneous conversation might leam that those who hold opposing opinions are
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people o f good faith with whom they have honest differences. In fact, the opposite
proves to be the case. Frequency o f disagreement is positively related to the perception
o f self-interest, even when overall frequency o f conversation is controlled (Figure 5-6).7

F ig u re 5-6: Interactio n o f D isc u ss io n a n d
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We do see that among one group, those who discuss politics every day and report
frequent disagreement, the perception o f self-interest declines somewhat. Nonetheless,
overall both conversation and disagreement are positively related to the perception o f
self-interest. In explaining this result, we can extend the previous argument to speculate
that in discussions that include disagreement, the give and take o f argumentation leads
people to question others’ motives with even greater frequency than is required in a

7 Those who reported never discussing politics were not asked how much disagreement they encountered.
For the purposes o f Figure 5-6, both disagreement groups begin at the mean self-interest score for this
group (47.5%).
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concordant discussion. Whatever they hear in response from their discussion partners,
those who find themselves arguing in this way on a more regular basis could become still
more likely to believe that most people are self-interested in their opinions. Once again,
this is a plausible explanation o f this result, but not one that these data can address
directly.
It is no doubt the case that some o f the political conversations that occur every
day are truly deliberative. It is possible for participants who agree with one another to
address competing claims fairly, granting the good will o f those o f opposing views. It is
similarly possible for those who disagree to discuss the merits o f policies and candidates
without resorting to motive questioning. Nonetheless, the fact that both political
conversation and political disagreement are positively related to the perception o f selfinterest strongly suggests that these kinds o f conversations are the exception rather than
the rule.

Rethinking the role o f interest
One inescapable conclusion is that while some differences exist, the perception
that others are self-interested is widespread. Where does this leave the citizen? If
politics is nothing more than a competition among self-interested parties, is there any
point to deliberation? Should we bother to engage those with whom we disagree if their
opinions are narrowly self-serving? In fact, deliberation can and should be based on an
integration o f self-interest and the interests o f others. When the types o f interest truly at
stake in political debate are distinguished, it becomes clear that the self-interest/common
interest dichotomy does not adequately capture the effects o f government policy on
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individuals. Most issues occupy a middle ground for the citizen, where self-interest is
minimal, but the interest at stake is not universal. Instead, the most apparent effects are
on a finite set o f other citizens.
As I discussed earlier, certain proposals have clear, direct, and significant effects
on individuals. At the national and state level the most notable are changes in tax policy.
For example, opinions o f Proposition 13 in California, which proposed (among other
things) hefty reductions in property taxes, were closely correlated with home ownership
and the value o f individuals' property (Sears and Funk. 1991). At the other end o f the
scale are issues that involve absolute common interests. In order for an interest to be
common, benefits must be distributed equally to all members o f a society or community.
National security is a common good, as is a public park. It is not always the case that
providing a common good will involve equal costs to all citizens, first because all
government expenditures involve the use o f taxes taken more from some individuals than
others (although the progressive taxation system operates on the principle that each
citizen's payment constitutes a roughly equal level o f hardship), and second because any
expenditure involves an implicit trade-off with other potential expenditures. More
specifically, it is also often the case that the costs for a common good are borne by a
specific group (as when education, a quasi-public good, is paid for by those who play a
state lottery).
Finally, there are issues where the interest at stake is not common, but does not
involve the individual forming an opinion. The group affected could be small (e.g. taxi
drivers) or large (e.g. welfare recipients). The vast majority o f decisions made by
government involve such interests. Furthermore, while most government decisions have
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wide effects, each will usually affect some individuals more than others. It is also
important to note that any one issue may involve multiple considerations. To use the
example o f funding the helicopter, whether the government should do so raises questions
o f the common interest (national defense) and the interests of specific others (employees
o f the contractor which produces the helicopter).
Often, the different types o f interest will conflict. In order to enhance mutually
shared goods, we must almost always expend an individually held good, namely money.
State funds are scarce, and every dollar spent in one area reduces that available to others,
including the allocation o f individually enjoyed benefits. In the case o f government
edicts imposing costs on private individuals or groups, the starting point (enhancing the
mutually shared good by taking from individual goods) is the same, but the process
brings different considerations into play.
For example, let us imagine that we wish to enhance the mutually shared good o f
clean air, and we have two alternatives. If we spend state money by buying pollution
control devices for privately owned factories, we have reduced the available funds
available for the satisfaction o f other state goals, some o f which are mutually beneficial
(e.g. national security) and some o f which are individually beneficial (e.g. tax cuts or
entitlement benefits). In this case, the debate will likely center on the benefits to be
gained in relation to a particular conception o f costs, i.e. how bad the air really is and
whether the devices are a '‘good buy” for the government. This does not mean, however,
that consideration o f individual costs will be completely absent. One common rhetorical
tactic used by opponents o f a particular program is to translate the common expenditure
back to individual costs: “The taxpayers in my district didn't give us their money so we
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could waste it on this boondoggle.”8 On the other hand, if the proposal is to make the
industries themselves pay for the devices, the benefits will be discussed in the same
terms, but the costs will be weighed on questions o f fairness, i.e. whether they impose too
great a hardship on the industries, how they measure against the industries' responsibility
for creating the pollution, etc. The industry will in turn argue that in order to pay for the
devices they must lay off workers. Thus in both cases, common benefits are weighed
against individual costs, although the connection may be more central to the debate in the
second case.
However, unless you happen to work for the affected industry, self-interest will be
o f little use to you in arriving at an opinion. Rational choice theorists tend to assume that
all kinds o f policies are alike in that they m ay be reduced to a calculation o f the
individual's self-interest, but a look at the political world shows that this is plainly not the
case. Some matters involve concrete benefits and costs for an individual, but most are
more remote. If I am a farmer, a change in farm subsidies will directly affect my life,
while my cousin the computer programmer will not be so affected. For the computer
programmer, the interest in seeing his cousin prosper may be sufficient to outweigh the
cost to each taxpayer o f maintaining farm subsidies, as long as that cost remains minimal.
If, on the other hand, the proposal is to drastically increase farm subsidies by cutting
welfare benefits to millions, the computer programmer may conclude that the benefits to
his cousin are insufficient to justify a hardship inflicted on a large segment o f society.
The citizen will seek a balance between his own interests and those o f others; as the

8 This formulation is sometimes used in support o f expenditures as well, with speakers emphasizing the
trivial per-taxpayer cost o f a particular program.
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number o f others affected by a policy and the severity o f that effect increase, the relative
weight o f self-interest should decrease.
Only on rare occasions will a clear and direct cost compete with a clear and direct
benefit. Nonetheless, in the majority o f political choices, the weighing o f self-interest
and the interests o f others will be, if necessarily imprecise, relatively uncomplicated due
to the slight self-interest involved. While every citizen is affected by government
policies in numerous ways, the total range o f policies is so great that in most cases, the
individual's interest in a particular policy will be remote and difficult to ascertain. If we
set aside the fact that each expenditure involves some o f each taxpayer's money, we see
that it usually becomes extremely difficult for even the most informed and educated
citizen to follow a path from a policy to his own interest. While the computer
programmer could calculate the impact o f farm subsidies on food prices, taking into
account grain imports and exports to arrive at the possible change in the price o f his com
flakes, chances are that he won't, not simply because o f the cost o f doing the calculation,
but because the result o f either outcome will seem insignificant. This point must be
emphasized: in most political choices, the impact on the individual is either so slight or
so difficult to assess that self-interest becomes useless as a consideration. Consequently,
other criteria must be employed.
Although most policies affect many people, very few affect all or most people.
There are notable exceptions, such as Social Security (o f which all citizens are present or
potential beneficiaries). When the benefits and costs to a particular individual are
negligible, considerations apart from self-interest will have to determine her opinion.
Since most policies affect a finite subset o f the population, this means that the majority o f
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citizens will, on any given policy, be form ing their opinions on grounds other than selfinterest,. W hile some have lamented the difficulty that incentives for self-serving
behavior pose for theories o f deliberative democracy (Knight & Johnson, 1994), this
simple mathematical fact o f the distribution o f costs and benefits provides an answer. It
is only necessary to accept a less utopian vision o f public debate, acknowledging that
self-interest may become an appropriate consideration in those circumstances where, for
that particular individual, it becomes applicable.
Furthermore, in an ironic way the lack o f influence held by an individual citizen
frees her to consider the welfare o f others. The disconnect between individual political
choices and ultimate political outcomes enables consideration o f others. In the economic
realm, individual outcomes are the direct product o f individual choices: if the consumer
chooses Colgate over Crest, he gets Colgate (Meehl, 1977). In the political realm, on the
other hand, outcomes have only an indirect relationship to individual choices. Except for
the relatively small number o f citizens who regularly take concrete political action,
politics is fundamentally not about behavior. One may freely hold altruistic opinions
without the concern that the holding o f such opinions will result in adverse consequences
for oneself. There is neither a cost for the opinion one holds, nor a cost in terms o f
outcome for casting one’s vote a particular way, since a single vote will not determine the
outcome o f an election. Even for those who do participate actively, on an individual
level their involvement in collective action will usually not have a demonstrable effect on
outcomes (Olsen, 1965). Consequently, citizens are free in both opinion and action to
ignore or act contrary to their interests without cost. As an example, one election year an
upper-class liberal couple told me, “We realized that either way, we win. If the
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Democrats win. they'll put in place liberal policies with which we agree. And if the
Republicans win. they'll reduce taxes on the wealthy." They voted Democratic without
hesitation. Their vote was an opportunity for political expression; its lack o f apparent
material value liberated them from the need to consider self-interest. While people are
quite imaginative in making connections between seemingly distant issues and their own
lives (Gamson, 1992), the purpose is not necessarily to evaluate their own costs and
benefits, but to bring insight and understanding.

Deliberation and self-interest
The context o f citizen deliberation enables individuals to move beyond selfinterested conceptions o f politics because o f its non-purposive nature (Habermas, 1984).
Although citizens vote for candidates and on issues in referenda, their votes are not
directly tied to the deliberative process. As a public, they are free to incorporate any
considerations they wish. In conversation, these considerations will usually be required
to be expansive. Citizen deliberation is above all a social undertaking. When we discuss
political issues, we must provide reasons that incorporate consideration o f others in order
to maintain a conversation that goes beyond simple statements of preference.
Even in conversations without disagreement, people need to support their
positions with reasons acceptable to others in order to carry discussion forward. This is
not to say, o f course, that people who are sufficiently similar not only in outlook but in
interests could not discuss political matters in plainly self-interested terms. Two
restaurant owners, for instance, might discuss a proposed increase in the minimum wage
without expanding their discussion beyond the effects such an increase would have on
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their expenses. But these cases will be relatively infrequent; more often, political
discussion will need to expand beyond the interests o f the participants simply because o f
the nature o f political issues. In this way, everyday conversation does largely adhere to
the deliberative standard.
Political conversation thus has the potential to enhance regard for others. Even if
some common-interest argumentation may be motivated by a desire not to appear selfish
(Fearon, 1998), when one is forced to argue in terms that incorporate others, one may not
only come to understand one's positions in more public terms (Bohman, 1996), but one
may in fact change, taking on new concerns as a citizen (Arendt, 1959) rather than
merely an individual or a consumer. Simply participating in a common enterprise can
encourage cooperation. Experiments on rational choice dilemmas have shown that in
circumstances where non-cooperation maximizes individual benefits, subjects are more
likely to cooperate when given the opportunity to communicate with each other (Dawes,
van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990). A communicative process in which the interests o f others
and the possibilities for mutual action for common benefit are explored can thus produce
other-regarding choices, even when incentives for free riding are strong.
Undeniably, citizens are conflicted when it comes to balancing their own interests
and the interests o f others, particularly members o f the larger national community, most
o f whom we never meet. As Robert Bellah et al (1985) report, “Buried within their
language o f individual self-interest is what we have called a second language o f social
commitment...Such ‘natural citizens’...experience little conflict between their selfinterest and the community’s public interest precisely because a long-term involvement
in the community has led them to define their very identity in terms o f it.” Enabling
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citizens to share the same feelings o f kinship and involvement with more remote others is
a key challenge for advocates o f deliberation. A reconciliation o f self-interest and the
common good requires first an acknowledgment that the two are not necessarily in
conflict. When presented with specific issues, we find that most o f time the decisions are
less troubling than we imagine them to be in the abstract. Implicit in much deliberative
theory is an assumption that without a normative requirement mandating the bracketing
o f interests, political discussion will inevitably degenerate into incompatible selfinterested claims. But as we have seen, the extent to which this is likely is highly
dependent on the issue at question and the identity o f the participants. The greater danger
may be that people will assume that others are self-interested.
Unfortunately, much o f the presentation o f politics in news media tells a story in
which self-interest is the primary motivation behind statements and actions. Media
presentations are important to conversation in part because they perform an "articulation
function" (Noelle-Neumann, 1993) by giving us the words, phrases and lines o f argument
we then use in political discussion. They also influence the frames o f reference through
which we understand and discuss political issues (Gamson, 1992). Our expectations o f
conversation may also be influenced by news media, just as they are by the larger opinion
climate in which we reside (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995). For instance, if most people in
town seem to be voting Republican, I expect that my coworkers will be Republicans,
even if we haven’t discussed the election yet. It seems reasonable to suggest that similar
expectations could prevail with regard to a larger national community and conversational
norms: if the citizens I see in news media seem to be self-interested in their political
opinions, then I may predict that some o f m y interpersonal contacts will be as well.
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In the political realm, we concern ourselves with the well-being o f others and the
community. Both the norms o f discourse and the nature o f the questions involved invite
us to think, speak, and act with the concerns o f the public in mind. Political decisions by
definition involve the community at large. Even when parties explicitly argue for their
self-interest, they do so with the understanding that their intended audience will judge the
validity o f their claims on more general criteria, either the common good or principles
such as fairness.
Deliberative democracy demands that citizens discuss politics with each other.
When they do, they must offer at least some public reasons for their choices and
opinions. Vote choice offers a good illustration. We may make two arguments for our
vote choices, one private and one public: I prefer Candidate X for reasons A, B, and C;
or Candidate X is the better candidate for reasons D, E, and F (Stoker, 1992). The first
requires little or no justification, while the second demands public reasons. A normative
requirement prohibiting any self-interested claims, however, not only places unrealistic
demands on the participants, particularly those with more limited skills o f analysis and
articulation, it is not functional for democratic purposes. Because it excludes personal
testimony (Sanders, 1997), it actually makes it harder for the participants to understand
and assess the interests o f others. Often, individuals are the only ones who can offer the
most complete articulation o f their interests. If they are forbidden from doing so, their
interests will not be known or accounted for.
The demand o f “public” reasons should therefore be reconceived not as a
requirement that all reasons must be based solely on the common good, but simply that
all reasons must be acceptable to others, thus allowing arguments based on, for instance,
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the principle o f justice (Cohen, 1997). What Laura Stoker (1992) argues about acting
ethically, that it "does not require a subversion o f self-regard or interest, but it does
minimally seek a reconciliation o f that self-regard and the interests o f others,” can also be
said o f deliberation. One individual's conception o f the common good may include the
interests o f specific others; "...th e interests, aims, and ideals that comprise the common
good are those that survive deliberation, interests that, on public reflection, we think it
legitimate to appeal to in making claims on social resources." (Cohen, 1989). We may on
occasion judge some individual claims as legitimate; a reasonable ideal o f deliberation
leaves this possibility open.
James Madison insisted in Federalist #10 that "No man is allowed to be a judge in
his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not
improbably, corrupt his integrity.'' The nature o f politics is such that the cause is usually
not our own; deliberation thus allows citizens to judge their common cause with minimal
concern for self-interest. Unfortunately, the survey evidence presented here suggests that
while everyday political conversation may increase people's regard for others in political
questions, it reduces the extent to which they believe others are motivated by concern for
the larger community. Conversation dominated by motive questioning could produce
such opinions - and would necessarily fail to be truly deliberative.
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Chapter 6
Information, Conversation, and D eliberation

[Man] is capable o f rectifying his mistakes, by discussion and experience. Not by
experience alone. There must be discussion, to show how experience is to be interpreted.
ITrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fa c t and argument: but fa cts and
arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it... In the case o f
any person who is really deserving o f confidence, how has it become so? Because he has
kept his mind open to criticism o f his opinions and conduct...Because he has felt, that the
only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole o f a
subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons o f every variety o f opinion,
and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character o f mind. No wise
man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this: nor is it in the nature o f human
intellect to become wise in any other manner.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty

The importance o f political knowledge to an active citizenry seems beyond
question. In order to participate in a meaningful way, citizens must have some
understanding o f the workings o f government, the consequences o f policies, and the goals
o f those they elect. Deliberation is itself impossible without political information. One
cannot deliberate on a proposed policy without knowing its content, or on an election
without knowing the agendas o f those seeking office. In order to assess whether news
media prepare citizens adequately for deliberation, and whether the political conversation
that does occur performs the educational function characteristic o f deliberation in theory,
we must examine the political knowledge held by the citizenry
Unfortunately, it appears that a great many Americans are ill-equipped for
deliberation. For years, researchers have bemoaned the low levels o f political knowledge
identified in survey research. As Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) wrote, "‘The
democratic citizen is expected to be well informed about political affairs. He is supposed
to know what the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what
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alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are. By
such standards the voter falls short." Similarly. Angus Campbell et al (1960) found
citizens to be largely unaware o f what the government was up to. Philip Converse (1964)
classified only 2.5% o f voters as “ideologues." those whose opinions were constrained by
a coherent set o f overarching themes, and a further 9% as “near-ideologues.” The rest of
the citizenry, he argued, held attitudes which were inconsistent, ungrounded, and
contradictory. In addition, only 17% had a complete understanding o f the concepts o f
liberalism and conservatism. “The two simplest truths I know about the distribution o f
political information in modem electorates,” Converse wrote later, “are that the mean is
low and the variance high.” (1990). Lack o f understanding o f the nature o f ideology and
its use in the political world appears to persist. When asked which o f the two major
parties was more conservative on the national level, only 57% o f respondents to the 1992
NES answered the Republicans; this figure has not risen above 60% in the last thirty
years.
Although another o f Converse’s findings, response instability - the tendency o f
respondents to give varying answers to the same questions at different points in time may reflect reasonable ambivalence rather than ignorance (Hochschild, 1993),
researchers continue to find that citizens perform poorly on political information quizzes
(Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Nor has there been an appreciable increase in citizens’
political knowledge in recent years, despite steadily increasing educational levels
(Bennett, 1989).
There are some who make a conscious decision to avoid news and conversation
about politics, wearing their disaffection as a badge o f honor (Eliasoph, 1990).
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Nonetheless, most citizens view keeping informed as a civic obligation, however
sporadically they comply (Graber, 1984; Hagen, 1997). Low levels o f information thus
appear to represent a serious weakness in the practice o f democracy. However, if the
electorate seems ill-informed at a particular moment, the context in which such a result is
found is as likely a suspect as the citizenry's inherent limitations (Alvarez, 1998; Key,
1966; Kinder & Herzog, 1993). That context is created by both press reports and
political discussion.
An opposing body o f research contends that citizens actually do quite well with
the information they have. This opinion comes from rational choice theorists starting
with Anthony Downs (1957), who argued that since the costs o f acquiring political
information far outweigh the benefits, it would be irrational to seek information. More
recent advocates o f ‘Tow information rationality” (Popkin, 1991) argue that a few
informational shortcuts - for instance, the endorsements o f key political figures - provide
voters with all the data they need to make good decisions. Informational shortcuts use
limited data as a proxy for a larger body o f data, allowing the voter to draw conclusions
as though the larger body o f information were known. For instance, Arthur Lupia (1994)
found that in voting on insurance reform initiatives, relatively uninformed California
voters were able to use knowledge o f which position the insurance industry advocated to
arrive at voting decisions that mirrored those they would have made with more complete
information.
In another example, Samuel Popkin (1991) offers the story o f Gerald Ford failing
to shuck a tamale before eating it as a cue to Hispanic voters in 1976 that Ford did not
appreciate their concerns. The publicity attending this story, however, was less the result
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o f people reaching conclusions based on the event than the result o f journalists believing
that they would and presenting the event as such; Popkin offers no evidence that Ford
was in fact insensitive to Hispanic concerns. A journalistic interpretation o f the event
and the repetition that comes with it are essential to its enshrinement as an "official"
informational shortcut. Such cases are far from uncommon; political reporters are always
on the lookout for events or statements that can be presented as symbols o f a candidate's
electoral prospects or personality. This is particularly true o f debate coverage, which
often pivots on supposedly "decisive moments" meant to characterize a candidate.
George Bush looking at his watch, Michael Dukakis answering a question about the death
penalty with reason instead o f passion. Richard Nixon sweating profusely - all were
presented by the press as particularly revealing, and thus became shortcuts for voter
understanding o f these candidates.
In these cases as well as others, particular moments were highlighted by the press
because they graphically incarnated conclusions reporters had already reached about the
candidates. This is not necessarily problematic, but in order for an informational shortcut
to be useful, it must lead to accurate conclusions; the goal is not simply to arrive at a
decision as quickly as possible. Although misconceptions and false information are
rarely discussed in public opinion literature (particularly rational choice analyses, which
usually follow Downs (1957) in assuming that all available information is accurate), they
can play a significant role in opinion. For example, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott
Keeter (1996) show that significant numbers o f people who voted for Bush in 1988 were
in effect fooled into doing so: they believed that the Reagan administration had increased
funding for causes they supported, such as the environment, schools and the poor, when
152

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in fact the opposite was true. These individuals not only voted differently than they
might have, but were also almost certainly less likely to engage in any political action to
change administration policy on these issues. Unlike lack o f information, misperception
tends to be valenced, in that it leads to conclusions supportive o f one or another side o f an
issue (Kuklinski & Quirk, 1997). Misperception can thus have electoral as well as policy
consequences; despite the apparent utility o f information shortcuts, a substantial number
o f voters do not use them successfully (Bartels, 1996). If it is truly endemic,
misperception on a particular issue may constitute prima facie evidence that deliberation
has either failed or failed to occur.
In the early part o f the twentieth century, Walter Lippmann (1922) argued that
given the complexity o f the modem world and the varied activities o f the state, the ideal
o f the "omnicompetent" citizen, who was informed about all issues, was an impossibility.
Instead, society should rely on a class o f impartial experts that would provide
policymakers with the information needed to make decisions. John Dewey (1927)
responded that "No government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance
to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the
interests o f the few.” To those such as Dewey who advocated expanding democracy to
rely more on the input and participation o f the citizenry, Lippmann (1927) responded that
doing so would only exacerbate democracy’s ills by giving more power to a populace illequipped to make decisions.
Is there a way to reconcile Dewey’s optimism and Lippmann’s realism? One
answer to Lippmann would be that greater engagement would enhance knowledge,
creating competent if not omnicompetent citizens. Even if the public’s abilities to
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analyze policy are necessarily imperfect, they need not be perfect to arrive at good
decisions. The question is not whether the masses have as much information at their
disposal as the experts, but whether they have sufficient information to render judgment,
and the capacity and ability to do so. Given the time and permission to decide, they may
indeed prove wise (Yankelovich, 1991), arriving at decisions which benefit not only
themselves but the populace as a whole. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro (1992)
argue that the question is not how much each individual citizen knows, but whether the
citizenry holds enough information collectively. If it does, a collective deliberation may
take place without any particular citizen necessarily deliberating (Page, 1996). The
notion that the public can show sound judgment without any o f its members necessarily
knowing very much can actually be traced to Aristotle (Bickford, 1996a). Although
Dewey did conceive o f a collective aspect to knowledge and discourse (Peters, 1989), the
question o f individuals becomes critical if it appears that certain individuals are
systematically shut out o f deliberation. As I argued earlier, it would be one matter if half
the public deliberated on any particular issue, and membership in that half was randomly
determined or at least varied from issue to issue. But if certain people usually deliberate
and others never do, then a systematic distortion exists. As we saw in Chapter 3, this is
precisely the case: conversation is in fact largely the province o f members o f more
powerful groups.
Although Dewey (1927) conceded that “There are too many publics and too much
o f public concern for our existing resources to cope with,” he also hoped that evolving
communication technology could mitigate the atomizing effects o f mass society and
establish, if not a substitute for face-to-face contact, some basis on which to bond remote
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citizens to one another. This view is shared by others as well (Abramson, 1992; Barber,
1984; see Simonson, 1996 for a review). His argument is not so much that
communication will produce civic education in the form o f factual knowledge, but that it
will show us where our common interests lie. The logical question, then, is whether the
extraordinary changes in communication technology in the intervening years have in fact
done so. The unfortunate answer is that enhanced opportunities for political learning
have not enhanced the aggregate knowledge held by the bulk o f the citizenry (Neuman,
1986).
One conclusion that is widely embraced is that those who rely on the medium
dominant in Lippmann and Dewey’s day, the newspaper, are better informed than other
citizens. Numerous studies have found that newspaper reading outstrips other media as a
source o f political information (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997). John Robinson and Dennis
Davis (1990) list the traditional explanations for the assumed superiority o f newspapers
in imparting knowledge:
First, a TV newscast has fewer words and ideas per news story than appear in a front
page story in a quality newspaper. Second, attention to a newscast is distracted and
fragmented compared to attention when reading. Third, television newscasts provide
little o f the repetition o f information, or redundancy, necessary for comprehension.
Fourth, TV viewers cannot 'turn back" to. or review, information they do not understand
or that they need to know to understand subsequent information. Fifth, print news stories
are more clearly delineated, with headlines, columns, sidebars, and the like. Sixth,
television news programs fail to coordinate pictures and text. Finally, television has
more limited opportunity to review and develop an entire story.

Despite an impressive body o f research arguing against television’s ability to
impart political knowledge, recent studies have in fact found significant information
gains from television viewing (Chaffee & Frank, 1996). Thomas Patterson and Robert
McClure’s (1976) dramatic finding that voters leam more from campaign advertisements
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than from television news has been challenged in subsequent years, with many studies
reaching the opposite conclusion (Zhao & Chaffee, 1995). One panel study found that
television use (but not newspapers) increased knowledge o f candidates over the course o f
a Senate campaign (Lesher & McKean, 1997). Jeffrey Mondak (1995) found that even
explicit newspaper content aimed at familiarizing readers with candidates’ issue positions
in the form o f front-page boxed statements on one issue at a time did not notably increase
knowledge o f candidate positions. Information that voters gained from newspapers was
apparently also available elsewhere. Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) report that in some
cases learning from television surpassed learning from newspapers when the information
contained in each was the same. Their experiments suggest that cognitive skills
determine in part how much individuals retain from exposure to media messages,
indicating that self-selection, modality, and content are all critical factors in explaining
differences in learning from various media.
Similarly, Vincent Price and John Zaller (1993) suggest that information gain
from media is best predicted by prior knowledge. In other words, while the less-informed
leam some things and miss others, “well-informed people succeed in learning most types
o f news, regardless o f the topic.” This may be due in part to the fact that the betterinformed have more highly developed political schemas, allowing them to assimilate and
integrate new information more easily (Conover & Feldman, 1984; Lau & Erber, 1985).
In addition, it is possible that, as Doris Graber (1994) argues, “most election news stories
cater to the concerns and comprehension levels o f politically sophisticated elites.” In
sum, the contribution o f television news to voter information is still open to debate
(Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997).
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In one sense, it is not surprising that the studies mentioned here reach varying
conclusions. Although they go back almost thirty years, most concern a single election.
One must keep in mind that each election or policy debate creates a distinct information
environment. It is therefore possible - in fact likely - that the news in general and
different media in particular will provide more issue information in one election than in
another.
The relative value o f various media in imparting different kinds o f knowledge
tells only part o f the story, however. I propose accepting a number of principles to lead
us toward a reasonable ideal o f citizen knowledge. The first and most obvious is that no
citizen can know everything. There is simply too much information available on too
many issues, as Lippmann pointed out. The second is that more information is better
than less information. Assuming that what one knows is not false, the more one knows,
the more complete a decision will be. The third principle is that some pieces o f
information are more important than others. This principle allows one to circumvent the
need for the omnicompetent citizen.
For any given issue, there will be three general classes o f information:
information about the nature o f the problem or the status quo; information about the
content o f proposals; and information about the possible consequences o f proposals
(while there are certainly other kinds o f information, these will be most central to any
debate). The first class is usually (although not always) characterized by less uncertainty;
the question here is which facts are important to evaluating proposals. The second class
is easily ascertained, but critical to forming judgment. The third class is open to the
greatest amount o f interpretation. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess, except on a case157
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by-case basis, whether the public holds the specific information it needs to make
appropriate judgments. Each issue brings with it a distinct universe o f information; in
some cases a citizen will require only one or two facts to be adequately informed, while
in others more complex knowledge will be necessary.
Consequently, there is no single body o f facts we can specify which will
differentiate the informed from the uninformed. This distinction may be possible,
however, when we examine a single issue in isolation. An adequate test to determine
whether a particular piece o f information is vital to understanding an issue might be this:
would knowledge o f the information cause anyone to change his or her opinion on the
issue? An example will illustrate the kinds o f information that would pass this test.
Recently, Republicans in Congress passed, and President Clinton later vetoed, a repeal o f
the estate tax, which they refer to as a “death tax.” A citizen considering whether the tax
should be abolished would need to know one vital piece o f information: that the current
tax does not apply to the first $675,000 o f any individual’s estate, a figure scheduled to
rise to SI million in 2006. Concerns o f fairness and appropriate taxation will likely tum
on this fact, because the tax applies almost exclusively to substantial estates, i.e. those o f
wealthy citizens.
This is an example o f what I call a critical datum: a piece o f information that is
sufficient in and o f itself to determine an individual’s position on the issue (or candidate).
A critical datum could be an informational shortcut, such as the stance o f the insurance
companies in Lupia’s (1994) research, but it is not necessary that it permit the individual
to infer other information. O f course, there is no general theory that will predict the
effects o f a critical datum within a given issue; some issues will have no critical data, and
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different critical data will have different power. In an election campaign, one issue
position could function for some as a critical datum, although evidence indicates that
most people do not belong to an ‘‘issue public” for whom one issue is all-important
(Jacoby, 1999; Neuman, 1986). We may conceive o f a hierarchy o f data for each issue
running in importance from the critical datum down to the irrelevant fact. O f course,
each individual’s hierarchy will be slightly different.
Thus, the second principle o f political knowledge must be modified: whether
more information is better than less depends on the relationship o f each new datum to the
store o f data already held. If a datum high in the hierarchy o f information is missing, the
addition o f a lower-ranked datum will be unhelpful, and may lead to an erroneous
conclusion. Consider the following example concerning a voter in 1988. The voter is in
favor o f increased protection o f the environment, but knows nothing about the
environmental records o f either George Bush or Michael Dukakis. If he sees a particular
Bush advertisement, he will learn that Boston Harbor has remained polluted under
Dukakis' tenure as Massachusetts governor. He now has more information than he did
before. If he makes his vote choice based on the information now in his possession, he
will conclude that Bush is more likely to protect the environment than Dukakis. Given
his preferences, this is likely to be an incorrect choice, since Dukakis had been endorsed
by all the major environmental groups and in fact had a record on the environment
superior to Bush’s. The endorsements and the rest o f Dukakis’ and Bush’s records on the
environment should rank higher in the hierarchy o f information than Boston Harbor; only
if those higher-ranking facts are known can the fact o f Boston Harbor be properly
contextualized and weighted.
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The logical question then, is whether the vital pieces o f information actually find
their way to individual citizens. Benjamin Page (1996) argues for a division o f labor, in
which a small group o f “professional communicators” is responsible for obtaining
information and building arguments, then passing what they know on to the public: “...if
extensive political information is available somewhere in the system, not everyone has to
pay attention to it all the time; a lot o f information, and reasonable conclusions from it,
will trickle out through opinion leaders and cue givers to ordinary citizens.” Is this
formulation also too optimistic? It attempts to answer those who offer hegemonic
interpretations o f news coverage (Gitlin, 1980; Herman & Chomsky, 1988) by arguing
that in a communication environment as varied as ours, most ideas and facts will be
published or broadcast somewhere; as long they are, they will find their w ay to the
citizenry. For such a system to work, however, one critical element is required: citizens
must engage each other in political discussion so that information and arguments can
“trickle out.”
When they do, the body o f knowledge held in aggregate by the group becomes
the resource available to each individual. Importantly, the breadth o f this knowledge will
depend in part on the makeup and diversity o f the group. If everyone in the group is alike
in their opinions and information sources, discordant facts and arguments are less likely
to find their way in (Granovetter, 1973), and inaccurate information is less likely to be
corrected (Chaffee, 1986).
The nature o f critical data is such that once they are known, they are highly likely
to be raised in conversation as people formulate arguments and arrive at positions. In
news coverage, on the other hand, quotes are more apt to be selected for publication if the
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speaker attacks and vilifies opponents than if she offers a particularly cogent rationale for
a policy. This is one possible explanation for the fact that exposure to political
conversation frequently outperforms exposure to news media as a predictor o f political
knowledge. To use the example o f the estate tax, a Lexis/Nexis search for the first six
months o f 2000 revealed that only 18% o f newspaper articles, 12% o f magazine articles,
and 9% o f news transcripts concerning the estate tax mentioned the S675,000 figure. It
would then seem likely that most people would be unaware o f the critical datum
necessary to judge this issue, particularly if they have not discussed it with others.

Conversation and information
There is ample evidence that when discussion occurs, knowledge is enhanced.
Early research on political campaigns in the United States found that personal interaction
was an important determinant o f information flow. Formulated by Lazarsfeld, Berelson
and Gaudet (1944) and elaborated by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), the “two-step flow”
hypothesis posited a one-way flow o f information from the media to “opinion leaders”
and from them to followers. Although later research indicated that the view o f a
politically sophisticated elite speaking to uninformed others was not an entirely accurate
representation o f political conversation (Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1995), Katz and
Lazarsfeld's work introduced a critical element to the analysis o f political information
reception.
Other research has confirmed that conversation remains critical to learning and
retaining information. For instance, in a study o f news comprehension, Robinson and
Davis (1990) showed that while education is the greatest predictor o f comprehension,
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quantity o f political talk showed a strong linear relationship with knowledge in four
separate surveys. Those who talked more were more likely to recall stories in the news
and correctly describe the actors and events involved. This result echoed an earlier
finding that discussion o f events in the news predicted comprehension to a greater degree
than any media use variable (Robinson & Levy, 1986). As Dewey (1927) put it,
"Publication is partial and the public which results is partially informed and formed until
the meanings it purveys pass from mouth to mouth."
The following analysis uses three data sets to explore the relationships among
media use, conversation, and knowledge in electoral contexts. The first set is the
National Election Studies, which since 1984 have asked respondents how often they
discuss politics. The second is a study conducted in 1996 by the Annenberg School for
Communication o f the University o f Pennsylvania consisting o f a four-wave crosssection supplemented by a panel drawn from the first wave and reinterviewed at later
points in the campaign. Finally, the 1998 Annenberg California survey is examined as
well.
Political knowledge tests such as those discussed here have been justifiably
criticized for focusing on a narrow range o f facts and ignoring what citizens do know
(Popkin, 1991). Admittedly, surveys are not particularly good at assessing whether
citizens are able to process political information and arrive at reasonable conclusions. As
Doris Graber (1996) argues, “The typical survey research knowledge test focuses on what
people ideally ought to know, rather than testing whether people are well-informed
enough to cope with the civic tasks that face them.’’ In short, while the types o f
knowledge measure by the NES and the Annenberg studies are useful, they do not tell
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anything approaching the entire story o f citizen knowledge. Nonetheless, taken together
they may stand in rough correlation to "true" political knowledge in all its breadth and
complexity. While factual knowledge may be less important in evaluating a policy
debate than an understanding o f history or an appreciation o f the realities o f policy
implementation, these qualities will usually travel together. We may therefore make
cautious evaluations o f patterns o f knowledge while avoiding categorical conclusions
about whether the American public is smart or stupid when it comes to politics.
Political sophistication, furthermore, is not a static characteristic o f individuals,
but is instead constantly renewed through media attention and discussion. It is, in short,
"a resource rather than a trait” (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). One is not bom
sophisticated; political knowledge requires constant upkeep, and discussion is essential to
this process (Gastil & Dillard, 1999).
The first questions I will ask are, how does conversation correlate with political
knowledge, and to what extent does conversation predict knowledge over and above the
contributions made by demographic variables and media use? As we see in Table 6-1,
media use, conversation, and political knowledge are closely correlated. The only non
significant relationship is between talk radio listening and local news watching. It is
worth noting that local news has less political content than national news; furthermore, a
certain number o f people watch local news primarily for sports or weather. It is thus not
surprising that local news shows a lower correlation with political knowledge than other
media variables.
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T ab le 6-1
Z ero -O rd er C o rre la tio n s:
C o n v e rsa tio n , M edia U se, a n d P olitical K n o w le d g e
(1996 Annenberg Survey)
Conversation

Newspaper

Local
news

National
news

Talk
radio

Newspaper

.154“

Local news

.073“

.147“

National
news

.188“

.232“

.4 6 8 "

Talk radio

.245“

.119“

.021

.054*

Political
interest

.371“

.172“

.179“

.277“

.257“

Knowledge

.354“

.249“

.197“

.177“

.229“

Political
interest

.322”

• p< 05
" p<.01

These results come from a national sample o f registered voters. Respondents
were told an issue position, then asked whether it was held by Clinton, Dole, both
candidates, or neither candidate. Twenty-three separate issues were tested, offering a
scale including both easy and difficult questions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993) which
resulted in a normal distribution, unlike the knowledge scales in the other data sets (see
Appendix). Despite the fact that all four options were reread by the interviewer before
every question, respondents were largely unwilling to answer “both” or “neither.” The
issues on which the candidates agreed (NAFTA, the death penalty, and same-sex
marriages) had among the lowest percentage o f correct responses. This pattern might
indicate a great deal o f guessing, with respondents more likely to guess one candidate or
the other. On the other hand, because press accounts stress disagreement between
candidates within an overarching campaign narrative structured around conflict, the idea
that opposing candidates could agree on anything m ay simply not occur to most people.
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The National Election Studies measure a number o f different political knowledge
domains, and offer the benefit o f data going back to 1984, when questions about political
conversation were first included.1 To assess knowledge o f public figures, respondents are
asked if they know the position held by a number o f individuals. Although the list varies
from year to year, it always includes the vice-president and usually includes
Congressional leaders and foreign heads o f state. The second knowledge domain is
control o f Congress: respondents are asked which party controlled each house before the
election. Finally, knowledge o f the issue positions o f the two major party candidates for
president is measured. Respondents are asked to place each candidate on a differential
scale on a series o f issues. For instance, the abortion question runs from “By law,
abortion should never be permitted.’’ to “By law, a woman should always be able to
obtain an abortion as a m atter of personal choice.” I coded answers as correct if a
respondent placed the Republican candidate closer to the conservative position than the
Democratic candidate. Only issues marked by clear differences in positions were
utilized.
As Figure 6-1 shows, the correlation between conversation and knowledge as
measured by the NES varies considerably from year to year. Nineteen ninety-two
appears to be a low point for the effectiveness o f conversation for knowledge o f
candidate issue positions, while talk and knowledge o f political figures and control o f
Congress were lowest in 1996. O f course, correlations are affected by the general
variance in knowledge; the low correlation in 1996 between conversation and knowledge

1The NES asks whether respondents ever discuss politics, then asks those who say yes how often they
discuss politics and how many days in the last week they did so. The three questions are asked in
sequence. The Annenberg survey o f 1996 used an identical format.
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o f control o f Congress is due in part to the fact that three-quarters o f respondents knew
that Republicans were in the majority. This may also explain the low correlation for
identification o f political figures in that year, since here too most respondents scored well
(see Appendix). Overall, the correlation between knowledge and conversation is a strong
one, falling between .25 and .35 in most years.

F igure 6-1: Z ero-O rder C o rrela tio n s
B etw een F re q u e n c y o f C o n v e rs a tio n a n d
M e a su re s o f K n o w le d g e (NES)
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0.1
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It is notable that the correlations between knowledge o f candidate issue positions
and political conversation on the National Election Studies are lower than that obtained
by the 1996 Annenberg survey. The format o f the NES questions, where respondents
were asked to place both candidates in separate questions, may result in less guessing
than the Annenberg format, where respondents are given a position and asked which
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candidate holds it. Respondents on the NES do score slightly lower on similar questions
than respondents on the Annenberg survey.

The question o f causality
The next question to address is whether conversation leads to knowledge or
knowledge leads to conversation. There is reason to believe that both are in fact true.
Without question, people can leam political information from their conversation partners
as issues and candidates are discussed. In addition, it seems likely that those who are
more knowledgeable about politics will be more willing to discuss political subjects with
their family, friends, and co-workers. They will be less likely to fear displaying
ignorance or being unable to provide justifications and evidence for their opinions.
Furthermore, both knowledge and conversation are influenced by the same classes o f
variables. A general model o f influence, then, can be seen in Figure 6-2:

Figure 6-2
G eneral Model o f In flu en ces on C o n v e rsatio n a n d K now ledge

Media Use

Knowledge

Demographics

j

Conversation

Political Interest
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The close correlation between political discussion and political knowledge,
combined with the inherent weaknesses o f cross-sectional data, make precise estimates o f
the comparative magnitude o f reciprocal effects extremely difficult. Obtaining such
estimates using a technique such as two-stage least squares regression or structural
equation modeling would require the identification o f exogenous variables that are
correlated with knowledge but not discussion, and separate exogenous variables
correlated with discussion but not knowledge. As it happens, such variables are not easy
to find. While party identification is associated with discussion but not knowledge
(Republicans talk about politics more than Democrats and Independents, but show no
higher levels o f knowledge), there is no variable measured in the data sets at hand that is
associated with knowledge but not talk. The consequence is that while we may use party
identification to construct an instrument for use in a two-stage least squares regression
predicting knowledge, we are unable to do the same for conversation.
This is not to say that the predictors o f discussion and knowledge are identical,
but rather that they are associated in bivariate terms with an identical set o f variables. In
addition to the media use variables shown in Table 6-1, both discussion and knowledge
correlate with education, income, gender, age, race, political interest, and ideological
strength. This close association suggests that discussion is both an arena o f learning and
in significant part the province o f the knowledgeable.
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Table 6-2: Predicting Candidate Knowledge
NES
Annenberg
(1996)___________National (1996)
Gender (female)

Annenberg
California (1998)

-.39***
(.11)

-.09

-1.47***
(-17)

-.16

-.28*
(-13)

-.06

Race (white)

.43*
(.17)

.06

.73**
(.24)

.06

.26
(.15)

.05

Age

-.02
(.02)

-.15

.10**
(.03)

.34

.03
(-02)

.20

Age squared

.00
(.00)

.01

-.001**
(.00)

-.33

-.00
(.00)

-.18

Education

.48***
(.05)

.25

.88***
(-08)

.22

.31***
(-06)

.17

Income in thousands

.00
(-00)

.04

.01**
(.003)

.06

.001
(.001)

.02

Newspaper

.03
(-02)

.04

.16***
(0 3 )

.10

.07**
(-02)

.09

Network news

.03
(.02)

.04

.11**
(0 4 )

.06

-.04
(.03)

-.05

Talk radio

.06
(.03)

.04

.29***
(.05)

.11

.14***
(.03)

.14

Ideological strength

.35***
(-04)

.21

.06
(.12)

.01

-.08
(-09)

-.03

Political interest

.60***
(.09)

.19

1.00***
(13)

.16

.91***
(.08)

.36

Political discussion

.10***
(.03)

.10

.35***
(04)

.16

.1 1 "
(-04)

.10

Constant

1.35**
(-51)

R2

3.24***
(.80)

.360

-.25
(.55)

.302

.325

* p < .05
*' p < .01
*** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses, standardized coefficients in italic.

The differences between the two data sets beg some cautions in interpreting these
results. While both the Annenberg survey and the NES measured respondents’
knowledge o f candidate positions, they did so in different ways. While the Annenberg
survey offered a specific issue position and asked whether it was held by Clinton, Dole,
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both or neither, the NES asked respondents to place each candidate on a scale; correct
and incorrect answers were then built from these scales. Overall, respondents did slightly
better on the Annenberg versions o f questions covering the same issues. The NES
version required respondents to at the very least be willing to place both candidates,
whereas knowledge o f only one candidate would in most cases have been sufficient to
answer correctly on the Annenberg questions. In addition, while there is some overlap
the NES questions are less specific than the Annenberg questions; any number o f
governmental policies could fall under the categories o f “aid to blacks" or “protecting the
environment."
If we then assume that the NES scale measures a more complex and integrative
form of political knowledge while the Annenberg scale measures a wider array o f issues,
a few differences are worthy o f note. While the curvilinear relationship o f age to
knowledge is significant in the Annenberg data, it fails to predict results on the NES
scale. While education has a roughly equivalent effect in both cases, income provides no
further predictive power in the case o f the NES.
None o f the media use variables reaches statistical significance in the case o f the
NES, while all are significant in the Annenberg data. One interpretation o f this result is
that the more difficult but broadly focused NES questions measure political knowledge
that is less dependent on the issues discussed in a particular campaign and more general
in nature. While more frequent users o f media might be more likely to learn that Dole
supported a 15% tax cut, knowing which candidate was more supportive o f
environmental regulations requires a general assessment o f a variety o f policy positions
which may or may not have been reported on recently. It is therefore not surprising that
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ideological strength shows an extremely strong effect in the NES data but not in the
Annenberg data; strong conservatives and strong liberals are apparently more adept at
connecting issue positions to arrive at a placement o f the candidates on more general
themes o f government priorities.
Despite these differences, the frequency o f political conversation predicts levels
o f political knowledge fairly strongly in both cases, even when all other factors are
controlled. It is reasonable to conclude that a significant amount o f learning takes place
in everyday political conversation. It is also fair to assume that if learning on candidate
issue positions occurs in conversation, there are other types o f political knowledge that
are bolstered as well. Increases in the factual knowledge measured by these survey items
may not be the most important effect o f political discussion. If the benefits o f discussion
are a result o f its dynamic nature, participants may be gaining sophistication in ways
difficult (though by no means impossible) to measure in surveys. Citizens should in
theory emerge from deliberation not only with new facts but with a more complex
understanding o f issues and an ability to assess evidence for claims and construct
persuasive arguments. It is possible that the positive effects o f political discussion could
be identified even more strongly with data that combined a factual quiz with in-depth
interviews (Luskin, 1987).

Conversation and knowledge gaps
Conversation significantly predicts knowledge, but are those with knowledge
simply gaining more, while those without knowledge gain nothing? Some hold that
interpersonal communication may have the potential to mitigate knowledge gaps
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(Viswanath & Finnegan, 1996), although this has yet to be demonstrated empirically.
Briefly, the knowledge gap hypothesis states that because o f unequal access to media and
unequal ability to comprehend mediated information, communication campaigns
generally and political news in particular primarily benefit those who already possess
information, thus exacerbating inequality (Gaziano, 1983).
Political discussion is likewise distributed unequally: those who are more highly
educated, wealthy, and knowledgeable are more likely to discuss politics. If there is a
linear association between discussion and learning, those who talk more will leam more.
We may nonetheless be able to find some situations in which political discussion does
narrow knowledge gaps.
As the 1996 campaign progressed, the overall gap in candidate issue knowledge
between people engaging in different levels o f conversation did narrow somewhat, with
those talking less frequently gaining slightly more:

F ig u re 6-3
K n o w le d g e By C o n v e rsa tio n L evel
(1996 Annenberg study)
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The 1996 survey also included a smaller panel study using the same
questionnaire. Although the small size o f the subgroups in this sample constrains us from
making any sweeping conclusions, the data in Figure 6-4 do suggest that conversation
can mitigate knowledge gaps. Those who scored lower on knowledge at Time I gained
more from conversation than did those in the medium and high knowledge groups over
the course o f the campaign. The correlation between conversation and knowledge at
Time II for the group scoring low in knowledge at Time I was .273, compared with .183
and . 195 for the medium and high knowledge groups. This is unsurprising for two
reasons. The first is that the less one knows, the more one is able to leam. Many in the
high knowledge group are aware o f (or can guess correctly at) candidate stands on all but
the most obscure issues, so they have less to gain as the campaign progresses.
The second reason is that unlike media presentations, each conversation is
particular to its participants. The knowledge gap hypothesis is based on the presumption
that those with high levels o f knowledge and cognitive skills are better equipped to
understand and recall mediated information. This information arrives in the same form to
those who comprehend it and those who don’t. On the other hand, if my conversation
partner tells me something I don’t understand or my mind wanders as she speaks. I can
ask her to repeat herself or elaborate. An hour o f political discussion is very different
from an hour spent watching or reading the news (Mondak, 1995). It is thus possible that
the less one knows, the more one gains from discussion.2

2 Another possibility that should be acknowledged is that o f testing effects. Improvements in knowledge
scores from one panel wave to the next could be attributed to the fact that subjects were prepared by their
first attempt. This effect could be more pronounced for those low in knowledge, who had more to leam.
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F igure 6-4
E ffect o f C o n v e rsa tio n o n Tim e II
K n o w le d g e, B y Level o f Tim e I K n o w led g e
20

High Time I knowledge
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Medium Time I knowledge
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Low Time I knowledge

5
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L e s s o ften

Once or
tw ice
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four tim e s

Every day

How m any d a y s/w ee k do y ou talk p olitics?

Interactions with media use
Judging from the cross-sectional data from 1996, there does not appear to be a
significant interaction between conversation and media use. As Figures 6-5 and 6-6
show, conversation has roughly the same impact on knowledge at different levels o f
media use.3 There is one exception, however. Those who frequently discuss politics but
rarely watch network news actually score quite high on knowledge o f candidate issue
positions. This result may be accounted for by the fact that members o f this group tend to
be heavy newspaper readers.

3 Levels o f conversation were coded as follows. In response to the question “How often do you talk about
politics?”: every day, 3 or 4 times a week = High; once or twice a week = Medium; less often, never =
Low. Newspaper use was coded as follows: every day = High; 2 through 6 days = Medium; 1, 0 days =
Low. Television news use was coded as follows: 5 through 7 days in week = High; 2 through 4 days =
Medium; I, 0 days = Low. Divisions were made on the basis o f each variable's distribution.
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F ig u re 6-5: In teractio n o f C o n v e rsa tio n a n d TV
N ew s W atch in g (1996 Annenberg Survey)
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At first glance this result might seem to strike a blow at the effectiveness o f
citizen deliberation. Ideally, conversation should enable individuals to store and retain
what they leam from media as events are related and discussed. If the effects o f the two
are completely independent, then the deliberative system would not appear to be
operating as a coherent whole.
At the same time, this lack o f interaction may not be a threat to deliberation if one
keeps in mind that conversation partners are not necessarily exposed to precisely the
same media diet. Let us imagine three co-workers, John, Mary and Alex, w ho talk about
an election together. John reads the newspaper and learns facts A, B and C; M ary
watches the news and leams facts D, E, and F; and Alex listens to the radio and learns
facts G, H and I. After a discussion, each will have added some o f what the others
learned from media to their body o f knowledge. Conversation would boost knowledge
for each in this context not because o f the reiteration o f facts already heard elsewhere, but
because o f the introduction o f new facts. Thus, in their case there will not be any evident
interaction between media use and conversation in increasing knowledge. T his occurs
precisely because most individuals are exposed to a variety o f news sources in varying
combinations. Despite the fact that most American cities do not have com peting
newspapers, even in one-paper towns citizens have access to local and national news,
radio, magazines, and web sites. As a consequence, there is at least the potential that a
conversation may bring in disparate information. Whether this in fact occurs is an open
question; although we know that most groups are relatively homogeneous in term s o f
opinion, one direction for future research should be to investigate whether discussion
partners tend to share the same media diet as well.
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In each case, we see that the difference between infrequent talkers and moderate
talkers is greater than the difference between moderate talkers and frequent talkers. As
Figure 6-7 shows, those moderate or high in newspaper reading gain almost no
knowledge as television news watching is increased. Infrequent newspaper readers gain
substantial knowledge as television watching is increased, but only at the high level o f
network news watching do those low in newspaper reading score as high as even
moderate readers.

F igure 6-7: K n o w le d g e b y N e w sp a p e r
R e ad in g a n d T e lev isio n N ew s W atching
(1996 Annenberg Survey)
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While this result may be partly explained by the differences between newspaper
readers and television viewers in education and cognitive ability (Neuman et al., 1992), it
indicates that those who are exposed to moderate amounts o f news media do far better
when the medium in question is the newspaper. Those who claim to rely primarily on
newspapers for their news score better on knowledge quizzes than those who rely on
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television (Culbertson & Stempel, 1986; Robinson & Levy, 1986), but most people do
not use one medium exclusively. These results indicate that the relative quantity o f each
may be an important determinant o f knowledge acquisition.

Conclusion
Many analyses o f political knowledge assume that people leam, store, and use
information primarily for a single purpose: voting. For example, one recent volume
entitled Political Judgment (Lodge & McGraw, 1995) consists entirely o f essays on the
determinants o f vote choice. While deciding for whom to vote is undoubtedly an
important task for citizens in a democracy, it is by no means the only judgment to be
made. In a system in which deliberation is the underpinning o f democratic practice,
information is held for use in future discussion as well as future action and votes. The
focus on voting leads to the conclusion that what people know is less important than
whether they are able to vote as if they know a great deal (McKelvey & Ordeshook,
1986).
However, the citizen, unlike the voter, needs to do more than simply make the
"correct" vote choice; she also needs to appreciate the consequences o f her choices
(Yankelovich, 1991). Let us take as an example a liberal voter in 2000 choosing between
Bush and Gore. One o f the issues she cares about is the death penalty; if she is unaware
o f the candidates’ positions, she may assume based on party heuristics that Gore opposes
it while Bush supports it. What if she learns that Gore too supports the death penalty?
She is unlikely to change her vote, since Gore remains the more liberal candidate.
Nonetheless, she votes with an understanding that whoever wins, a death penalty
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advocate will reside in the White House. This knowledge will aid in her understanding
future debates and may alter the kinds o f political action she is motivated to undertake. If
one focuses only on her vote choice, one will conclude that whether she knows the
candidates* positions on the death penalty is unimportant. But it may be important to her
responsibilities as a citizen, which do not end the moment she steps out o f the voting
booth.
One o f the key arguments for deliberation is that it educates those who engage in
it; in this, the present data indicate that ordinary conversation seems to succeed. Talking
about politics aids citizens in understanding campaigns, candidates, and issues. Whether
those citizens - both the ones who talk and the ones who d o n 't - can be said to be
"informed'* is ultimately largely subjective. In fact, the holding o f information about
politics is both a precondition and a consequence o f deliberation. In order to deliberate,
we need information; by deliberating, we share our knowledge with others and leam from
them. On this foundation o f deliberation, the performance o f the media seems a mixed
bag. On one hand, significant learning takes place as a consequence o f media exposure.
On the other, different media operate with varying effectiveness in different contexts;
television news appears to produce no learning in some cases. Talking about politics,
however, produced learning in all o f the data sets examined. Everyday conversation thus
fulfills one o f the critical requirements o f deliberation.
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Chapter 7
Uncertainty and D eliberation

As Aristotle observed in Nicomachean Ethics, uncertainty is what makes
deliberation essential; we do not deliberate about questions open to straightforward
empirical resolution (Aristotle, 2000). If you believe it is two o'clock while I think it is
closer to two-thirty, we would do better to find a clock than to deliberate. Much o f public
debate, furthermore, proceeds on utilitarian principles, namely that policies should
provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number (Guttman & Thompson, 1996). If the
consequences o f policies could be known precisely, then benefits and harms could simply
be calculated, one subtracted from the other, and the proper course o f action determined.
They could be if all benefits and harms were translated to a common currency;
utilitarianism argues that “utility" is such a currency, but in practice different types of
benefits and harms are difficult to equate. One o f the central tasks o f deliberation is to
debate potential consequences o f decisions and weigh competing benefits and harms.
Despite what Rousseau and other theorists believed, the best course o f action to serve the
common good is not always readily apparent (Mansbridge, 1999).
In an uncertain political world, citizens must thus be willing to accommodate their
own uncertainty in order to deliberate. If they are not, they will be unwilling to enter into
discussion when they are unsure o f their positions, and unwilling to change when they
are. Given that every policy has consequences that are usually difficult to predict and
relevant facts are themselves often contested, individual uncertainty is not only
understandable but eminently reasonable. The imprecise relationship between intentions
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and outcomes makes a period o f uncertainty a necessary part o f political decision
making. But uncertainty often seems paralyzing; those who are less certain o f their
positions are less willing to express them (Lasorsa, 1991). This may be logical if we see
political conversation in the same competitive context in which the rest o f politics
appears to exist. The reliance on personal testimony in public speech identified by
Eliasoph (1998) may also reflect the desire to avoid uncertainty. One may tell one’s own
story without worrying about being questioned or having all the facts. But when
testimony is inapplicable, many shun political discussion. The desire to avoid displaying
uncertainty provides an even stronger disincentive for discussion with those with whom
we disagree.
Although there is a large body o f research examining the implications o f
uncertainty for voter decision-making dating back to Anthony Downs’ An Economic
Theory o f Democracy (1957), and before that to the Columbia election studies (Berelson
et al., 1954; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), my concern is less with uncertainty as a lack o f
information that influences decisions than as a subjective feeling and a mode o f
expression. In a deliberative democracy, citizens would enter into political discussion
regardless o f their level o f certainty, but emerge from discussion more certain o f their
positions than they were at the outset. In reality, however, discussion may be considered
the province o f the certain, an arena best joined only when opinions are set and
immovable. This model o f deliberation can be seen clearly in news presentations o f the
political world.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Uncertainty in Discourse
The citizen viewing the political world through the eyes o f the news media sees
an arena where uncertainty is utterly absent. Speakers in the mediated public sphere
strive to give the impression o f absolute certainty in the rightness o f their positions and
the wTongness o f their opponents'. Members o f Congress, who may actually go
through a period o f uncertainty on issues, wait until they have made up their minds to
make public statements. Congressional hearings function less for the purpose o f factgathering than as a forum for argumentation. Politicians demand o f each other that
they have clear issue stands which are never subject to change. In campaigns,
changing one's mind is an unpardonable sin; a common charge is that one’s opponent
has "flip-flopped.” For example. Michael Dukakis dealt the final blow to Richard
Gephardt's 1988 presidential bid with an ad that showed a figure in a suit representing
Gephardt doing back flips. Similarly, a Nixon spot in 1972 showed pictures o f George
McGovern flipping back and forth atop a weather vane. Another Nixon ad detailed
instances where McGovern had changed his position from the year before, ending
ominously, ‘"Last year, this year. The question is, what about next year?” In 1992,
George Bush aired an ad discussing opposing positions held by two candidates, who
were revealed to both be Bill Clinton. In 2000, Bush’s son said o f his opponent Al
Gore, “He’s changed his tune...I believe it’s important to have somebody who’s
willing to have the same message all o f the time in the course o f a campaign” (Neal &
Nakashima, 2000). Thus, changing one’s position on an issue - often an indication o f
uncertainty resolved - is constructed as a failure. A few weeks later, Gore was asked
whether he would favor the execution o f a pregnant woman. To this unusual ethical
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dilemma, o f which there has not been a single recorded case in the United States, Gore
did not instantly take a position but replied that he would need to consider the question.
Bush then criticized Gore for his uncertainty (Seelye, 2000).
Another crucial element in the assault on uncertainty in mediated politics is the
importance opinion polling holds for news coverage o f both campaigns and policy
debates. The proliferation o f opinion polls has had wide-ranging effects on the conduct
o f politics and political journalism, which are too complex to discuss at length here.
There are, however, a few essential points to be made about the relationship o f polling
to uncertainty.
When the technique o f opinion sampling emerged, it was quickly embraced
within a paradigm o f progress that equated scientific methods with higher truth (Herbst,
1993). "Public opinion" came to be understood as that which public opinion polls
measured. Although some warned that polls were incapable o f capturing opinion's social
element (Blumer, 1948), the imperative o f quantitative measurement swept such dissent
aside. However accurately a sociological model might describe the public, it is o f little
use if the goal is predicting the outcome o f an election.
Opinion polling assumes first that everyone has an opinion on a particular subject,
and second that any one individual’s opinion is equal to any other’s (Bourdieu, 1979).
Distinctions among informed, uninformed, and misinformed opinion - three very
different animals (Dalager, 1996; Kuklinski & Quirk, 1997) - are washed away. A
further distinction, between certain and uncertain opinions, is also obscured. This is a
product not simply o f the assumptions on which the enterprise o f polling is based, but o f
the particular methods used and the dynamics o f the survey interview that emerge.
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Within the context o f the survey interview, individuals prefer not to respond that
they “don't know” or are “unsure” to an opinion question, whether because they don't
want to seem uninformed, or because they are attempting to please the interviewer, who
plainly is seeking an answ er (Converse, 1964). This dynamic has been amply
demonstrated by Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser (1981), who showed that survey
respondents were quite willing to offer opinions on issues which were actually fictitious.
In addition. "Training manuals [for survey interviewers] often urge interviewers not to
accept DK [don't know] too easily, on the assumption that it may represent only
momentary hesitancy, and questionnaires frequently do not provide a DK option for
interviewers to check.'' The imperatives o f quantitative research (including data with a
minimum number o f m issing cases) shape the survey with the assumption that
uncertainty is unacceptable. The result is a set o f data in which almost everyone seems to
know exactly where he or she stands. When these data are reported in news and read by
an individual, he sees that all his fellow citizens are certain o f their opinions. Certainty
appears to be the accepted norm, making uncertainty a kind o f personal failure. He may
then decide that unless he has made up his mind, he should just keep quiet.
Furthermore, the m edia’s need for data that can be analyzed quickly and reported
in simple terms leads them to pose most survey questions in a format with two possible
responses: Do you intend to vote for Bush or Gore? Do you approve o f the job the
President is doing? Do you favor or oppose abortion? Posing questions this way distorts
results in a number o f ways. First, it makes it simple for respondents to guess or invent
opinions that reflect no actual convictions; the number o f “don’t know” responses in such
polls is always suspiciously low. Second, it obscures important subtleties o f opinion;
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Jesse Helms and Jesse Jackson may both disapprove o f the job President Clinton is doing,
but for very different reasons. Third, it poses each political question as having two (no
more, no fewer) sides, accentuating conflictual framing.
Another function o f the dissemination o f poll results may be to discourage
participation, not simply by quieting the uncertain but by informing news receivers that
their participation is unnecessary. Polls act as a system o f representation; the sample
survey uses a small number o f individuals to represent the larger universe o f citizens.
Each citizen, therefore, sees herself represented. In the survey interview, someone has
expressed her opinion for her; she need not do so herself. If she finds herself in the
majority, she is assured that no action on her part is necessary - things will work out the
way she would like them too. If she is in the minority, then political action seems useless
- the votes are in, and her side has lost. Journalists also tend to take even slim majorities
revealed in polls and make disproportionately sweeping conclusions about what '“the
public" thinks, reducing complexity to a single voice.1
The use o f opinion polling in policy formation might seem on its face to involve
the people more directly in the functions o f government by using their opinions as a
guide. However, by invalidating uncertainty and thus hampering deliberation, polls may
be considered an agent o f what Robert Dahl (1989) calls “pseudodemocratization,” “a
change taken with the ostensible, and perhaps even actual, purpose o f enhancing the
democratic process that in practice retains the aura o f its democratic justification and yet
has the effect, intended or unintended, o f weakening the democratic process.” The

1 Brady and Orren (1992) observe that while academic researchers are more comfortable with Type II
errors (rejecting correct hypotheses), journalists would rather commit a Type I error (accepting an incorrect
hypothesis) than miss a story.
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combination o f poll-driven news and a discourse marked by statements o f unswerving
conviction produces a political world in which uncertainty is not merely absent, but
delegitimized. As a result, the citizen has no model o f deliberation that incorporates this
necessary part o f political opinion formation.
When news programs use "person-in-the-street" interviews, they do portray a
more active public sphere with actual citizen involvement (Larson, 1999). However,
these interviews are usually used to provide an illustration o f poll results; if, for example,
two-thirds o f individuals polled are found to favor Candidate A and one-third Candidate
B. the segment is likely to feature two citizens proclaiming their support for Candidate A
and one for Candidate B. Interviewees who are ambivalent or have no opinion are
unlikely to be featured. As a consequence, such interviews serve to perpetuate the image
o f public opinion as a static fait accompli. Opinion is also portrayed in different ways on
different issues; while the news media may represent opinions on one issue as the product
o f an active citizenry, on others citizens are absent, merely assenting to the decisions o f
elites. These portrayals are often at odds with the reality o f citizens* actual understanding
and participation (Bennett & Klockner, 1996).
Polls also serve a variety o f functions for journalists, including enabling them to
disguise opinion as fact (Salmon & Glasser, 1995). While a reporter might not be
permitted to opine that Bill Clinton is dishonest, he is free to report that 65% o f the public
believes that Clinton is dishonest. Sweeping generalizations can then be made about
what “the public" believes. If the public has already decided, deliberation seems less
worthwhile. The endless dissemination o f poll results - as James Carey (1995) describes
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it. "an attempt to simulate public opinion in order to prevent an authentic public opinion
from forming” - can thus serve to dampen deliberation.
O f course, survey research as a means o f ascertaining public opinion is not
necessarily incompatible with deliberative democracy. W hile some argue that discussion
increases the likelihood that consensus will be achieved (Barber, 1984), most theorists
assume that even after deliberation some disagreement will persist (Knight & Johnson,
1994; Mansbridge, 1980). In such cases, some form o f aggregation —votes, for instance
- will be necessary to arrive at a decision. Polls are in one sense simply another form of
aggregation, by which individual opinions are collected to describe the collective will. If
opinion is to translate into policy, there must be some w ay for officials to ascertain what
public opinion is. What would be required for polls to fit within the framework o f a
deliberative system is that the opinions sought and received by the poll reflect a
completed process o f deliberation. For that to be true, the respondents must have
deliberated prior to being polled, and the interview itself m ust reflect the product o f their
deliberation and not describe a set o f opinions dictated by the particularities o f the survey
interaction. This is what James Fishkin (1991) and others have attempted to do with
"deliberative polling.” As Joseph Bessette (1994) has observed, the context o f a
telephone survey, where respondents are interrupted from other activities and asked to
produce opinions instantaneously, can produce undeliberative opinions even when the
same individuals in a more deliberative context would produce deliberative ones. For the
moment, however, deliberative polling remains an interesting experiment that has yet to
have any impact on policy in the United States.
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Ordinary media polls, on the other hand, which reflect no deliberation and are
structured to simplify opinion, influence not only official decision-making but public
opinion itself on a daily basis. Combined with a rhetorical norm that excludes
expressions o f uncertainty, they produce a news discourse that stands in contrast to the
natural evolution through which we would expect any individual’s opinion to move, from
greater to lesser uncertainty.

Data on uncertainty
If ordinary political conversation were to operate in a deliberative fashion,
uncertainty would motivate joining political discussion, while certainty would be an
outcome o f discussion. Since in a cross-sectional survey we can measure only the
conversation which has already taken place, what will be visible is only the outcome:
reduced uncertainty. It is possible that a failure to find a significant effect o f
conversation on uncertainty could reflect the countervailing effects o f two processes.
While deliberation can illuminate unknown facts and arguments, thereby reducing
uncertainty, it can also demonstrate an issue’s complexity, making participants
ambivalent about theretofore firmly held positions. While there may be issues
characterized by such an effect, we would nonetheless predict that overall, political
discussion should ultimately reduce uncertainty, making individual opinions more stable.
Experimental research has shown that group dynamics can push opinion in
extreme directions, particularly when consensus is the goal (Moscovici & Doise, 1994;
Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969). Corroboration o f one’s views can also lead to increased
opinion extremity (Baron, 1996); when someone else agrees with me and together we
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reject the arguments o f opponents, I become more convinced that I am right. Since most
political conversations take place between people who agree, this dynamic could be
another key factor in any relationship between conversation and uncertainty.
Uncertainty in voter perceptions o f candidates' positions has been measured in a
number o f ways at both the aggregate and individual level (Bartels, 1986; Campbell,
1983). The principle focus o f prior research has been to assess the impact o f uncertainty
on vote choice; while some researchers have argued that uncertainty about a candidate
can in some cases confer an electoral advantage, thus making ambiguity an effective
strategy (Glazer, 1990; Shepsle, 1972), others have found situations in which ambiguity
and uncertainty reduce support (Alvarez, 1998; Rudd, 1989).
Only recently, however, have direct subjective measures o f uncertainty been
developed to permit voters to express the uncertainty they feel about issues and ideology
(Alvarez & Franklin, 1994). In the 1996 National Election Studies, respondents were
asked to place themselves and the presidential candidates on a number o f scales. On six
o f these scales - liberal-conservative ideology, abortion, government aid to blacks,
spending on social services, spending on defense, and tradeoffs between environmental
protection and jobs - follow-up questions asked, “How certain are you o f
[Clinton’s/Dole’s/your] position on this scale? Very certain, pretty certain, or not very
certain?"2 Out o f these questions, I constructed uncertainty scales running from 1 (very
certain) to 4 (don’t know).

2 Certainty questions were also asked about two trait items, Ross Perot, and local House candidates. The
present analysis is restricted to liberal-conservative placement and the five issue questions.
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F ig u re 7-1: U n certain ty o f Liberal'
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The distribution o f uncertainty shows some interesting results. First, as we see in
Figure 7 -1. respondents express slightly more certainty o f the candidates' ideology than
o f their own. In contrast, they express significantly more certainty o f their own issue
positions than o f the candidates' (Figure 7-2). This result accords with Converse's
( 1964) finding on the lack o f understanding o f ideology. M any people may feel certain
that Clinton is a “liberal” but have a less than complete understanding o f what that
implies; when asked to apply an ideological label to themselves, they hesitate. In
general, mean uncertainty o f Clinton and Dole on issues runs between 2 and 2.5, at or
near “pretty certain.” while the respondents' uncertainty o f their own positions goes from
a low o f 1.3 on abortion to a high o f 2 on the environment. Interestingly, the issue on
which respondents expressed the most certainty - abortion - is one which is considered by
many to be so highly charged and personal that it is rarely discussed except by those who
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share the same opinions. There was not a single respondent who was unwilling to place
him or herself on the abortion scale (see appendix for distributions on each issue).

F ig u re 7-2: A v erag e U ncertainty o n I s s u e s
(1996 NES)
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While all the uncertainty scales are correlated, there are some differences, as
shown in Table 7-1. As one would expect, we see stronger correlations within referents
(e.g. between uncertainty on Clinton issues and Clinton ideology) and within realms (e.g.
between uncertainty on Clinton ideology, Dole ideology, and self ideology). Across both
referents and realms (e.g. between uncertainty on Clinton issue stands and the
respondents' ideology) correlations are somewhat lower. The most striking figure is the
high correlation (.77) between uncertainty on Clinton and D ole's issue stands, despite the
somewhat higher certainty on Clinton’s positions overall.
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Table 7-1
Zero-Order Correlations: Uncertainty
(1996 NES)
Respondent
liberalconservative
.407

Clinton
liberalconservative

.465

.570

.448

.322

.346

Clinton issues

.351

.522

.469

.487

Dole issues

.375

.481

.568

.448

Clinton liberalconservative
Dole liberalconservative
Respondent
issues

Dole liberalconservative

Respondent
issues

Clinton
issues

.770

All significant at p < .001

One would assume that people who understand the candidates' positions - or at
least can guess correctly at those positions - would express more certainty than people
who couldn't give an answer or guessed incorrectly. While this is in fact the case, the
correlations are less than overwhelming. The correlation between getting an answer right
on a given issue3 and expressing certainty o f the candidate's position on that issue
averaged .448 for Dole but only .345 for Clinton. Overall, people felt more certain o f the
incumbent president’s positions in 1996, as they did in previous years (Alvarez, 1998).
Uncertainty is imperfectly related to knowledge; not only are many people uncertain o f
what they know, many others are quite certain despite being incorrect.
Regressions identifying predictors o f the four types o f uncertainty produced a

J Correct answers were determined as follows. Respondents were asked to rate each candidate on a sevenpoint scale (or a four-point scale in the case o f abortion) running from a liberal position on the issue to a
conservative position. For example, the ends o f the environment scale were “protect the environment even
if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard o f living” and “protecting the environment is not as
important as maintaining jobs and our standard o f living.” If respondents placed Clinton more toward the
liberal side than they placed Dole, they were coded as having given a correct answer, regardless o f the
absolute placement o f either candidate. Respondents who answered “don’t know” on one or both
candidates, placed them at the same point, or placed Dole as more liberal than Clinton were coded as
incorrect.
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variety o f results (Table 7-2). Men expressed more certainty than women, while whites
were more certain o f their own positions and ideology than blacks, hispanics, and asians,
but no more certain o f the candidates. Education produced more certainty on candidate
issue positions and respondent ideology, but not on candidate ideology or respondent
issues. Uncertainty on issues declines until middle age, then increases as respondents get
older; this result mirrors the relationship between age and discussion or knowledge.
Strong ideologues are much more certain o f their own ideological placement.
Although those who accurately report the candidates’ issue positions are more
likely to be certain about them, knowledge does not explain all the variance in
uncertainty by any means. Political discussion did not affect uncertainty on ideology, but
it was associated with reduced uncertainty on issue positions, a result consistent with
Mendelsohn’s (1996) finding that discussion primes issues in voters’ minds. This was
true for both the respondents’ placement o f themselves and their placement o f the
candidates. Conversation thus appears to aid in voters’ confidence about issues, but has
no effect on their perceived ability to tie those issues together into a coherent
understanding o f ideology.
Here again we must be cautious about making causal claims. The inability to
identify instrumental variables precludes precise nonrecursive modeling o f the
relationship between conversation and uncertainty. While the regression in Table 7-2
indicates that discussion predicts certainty, it is also true that certainty predicts
discussion. In other words, while those who talk more are more certain, it is possible that
this is as much a consequence o f the uncertain avoiding discussion as it is the result o f
discussions themselves producing certainty.
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Table 7-2: Predicting Uncertainty
(OLS regression, 1996 NES)
Respondent
R espondent
Candidate
Candidate
Ideology___________ Issues___________ Ideology___________ Issues
G e n d er (fe m a le)

.07
(.05)

.03

.11***
(0 3 )

.10

.08*
(.04)

.05

.17***
(.03)

.14

A ge

.001
(0 1 )

.02

-.01
(-01)

-.29

-.01
(-01)

-.14

-.01**
(.005)

-.36

A ge sq u ared

-.00
(.00)

-.01

.0001*
(.00)

.41

.00
(.00)

.14

R a ce (w h ite)

-.18*
(-08)

-.05

-.14**
(-05)

-.08

-.01
(.06)

-.002

E d u cation

-.07*
(.03)

-.07

.01
(0 2 )

.01

.004
(.02)

.01

-.0 0 2
(0 0 1 )

-.05

-.001
(.001)

N e w sp a p e r

-.01
(.01)

-.02

N etw ork n e w s

-.004
(-01)

Talk radio

Party ID (R e p u b lica n )

.0001**
(0 0 )

.46

.07
(.04)

.04

-.06***
(0 1 )

-.12

-.002

-.00
(.001)

-.01

-.05

-.00
(-001)

.01
(.01)

.03

-.0 0 4
(-01)

-.02

-.004
(.005)

-.02

-.01

-.01*
(.01)

-.06

-.03**
(-01)

-.09

-.03***
(-01)

-.12

-.005
(-02)

-.01

-.003
(.01)

-.01

-.02
(0 1 )

-.03

-.01
(.01)

-.02

-.10
(.06)

-.04

.04
(0 4 )

.04

-.10*
(.04)

-.06

-.03
(0 3 )

-.03

Id eo lo g ica l str e n g th

-.37***
(-02)

-.47

-.06***
(0 1 )

-.15

-.11***
(-02)

-.19

-.01
(0 1 )

-.03

P olitical in te r e s t

-.16***
(0 4 )

-.12

-.11***
(0 3 )

-.13

-.09**
(-03)

-.09

-.13***
(.02)

-.15

P olitical k n o w le d g e

-.07***
(.02)

-.11

-.05***
(01)

-.14

-.16***
(01)

-.34

-.18***
(01)

-.49

P olitical d is c u s s io n

-.02
(01)

-.04

-.02**
(01)

-.09

-.01
(-01)

-.04

-.0 2 "
(.01)

-.08

In co m e in t h o u s a n d s

C o n sta n t
r2

3.75***
(24)
.426

2.46***
(.15)
.189

3.19***
(18)
.321

* p < .05
*' p < .01
*** p < .001
Standard errors in parentheses, standardized coefficients in italic.
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3.19***
(.13)
.426

Newspaper reading and talk radio use had no effect on uncertainty, while viewing
o f network news had a significant effect. Recall from Chapter 5 that the results on
prediction o f political knowledge were the reverse: newspaper reading and talk radio
predicted knowledge more strongly than television news watching. In other words,
viewing o f network news increases the certainty with which respondents believe they
know things without actually increasing the degree to which they do in fact know them.
While use o f television news, newspapers, and talk radio all correlate negatively with
uncertainty, controlling for knowledge significantly reduces the correlation with radio
and makes the correlation with newspapers disappear completely, but the correlation with
television news use remains unchanged. Although it is surely true that many people gain
information from television news (even if other predictors account for their knowledge),
the key point is that increases in certainty occur as network news use rises regardless o f
whether individuals actually learn anything.

Bluster
In many cases, individuals who have answered incorrectly will express great
certainty in their answers. For example, some respondents were quite certain that Clinton
favored more restrictions on abortion than Dole, or that Dole favored greater
environmental protection. Experimental research has shown that the tendency to express
certainty about incorrect assessments is quite common (Fischoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein,
1977). For lack o f a better term, I will refer to this outcome as “bluster.” As it happens,
a rather large proportion o f respondents falls into this category. On abortion, 25.5% o f
the respondents who incorrectly identified Clinton and Dole’s relative positions on the
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issue also said they were “pretty certain” or “very certain” o f both candidates’ positions.
On aid to blacks, the figure was 26.5%, on the environment 27.7%, on defense 34.4%,
and on social spending 35.4%. Similarly, 30.2% o f respondents who rated Dole as
equally or more liberal than Clinton felt certain o f both candidates’ ideology.
If we attempt to explain bluster, a number o f significant predictors emerge. Men
are more likely than women to express certainty about incorrect beliefs, the less educated
are more likely than the more educated, and the less strongly ideological are more likely
than strong ideologues to express certainty about incorrect beliefs. Interest in politics and
overall political knowledge (on issues other than the one in question) decrease bluster.
Finally, two media use variables have an effect: talk radio use decreases bluster, while
viewing o f television news increases it. This result held for both an OLS regression o f a
scale combining all six measures, and a logistic regression in which the dependent
variable was bluster on any one o f the six items. In all, 36% o f respondents expressed
bluster on at least one issue.
Differences in the quantity o f information present in various media are
insufficient to explain this result. The fact that television news stories about presidential
campaigns tend to have relatively little detailed issue information would not in and of
itself lead heavy TV news viewers to express certainty despite their lack o f knowledge; in
fact, given that the medium produces less learning than newspapers or talk radio,
television watching should either increase uncertainty or have no effect at all. It seems
more likely that the cause lies in the fact that those viewers are presented a particular
model o f political discourse in which certainty is valued, and political arguments are won
by those whose voices are loudest and most self-assured. The fact that this description
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would also apply to talk radio (perhaps more so than in any other medium) makes the
negative relationship between talk radio use and bluster somewhat harder to explain.
To return to political discussion, the original hypothesis was that those who
discuss politics more should display lower uncertainty, both o f their own beliefs and
those o f the candidates. When we talk about politics, we supposedly explore issues, both
learning facts and making and hearing arguments. In the process our opinions are given
shape and depth; if we have heard the arguments in opposition and found reasons to
reject them, we should be more certain o f our own positions. In addition, we can make
connections among issues, gaining understanding o f the ways they relate to various
ideologies. When we discuss candidates a similar process should occur, in which we
learn from our partners about their positions and the rationales for their candidacies,
becoming certain o f who they are so that we may decide on our votes.
According to the 1996 data, this set o f hypotheses turns out to be only partly
correct. Political discussion does predict certainty on issues, but it does not predict
certainty on ideology. Citizens may thus be emerging from political discussion with a
feeling that they have a greater command o f facts, i.e. where the candidates stand, but
with no greater understanding o f how those stances cohere into an ideological position.
The results for the respondents’ own positions were the same: increases in the frequency
o f political discussion led to increased certainty about issue positions, but not to a greater
certainty about whether those positions made one a liberal or a conservative.
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Conclusion
Some have bemoaned the fact that the opinions o f most survey respondents do not
appear to be ideologically consistent (Converse, 1964). Consistency is often defined as
adherence to the ideological structures held and defined by elites. Those who hold some
"liberal'' positions and some "conservative'’ positions - or whose positions waver over
time - are assumed to be confused or uninformed. Attitudinal constraints, however, m ay
be just that - schemas that inhibit us from understanding, closing our minds to the
perspectives o f others. As Jennifer Hochschild (1993) argues, "A democracy composed
o f consistent, tranquil, attitudinally constrained citizens is a democracy full o f smug
people with no incentive and perhaps no ability to think beyond their own
circumstances... Conversely, a democracy composed o f citizens coping with disjunction
and ambivalence is full o f people who question their own rightness, who may entertain
alternative viewpoints, and who, given the right conditions, are more driven to resolve
problems than ignore them."
It should also be noted that Americans are profoundly ambivalent on many
specific issues and on the role government should play in general (Cantril & Cantril,
1999). However, ambivalence and uncertainty are not the same thing; while uncertainty
can be explained in part by a lack o f information, given the complexity o f many issues,
ambivalence - simultaneously holding contradictory impulses or beliefs - may be a
natural response to full information. It is possible that NES respondents understood the
certainty questions on their own opinions to be asking about whatever ambivalence they
might have, while the questions on candidates asked about their understanding o f what
are assumed to be precise positions, whether the respondent is aware o f them or not.
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Respondents could have understood the questions to ask whether they were certain that
their own opinion was correct, but whether their perception o f the candidate was
accurate.
While each of us may carry a good degree o f both ambivalence and uncertainty,
candidates rarely portray themselves as less than certain o f the correctness o f their
positions. Although they may fail to communicate their positions because o f a strategic
decision or the limitations o f time and energy (Page, 1978), one is unlikely to hear a
candidate state. "I can't make up my mind." This is true not only o f candidates but o f
virtually all whose voices are heard participating in debates in mainstream news.
In spite o f that norm o f political discourse, citizens' understanding o f candidate
positions is remarkably vague. A relatively small proportion o f the population can place
the candidates on issues with both accuracy and certainty. While part o f this lack o f
understanding may be explained by the time candidates devote to various issues, much o f
it persists regardless o f the conduct o f a particular campaign. Nonetheless, voters find
ways to make decisions. They project their own beliefs on to candidates with varying
degrees o f accuracy (Conover & Feldman, 1989), and use a variety o f cues to make
inferences about candidate positions (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991).
When they are called to go beyond choosing a candidate and offer a public
expression o f opinion - whether to a survey interviewer or in a discussion about politics their knowledge and beliefs about issues interact with their beliefs about public
expression itself. What some people seem to leam from the elite discourse to which they
are exposed in news is not only the content o f arguments but the message given by their
form, namely that when opinions are offered, they should be spoken with conviction.
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This appears to be true even in the semi-private context o f a survey. We may conceive o f
the survey situation itself as a rhetorical arena, one in which respondents are influenced
by the norms o f political communication they see modeled in news. If the effects o f
news discourse emerge in the survey context, it seems likely that in citizens’ political
discussions they will be equally likely to follow the models o f discourse they have been
offered.
In a deliberative system, political discussion would dissipate uncertainty through
a process that involves learning o f positions but goes beyond acquisition o f facts to a
more nuanced understanding o f why a candidate might hold that position or how it relates
to other issues and character traits. Knowledge o f the issue position itself would be the
bare minimum gained along the road to certainty produced by conversation. If
conversation produced certainty without producing knowledge, it would only be able to
do so via an effect similar to the one suggested for news viewing, namely that
conversational norms give one practice in expressing opinions with certainty whether one
knows what one is talking about or not.
Results indicate that everyday political conversation has both a direct and an
indirect effect on certainty. Conversation boosts knowledge, which in turn decreases
uncertainty. On issues, conversation is directly associated with decreased uncertainty. In
this area, political discussion seems at least in part to serve its proper deliberative
function. The null finding on ideology does indicate, however, that this effect is limited.
If discussion were to mimic deliberation, it would reduce uncertainty both on specific
questions and on the larger themes o f politics, o f which ideology is certainly one o f the
most central.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion

H alf a century ago, Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton (1948) suggested that by
delivering a seemingly endless supply o f political information, m odem media make
simply keeping up with politics feel like action. The citizen, they wrote, "comes to
mistake knowing about problems o f the day for doing something about them.” More
recently, Roderick Hart (1999) argued. ‘T o r many citizens, watching governance has
become equivalent to engaging governance.” Indeed, watching governance is the closest
many people come to political participation. This may be true in part because news
media portray the political world as an unfriendly place, marked by endless and angry
conflict.
In a number o f cases, I have located only small effects o f media exposure on the
outcome variables o f interest. The relatively weak power o f exposure variables has
troubled communication researchers for some time; it has been suggested that in some
areas the crucial question is not the quantity o f news to which a person has been exposed,
but simply whether he has been exposed at all (Zukin, 1981). At the same time, we have
been able to identify effects o f news exposure on variables related to deliberation. Those
who are exposed to more news, particularly newspapers and talk radio, do learn about
candidates and issues. However, television news increases the likelihood that those with
incorrect information will express certainty, suggesting the possibility o f immovable
opinions based on inaccurate information. While media exposure is generally positively
associated with political discussion, exposure to television news does appear to
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discourage discussion for some people by increasing the fear that political discussion will
turn contentious. Based on the evidence I have offered in the preceding chapters, I
conclude that while news media do aid deliberation in some ways, they serve to limit it in
others.
The hypotheses generated from the reasonable ideal o f deliberation have produced
a variety o f results, some positive and some negative. To summarize:
1. Political conversation will be a common feature o f everyday life, not only fo r
members o f the elite but across all social strata. This element o f the reasonable
ideal clearly does not characterize the United States today. On almost any
demographic variable —most notably gender, race, education, and income - the
more advantaged members o f society discuss politics more often.
2. Citizens w ill regularly engage in political discussion with those whose views
differ from their own. This requirement o f deliberative democracy is likewise
absent. Overwhelmingly, citizens discuss politics only with those who share their
views.
3. Political conversation will enhance both the participants ’ own concern fo r the
common good, and concomitantly the perception that others are similarly
motivated. Here, the conclusions are mixed. While we were able to identify one
case (the 1984 presidential election) in which political discussion led some to be
less likely to act in accord with self-interest, the more troubling finding was the
positive association between conversation and the perception o f self-interest.
4. While lack o f political knowledge should not hinder participation in political
conversation, conversation should subsequently increase knowledge. Evidence
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here suggests a two-way relationship between knowledge and conversation, that
those who know more talk more, and those who talk more leam more.
5. While uncertainty should not hinder participation in political conversation,
conversation should subsequently increase the certainty o f opinions.
Conversation is associated with increased certainty on issues. This relationship is
also likely two-way; conversation reduces issue uncertainty, but those who are
more certain are more likely to discuss politics.

Along with the political philosophers from whom they draw inspiration,
contemporary deliberative theorists imagine a series o f individual benefits arising from
democratic practice in general and deliberation in particular. It has been noted that those
living in stable democracies appear no happier than those in less democratic systems once
income is controlled (Lane, 1999); self-rule, it is concluded, does not lead to
contentment. But is this a commentary on democracy itself or on the particular forms it
takes in the contemporary world? John Stuart Mill would probably argue that we have
plenty o f democracies but far too few citizens. He understood that occasional voting
without any further action was insufficient to generate the educative effects o f
participation, which empirical research confirmed (Pedersen, 1982). The survey data I
have presented suggest that few Americans deliberate about political matters, particularly
if we define deliberation as necessarily involving engagement with those o f opposing
views. The data also indicate that the discussions that do occur nonetheless succeed in
producing some o f the hypothesized benefits o f deliberation. Specifically, citizens
appear to gain knowledge and reduce uncertainty through conversation, although the
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effects on uncertainty do not extend to uncertainty about ideology. They also may in
some cases become less self-interested in their voting decisions as a result o f political
discussion.
Conversation appears to have at least one negative result: those who talk about
politics more are more likely to believe that their fellow citizens are motivated by selfinterest, despite the slight relationship o f self-interest to opinion. This belief is further
exaggerated by the amount o f disagreement they encounter. Although we should be
cautious when making inferences about the content o f conversations from survey data, I
have suggested that the source o f this effect may be the argumentative norm o f motive
questioning so common in mediated discourse. If we follow the lead o f those we see in
news and question the motives o f our discussion partners or o f others in the political
world to the degree that it actually changes our beliefs about our fellow citizens, then we
have made our discussions less deliberative in a critical way. While a goal o f
deliberation is a careful and complete examination o f all arguments around a particular
issue, motive questioning attempts to constrict debate by de legitimizing the source o f a
particular argument. Although we may still speak in accordance with the norms o f
deliberation, we have failed to listen in the same fashion. We have thus deprived
ourselves o f the benefits that accrue from adopting alternate perspectives. If we refuse to
grant the good will o f others, we make our discussions less deliberative and decrease the
degree to which they enhance public spirit.
It should be noted that the results presented here tell only part o f the story o f
political conversation. The survey questions used have limitations, not least o f which is
the way political conversation was operationalized. Most surveys addressing political
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conversation, including the ones I have utilized, have in the past had two features in
common: they were conducted in the weeks before or after an election (usually a
presidential election), and they asked people how much they talk about ■‘politics.” It
seems likely that different people consider different issues to fall under the category o f
politics. For instance, when two people talk about an election they are certainly talking
about politics. But what about when they talk about crime in their city, or the actions o f
the local school board? These topics are political, but many people may not conceive o f
them as such. Whether they do consider them political could affect the way their
conversations proceed. It m ay also be that most o f the time, people understand a wide
array o f topics to be political, but when a campaign is underway, respondents hear the
word politics and think “the campaign.” This could be particularly true when they have
just been asked a series o f questions about the candidates, and have thus been primed to
consider the campaign.
It is therefore possible that while deliberative discussion about the subjects people
understand to fall under the category o f politics - e.g. campaigns and legislation - is
relatively infrequent, conversations about the events o f the day actually adhere to
deliberative norms and serve deliberative ends. We m ay adopt different modes o f
speaking and conceive o f our partners in different ways when we forget that the topic is
“political” and, in effect, let our guard down. If these types o f conversations duplicate
the benefits o f political discussion and avoid the pitfalls, and if they do so for a more
representative portion o f the population, then our democracy may be more deliberative
than it appears.
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Throughout this study, I have argued for an understanding o f the public itself and
public opinion in particular as constituted in the interactions between citizens. While this
view is shared by many scholars, popular discourse tends to define public opinion as an
aggregation o f individual, private opinions; public opinion is, for all intents and purposes,
whatever is measured by polls.
W ithin this dominant view o f opinion, it becomes difficult to envision political
discussion as a core element o f democratic citizenship. If the citizen's role is only to be
counted on election day or at some other tim e via a survey, then we need not engage one
another. Without such engagement, however, we are members not o f a public but o f a
mass. We m ay occasionally share some object o f attention, but without discussion we are
incapable o f collective will formation and expression.
Despite discussion's weaknesses, when we talk about politics with our fellow
citizens, we engage in an act o f political participation. Traditionally, participation has
been defined as involving either a decision with direct consequences (e.g. voting) or an
action involving the expenditure o f time, money, or some other resource. In effect, we
have built a standard o f participation that assum es that if a citizen hasn’t engaged in a
difficult, unpleasant, or costly activity, then he has not truly participated. It is no wonder
that some would conclude that “democratic processes are generally painful, fail to
contribute to good cheer in democratic publics, and do very little to relieve what seems to
be an epidemic o f unhappiness and depression” (Lane, 1999). We also assume that
participation requires intentionality: as Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen (1993)
defined it, “Political participation is action directed explicitly toward influencing the
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distribution o f social goods and values.” If we do not realize we are participating, it is
thought, then we aren't.
We should not dismiss political discussion as “just talk” simply because it is free,
easy, and often pleasant. Discussion engages other citizens, passing influence in a
potentially wide circle. If public opinion itself has a role to play in policy formation, then
participation in the formation o f that opinion is participation in the policy process. If one
believes further that public opinion is not merely an aggregation o f individual attitudes
but something that emerges from the process by which citizens engage one another, then
political discussion - sharing information and arguments, attempting to persuade others qualifies as participation in a way that solitary opinion formation, however considered,
does not. It creates a ripple o f effects on opinion that diffuses outward from individuals'
immediate circles to their acquaintances and ultimately to those they have never met.
Discussion, therefore, is more than simply practice for “real” participation (Merelman,
1998), it is participation just as surely as is writing a letter to a member o f Congress or
marching in a protest. Citizens deliberating are not merely "judicious spectators” (Boyte,
1999), they are active participants because their discussions affect political outcomes.
To understand why this is the case, let us accept that policy proceeds in relation to
public opinion, not public opinion as it might be or should be but strictly as it is.1 The
areas in which the public is inattentive, indifferent, or lacks the requisite knowledge to
assess options are those in which policy-makers have the widest latitude (Page &
Shapiro, 1992). Public opinion affects policy in these cases by creating a vacuum into

1The precise extent to which this is the case has been the subject o f extensive research, complicated by the
issue o f causal direction (Page, 1994). While it is certainly true that officials influence public opinion, few
would argue that opinion has no influence on policy.
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which other forces - the preferences o f policy makers or the influence o f special interests,
for instance —may flow. If we further accept that something like "true” public opinion as
envisioned by advocates o f deliberative polls —what opinion would be under optimal
circumstances —does in fact exist, then the extent o f deliberation among the populace,
and thus the extent to which observable opinion reflects “true” opinion, is a not
unreasonable measure o f the quality o f opinion. Higher quality opinion is in tum more
likely to be reflected in policy. On those questions where there is substantial deliberation
and as a consequence informed and stable opinion, that opinion will be understood by
policy makers and the sanctions for contradicting it more substantial. Where deliberation
is minimal, opinions will be more easily manipulated. Where deliberation is completely
absent, policy makers will be free to do as they wish without fear o f consequence. O f
course, in many cases policy will correspond to “true” opinion regardless o f its distance
from current opinion, but without deliberation it need not necessarily do so. Although the
degree o f consensus that exists within ‘‘true” opinion will be a complicating variable in
this process, we may nonetheless say that in general terms, deliberation on an issue will
correlate with responsiveness on that issue. A culture o f deliberation will in tum tend to
produce a more responsive government (Putnam, 1993).
One could argue that in a representative system, we delegate both authority and
the obligation to deliberate to our representatives; as long as they deliberate, the citizenry
need not. In practice, however, we expect public officials to arrive at decisions through a
balance o f personal judgment and responsiveness to public opinion. Moreover, to satisfy
even the minimum responsibility o f assessing whether they have performed their duties
well and should thus be returned to office, we must have some understanding o f the
208
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issues that the representatives have confronted. In the absence o f deliberation, that
understanding will be less than complete. A public opinion that incorporates only certain
views, furthermore, is less than truly public. Decision-making bodies acknowledge,
through the requirement o f a quorum, that some threshold o f participation is necessary for
a decision to be meaningful. A similar threshold o f participation is necessary for a
representative public opinion to form. The absence o f some is problematic not simply
because they will be denied their “piece o f the pie” but because o f the increased
likelihood that the deliberation will fail to accurately assess the common good if some
voices are not heard (Sunstein, 1991).
This view o f democracy does demand participation in the form o f discussion. It
defines its citizens not simply as bearers o f rights but as active producers o f the common
will. While most people don’t conceive o f their discussions as participatory acts with
consequences for policy outcomes, as Gabriel Tarde (1969) put it, “There is a tight bond
between the functioning o f conversation and changes o f opinion, and on this depend the
vicissitudes o f power.” The fact that the effects o f an individual conversation on public
opinion may be extremely small in no way lessens its status as an arena o f participation.
An individual vote or an individual letter to a legislator m ay have similarly slight effects
on outcomes, but we do not doubt that they represent participatory acts.
Although news discourse may be partly to blame for Americans’ tendency to
avoid political discussion, that tendency is renewed and reinforced daily in the
interactions among citizens. Every time we skirt a political subject, we reinforce the
notion that the potential o f deliberation in finding creative solutions to problems and in
binding citizens together in common cause is outweighed by the danger that we might
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find ourselves at odds. The possibility o f disagreement leads us to avoid the very process
that could enable us to transcend it.
Because there is no such creature as an "average American,” we cannot say that
the average American is uninformed or that she does not participate (Kinder & Herzog,
1993). The results presented here suggest that some do participate in something
resembling deliberation. They discuss politics frequently, engage those with opposing
opinions, leam from their conversations, and reduce their uncertainty about issues. This
group, however, is fairly small. More common is the citizen who talks less frequently
and only with those who share his beliefs. This citizen cannot be said to be a participant
in deliberation. There may be times, however, when an issue o f sufficient interest and
ubiquity will arise, and he will deliberate in a meaningful way. At those moments, our
democracy becomes truly deliberative, if only briefly.
Widespread lack o f political knowledge is problematic only in the absence o f
deliberation. We assume that citizens are able to serve on juries regardless o f their prior
expertise; the fact that jury members do not know all the facts before arriving at a trial is
unimportant. Each citizen is assumed to possess a m ore important quality, that o f
judgment. Likewise, whether citizens will be able to arrive at political judgments is less
a function o f what they possess than whether they are willing to deliberate. If true
deliberation were widespread, we would have nothing to fear from a plebiscitary
democracy. It is the absence o f deliberation that, at least in part, makes ill-informed and
ill-considered judgm ent possible.
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Implications fo r further research
The survey data presented here are suggestive, but they go only so far in painting
a picture o f the degree to which everyday political conversation resembles deliberation.
A number o f specific issues have arisen that beg further research. I have argued that
motive questioning is a common mode o f argumentation in mediated discourse. A
content analysis o f news would be useful in establishing first to what degree this assertion
is correct, and more specifically if differences emerge between various media and on
different issues in the extent to which it is evident.
The inherent weaknesses o f cross-sectional data have made firm conclusions
about causality difficult, particularly in the relationship o f conversation to knowledge and
uncertainty. A number o f approaches could be used to attack this problem, including
panel studies and the utilization o f alternative variables related to conversation personality measures or analysis o f social networks - that when combined with survey
items on political topics could be used to build structural models that would provide more
evidence with which to make causal inferences.
I have also argued that critical data on issues are often missing from media
reports, but perhaps more likely to emerge in conversation. An obvious task would then
be to analyze political discussions to see how items at various positions in the hierarchy
o f information are used. While such an enterprise would require some subjective
judgments about the relative value o f different pieces o f information, given the right issue
such an analysis should be possible.
This brings us to the most pressing need for research in this area: scholars
focusing on political conversation should spend more time listening to actual citizens
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talking to one another. While there have been a few excellent works doing so, there is
yet much more to be learned by allowing citizens to not only respond to survey questions
but to speak in their own words. Such research could reveal, for instance, whether
motive questioning is in fact a common practice in everyday conversation, how
information is used and traded, and how political disagreements are addressed or
circumvented. We also need a better understanding o f the situations in which people
choose not to talk about politics, particularly in the workplace, the locale in which they
are most likely to encounter those with differing experiences, perspectives, and beliefs.
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Appendix
Methodology

Because there are a number o f different data sets used throughout this
dissertation, this appendix will be divided by chapter. In some cases, analyses from the
same survey will contain different numbers o f cases, since some questions were asked o f
some respondents but not others.

Chapter 2
The content analytic data in Chapter 2 are taken from the Campaign Discourse
Mapping Project, which analyzed speeches, ads, and debates from the 1952 through 1996
presidential campaigns, and television news coverage from the 1980 through 1996
campaigns. Candidate discourse was broken down into a series o f arguments, defined as
a claim plus evidence o r justification for that claim. The following table shows the
number o f texts and the total number o f arguments for each discourse genre.

1952
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996

Texts
22
25
27
23
23
22
20
33
22
22
22
38

Arguments
100
171
251
140
162
116
145
359
165
325
326
191

Texts
44
11
122
47
59
52
99
106
61
83
62
87

Arguments
45
26
127
48
60
70
115
94
71
89
64
87

Texts
-

Arguments
-

-

-

4

148

-

-

-

-

-

-

3
2
2
2
3
2

88
119
65
116
228
153
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Year
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996

Texts
104
63
97
86
70

Arguments
156
119
136
169
78

The content analysis was conducted between 1994 and 1996. The following text
details the coding instructions for the relevant measures. Intercoder reliability on all
measures exceeded a minimum Krippendorf reliability alpha o f .60, which depending on
the variance in the data usually translated to agreement between ninety and ninety-five
percent. While the speech and TV news portions o f the content analysis are based on
samples (as detailed below), we analyzed every general election advertisement by the
major candidates and every presidential (but not vice-presidential) debate.
■

CE NT RAL CLAIMS:

T H E UNIT OF A N A L Y S I S

We divided each speech, debate, TV ad, and free time statem ent into its main points, or central claims. We
divided each TV news story into quotes and paraphrases of candidates' central claims. Coders grouped with
each central daim any supporting material for the daim .
We coded each partidpant’s remarks in a debate separately. W e stipulated that each TV news central daim
could quote or paraphrase only one candidate.
Coders identified central daim s after reading each text and noting its organization. Central daim s represent the
highest level of generalization; if a text were outlined, central daim s would occupy the first outline level.
Typically, changes in topic signaled changes in central daim s. For example:
‘Here's what I want to accomplish in my second term. We need legal reform. I want caps on
frivolous lawsuits. Too many parents are frightened to coach Little League because they know they
can get sued.

Then we need to get to work improving our schools. We'll provide tax credits so all parents can
afford to send their children to private or parochial sch o o ls.''
We coded as central daim s only statements that m ade arguable assertions. We ignored six types of inarguable
statements: courtesies (“It’s good to be here,' T h is is the best crowd yet.’ T hanks for your support.* ‘God
bless*); categorical self-endorsements (“Vote for m e,' ‘I am the better candidate,* ‘America will be better with a
Democrat in the White House*); speculations on the horserace (‘I think we can take Michigan on Tuesday,*
‘Don't listen to the polls,* 'In the end, America will do what is right and vote Republican*); inarguable
generalizations ("I want a better America,* ‘I want a better future for our children,' ‘I want dean air*); statements
o f broad agendas (‘I have an plan for making America better.’ ‘H ere's what I promise to do if elected*); and
patriotic appeals ('America is the best country in the world,* ‘I'm proud to be an American*). We also did not
code endorsements of other candidates (usually at the beginnings of stump speeches and sometimes quoted or
paraphrased in news).

1 All examples in this codebook are based on actual texts but are fictitious.
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■

ENGAGEMENT:

A D V O C A C Y . A T T A C K . A ND C O M P A R I S O N

After identifying a text's central claims, we categorized each claim as advocacy, attack, or comparison:
Advocacy m akes a ca se for the speaker's position: “I want a tax cut." 'A s a senator. I consistently
voted for tax cuts and against tax increases.'
Attack indicts the opponent’s position: ‘My opponent say s you don't need a tax cut: in fact, he wants
to raise your taxes.' 'As governor, my opponent voted time and time again for tax increases.’
Comparison both indicts the opponent's position and m akes a corresponding—on the sam e topic—
case for the speaker's position: 'I want a tax cut. but my opponent says you don't need one.* 'As
governor, my opponent voted time and time again for tax increases. As a senator. I consistently
voted no to tax increases and yes to tax cuts.*
Another way to think of this categorization is in terms of self-promotion and opposition. Self-promotional
m essages promote the speaker; oppositional m essages criticize the opponent. Advocacy is self-promotion.
Attack is opposition. Comparison is both self-promotion and opposition.
We stipulated that the self-promotional part and the oppositional part of a comparison daim be on the same
topic.
We also stipulated that the opponent in an oppositional m essag e (attack or advocacy) be another presidential
candidate, his running mate, his relatives or associates, his staff, his party, or a member or members of his
party. We coded criticism of other opponents—for example. Washington in general, business leaders, foreign
politicians—as self-promotion (advocacy).
■

ARGUMENT VS. A S S E R T I O N :

EVIDENCE

We considered any supporting material for each central daim and coded each daim as evidenced or
unevidenced. We coded a central daim as evidenced if it w as accompanied by information that documented,
elaborated, or justified the daim. For example:
evidence that documents: 'As a senator. I consistently voted for tax cuts and against tax
increases. / was one of the architects of the historic Reagan tax cut in the early 1980s."
evidence that elaborates: 'I want a targeted tax c u t I want to give a tax credit to families so
they can send their children to college, so they can buy a first home, and so they can pay medical
expenses."
evidence that justifies: 'I propose expanding the Family and Medical Leave A d to give parents
time off for family functions. Too many parents can't go to their children’s PTA meetings or soccer

games because they can't take off work without fear of losing their jobs."
We stipulated that evidence could not merely restate the daim .
For this analysis, we did not evaluate the truth, suitability, or com pleteness of evidence.
■

NEWS STORY STR U CT U RE
We categorized the frame each TV news story as developed in the first three paragraphs—the primary
structure—as strategy, issue, or other
A strategy frame focuses on the campaign in terms of who's winning and who's losing. Candidate
statements and adions are deem ed important or relevant because of their strategic value: 'The
presidential race tightened today as a new poll shows the incumbent trailing by just 10 points.* ‘Our
campaign focus tonight is whether the Republican em phasis on family values is having the desired
effed.*
An issue frame focuses on the candidate’s positions for what they are—positions: *The president
unveiled a new program to help laid-off workers retrain for new jobs.* “Welfare—everyone agrees
something should be done, but not what should be done. The candidates’ approaches differ
markedly.*
An other frame focuses neither on the strategy of the campaign or the issues of the campaign: T h e
Commission on Presidential D ebates announced the moderator for Sunday’s face-off.*
We assigned strategy primary strudures to stories that began by framing issues as strategy: “Wooing the
Midwestern blue-collar vote, the president today promised tax breaks for depressed industries in and around
Detroit."

215

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

If more than half of the story developed a frame that differed from the primary structure, we coded a secondary
structure: strategy, issue, or other. If not m ore than half of the story developed a different frame, we coded the
secondary structure the sam e as the primary structure.
■

SAMPLING
We coded a sample of each candidate's speech es: the convention acceptance speech, any television
speeches, one randomly selected W ednesday stum p speech from Sept. 1 through the week before Election
Day. and one randomly selected stump speech from the Monday before the election. When no W ednesday
stump speeches were archived for a candidate, we looked to Tuesday, then to Thursday, then to Monday, then
to Friday; if no stump speeches were archived for a candidate in a Monday-Fnday period, we did not code a
speech for the candidate for that week.
We also coded Clinton's and Dole's (1996) Saturday morning radio addresses.
We coded a sample of campaign (not candidate) news aired on ABC World News Tonight. CBS Evening News.
and NBC Nightly News SepL 1 through Election Eve. The stump speech sample determined the news
samples: We sampled all archived TV news campaign stories the nights of sample stump speeches.

Chapter 3
The Annenberg surveys utilized in this study were conducted by telephone with
respondents obtained via random digit dialing. The 1996 national survey, which was
conducted by Chilton Research Service o f Radnor, PA, administered the questionnaire to
only those who claimed to be registered to vote, while the 1998 California survey and the
2000 rolling cross-section (both conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates o f
Washington, DC) interviewed any adult. In all three cases, the adult in the household
with the most recent birthday was chosen as the respondent. Methodological information
on the National Election Studies is available at http://www.umich.edu/~nes. The tables
below list the sample sizes represented in figures and tables. Regression analyses have
slightly lower N ’s because respondents listed as missing on any included variable were
not included.
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Item

,\

Figure 3-1
Figure 3-2

2646
2223 (‘84)
2154 (‘86)
2009 (‘88)
1966 (‘90)
2300 (‘92)
1525 (‘96)
1276 C98)
2482 (‘92)
1532 (‘96)
2827 (IA)
3329 (NH)
4341 (ST)
2646
2203
2233 - 2643

Figure 3-3
Figure 3-4

Table 3-1
Table 3-2
Table 3-3

Chapter 4
This chapter presents data from the 1998 California survey, which was
administered to residents o f the San Francisco Bay Area. Because questions in the
knowledge battery were asked o f subsets o f the California sample, analyses including
knowledge (e.g. Table 4-1) will have lower N 's than those without knowledge as a
variable. Small variations are the result o f missing cases.

Figure 4-1
Figure 4-2
Figure 4-3
Figure 4-4
Figure 4-5
Table 4-1

1581
2033
2026
2013
2015
812
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Chapter 5
Item

Figure 5-1
Figure 5-2
Figure 5-3
Figure 5-4
Figure 5-5
Figure 5-6

1939
1886
1712 (NES)
1902 (ASC)
1929
1929
1924

Chapter 6

Item
Figure 6-1

Figure 6-2
Figure 6-3

Figure 6-4
Figure 6-5
Figure 6-6
Figure 6-7
Table 6-1
Table 6-2

Year Congress
1984
1924
1986
2168
1757
1988
1990
1970
2244
1992
1994
1769
1996
1531
1998
1281
n.a.
607 (W ave 1)
1011 (W ave 2)
1029 (W ave 3)
1023 (W ave 4)
381
2630
2643
2635
2222 - 2646
1370 (NES)
2203 (96 ASC)
1456 (98 ASC)

Figures
n.a.
2158
1752
1969
2244
1770
1347
1267

Candidates
1252
n.a
1479
n.a
1739
n.a
1295
n.a
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Figure 6-8: Knowledge of Figures and C andidate P ositions
(1996 NES)

□ Figures
Percent

■ Candidate Positions

Number Correct

Figure 6-9: Knowledge of C andidate Issu e Positions
(1996 Annenberg Cross-Sections)

0 -5

6-10

11 - 1 5

16-20

21 -25
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Figure 6*10: K now ledge of C andidate F a c ts an d Issu e Positions
(1998 California Study)
40 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------□ Candidate facts
■ Issue positions

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Number Correct

T ab le 6-3: 1996 A n n e n b e rg S u rv ey , Final P o s t-E le c tio n C ro s s S ec tio n :
P e rc e n t A n sw e rin g C orrectly, C a n d id a te I s s u e P o s itio n s
”I am going to read you a list o f campaign issues. For each one, please tell me which
candidate favored it. Who favored (READ ITEM): Clinton, Dole, both candidates, or
neither candidate?”
Percent answering correctly
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

M aking it harder for women to obtain abortions
74.2
The deepest cuts in federal government spending on domestic social programs
68.4
The greatest increase in defense spending
56.0
The greatest reduction in future Medicare spending
58.5
Government vouchers to allow parents the choice o f sending their children to public.
private, or parochial schools
45.2
A Constitutional Amendment to balance the federal budget
43.9
A Constitutional Amendment to allow voluntary prayer in public schools
48.0
The elim ination o f the U.S. Department o f Energy
47.0
The immediate development o f an anti-missile defense system
40.9
Increased federal funding for jo b training programs
77.0
Expanding family leave
80.4
Shifting the greatest amount o f control o f federal programs to the states
57.6
A fifteen percent across the board tax cut
80.3
A ban on cigarette advertising to children
67.8
The elimination o f the Department o f Education
65.8
Permitting late term abortions using the so-called partial birth abortion procedure
when the life or health o f the m other is at stake
65.8
Legalizing same-sex marriages
39.2
NAFTA
21.2
Opposing the death penalty
24.9
Ending the IRS as we know it
49.3
Cleaning up two-thirds o f the toxic waste dumps in the next four years
57.9
Every child being able to read on his or her own by the age o f eight
62.3
Targeted tax cuts
28.7
220
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T able 6-4: N ational E lection S tu d ie s : P e rc e n t A n sw erin g C orrectly Iden tificatio n o f P u b lic F igures, R elative P ia c e m e n t o f C a n d id a te Iss u e
P o sitio n s, C ontrol o f C o n g re s s

Figures:

Figures:
Bush
Dole
O ’Neill
Rhenquist

Figures:
77.3
12.3
56.6
13.5

Candidate
positions:
G ov't services
Guaranteed job
Ctrl. America
Minorities
Women
Defense
Russia

68.7
60.1
57.6
54.9
56.7
72.5
60.2

Defense
Spending
Insurance
Stndrd. Living

Party
control:
51.2
30.4

Figures:
Quayle
Foley
Rhenquist
Yeltsin

House
Senate

33.3
47.9

Figures:
87.8
25.7
8.4
45

Gore
Foley
Rhenquist
Yeltsin

House
Senate

Party
control:
59.4
54

Figures:
80.1
34.6
7.1
46.7

Gore
Gingrich
Rhenquist
Yeltsin

House
Senate

48.8
41.9

Figures:
88.2
58
9.3
64.8

Gore
Gingrich
Rhenquist
Yeltsin

88.9
65.7
10.7
49.8

Candidate
positions:
63.2
64.6
55.7

Party
control:
House
Senate

81
2.3
8.9
4.3
50
15.3
69.3

65.7
58.7
44.2
49.2

Party
control:

Candidate
positions:
Defense
Spending
Guaranteed job

Quayle
Mitchell
Foley
Rhenquist
Thatcher
Mandela
Gorbachev

Candidate
positions:

Party
control:
House
Senate

Figures:
13.9
69.1
38.8
3.5
52.2
36.9
71.2

Wright
E. Kennedy
Schultz
Rhenquist
Thatcher
Arafat
Gorbachev

Abortion
Aid to blacks
Defense
Environment
Regulations
Health care

Party
control:
59.4
51.2

House
Senate

58.1
60.4
48.8
49.1
51.7
64.5

Party
control:
74
66.4

House
Senate

Party
control:
75
71.6

House
Senate

67.4
55.7
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T able 6*5: 1998 A n n e n b erg C alifornia S tudy: P e rc e n t C o rrectly
Identifying C a n d id a te Inform ation a n d Is s u e P o s itio n s
C a n d id a te inform ation:
Which was Attorney General
Which was Lieutenant Governor
Which was member o f Congress

50
54.2
25.1

Issu e P ositions:
Abortion
HMO reform
Indian casinos
School vouchers
CA join tobacco suit
Ban assault weapons
No farming on endangered land

64
5.3
26.7
47.2
2.3
53.4
36.5

The Lexis/Nexis search regarding the estate tax was conducted with the following
syntax: (estate tax OR inheritance tax) AND Congress AND date aft 12/31/99 AND date
bef 7/1/00: the term “AND 675.000” was then added. The search located 727 newspaper
articles during the period, o f which 130 mentioned the 675,000 figure, as did 6 out o f 52
magazine articles and 18 out o f 198 news transcripts.

Chapter 7
The sample sizes in the figures for Chapter 7 are higher than that for Table 7-2
because not all respondents were asked about political discussion. Small variations in
sample sizes on the figures are due to missing cases.

Figure 7-1
Figure 7-2
Table 7-1
Table 7-2
Figure 7-3
Figure 7-4
Figure 7-5
Figure 7-6
Figure 7-7

1677-1711
1673-1710
1641-1702
1448
1703-1710
1706-1711
1691-1706
1703-1709
1707-1713
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Figure 7*3: Uncertainty on
Government Services (1996 NES)

Figure 7 4 : Uncertainty on
Defense Spending (1996 NES)
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Figure 7*5: Uncertainty on
Aid to Blacks (1996 NES)

Figure 7-6: Uncertainty on Abortion
(1996 NES)
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Figure 7-7: Uncertainty on
Environment vs. Jobs (1996 NES)
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